


**MAHARANA BHUPAL
COLLEGE,
UDAIPUR.**

Class No.....

Book No.....

CURRENT PROBLEMS

General Editor:
SIR ERNEST BARKER, LITT.D.



20

COLONIES

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON: BENTLEY HOUSE
NEW YORK TORONTO BOMBAY
CALCUTTA MADRAS: MACMILLAN

All rights reserved

First edition 1944

Reprinted 1944, 1945

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

CONTENTS

Preface *page vii*

Chapter I. COLONIAL EMPIRES IN THEIR WORLD
SETTING *page 1*

The Colonial debate...Colonial empires in terms of space...
Colonial empires in terms of time...The time factor

Chapter II. THE POLICIES OF THE COLONISING
POWERS *page 24*

Moral motives for colonisation...Military motives for colonisation...Economic motives for colonisation...Recent policies.

Chapter III. COLONIAL CONDITIONS *page 62*

The White Man's burden...Colonial peoples...Tropical colonies and plural societies...Ethics...Economics...Politics.

Chapter IV. CONSTITUTIONS, DEVELOPMENT,
AND WELFARE *page 96*

Trusteeship and the Dual Mandate...French policy...Belgian and Dutch policies...British policy...United States policy...U.S.S.R. policy.

Chapter V. THE FUTURE OF THE COLONIES *page 136*

Colonial liberation...External problems...Internal problems...International aspects.

Index *page 163*

PREFACE

THIS book seeks to show the Colonies in their world setting, to give some idea of the variety of colonial societies and conditions of life, to set out the policies of the chief colonising Powers, first, towards other Powers in relation to their empires, and then towards their respective colonial peoples, and lastly to inquire into some of the problems that attend the 'liberation' of colonies.

Since there were fifteen colonising Powers in 1939, it has plainly been impossible to deal here with the empires of all of them in detail. Attention has been focused on the empires and policies of the six leading Powers; that is, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the United States, and the U.S.S.R., and this despite the fact that the three last-named reject the colonial idea. However this may be, the fortunes and prospects of the overseas portions of the dispersed Kingdom of the Netherlands, of the Outlying Territories of the U.S.A., and of the Autonomous Regions and National Areas of the Soviets, have at least as much to teach the world, both by way of example and warning, as have the acknowledged colonies of other Powers.

The term 'coloured' is used in this book in the African fashion to describe the mixed-breed descendants of Europeans and darker-skinned peoples, and

not all peoples of colours other than white. The author also wishes to make it clear, especially to his many African friends, that he uses the word 'natives' to indicate the indigenous inhabitants of a country, and 'tribal' to denote a certain type of society and the ideas that go therewith, with no implication of inferiority. He takes pleasure in the thought that he is himself a native of the British Isles, and has ancestors, not very far back, who were Highland tribesmen.

ERIC A. WALKER

ST JOHN'S COLLEGE

CAMBRIDGE

January 1944

COLONIES

CHAPTER I

COLONIAL EMPIRES IN THEIR WORLD SETTING

THE COLONIAL DEBATE

Colonies have been claiming a steadily increasing share of public attention since the close of the war of 1914-18. Many causes have conspired to this end: discussion of the mandates system and the British form of indirect rule; the widening of the scope of education and social anthropology; the hopes of a vast colonial development that were cherished during the nineteen-twenties, and the growing realisation during the darkening nineteen-thirties that development must be supplemented, perhaps even preceded, by care for colonial welfare; restiveness in some of the colonies and a questioning at home of the very *raison d'être* of colonial empires. From 1939 onwards the popular imagination was stirred, maybe also the public conscience was touched, by tales of the war services of 'the Colonials' of our day under whatever flags they served. The least observant could hardly fail to see something of the value of colonial bases and supplies. The leasing by the United States of bases in many of Great Britain's Atlantic and Caribbean colonies, and the presence in London of the exiled governments of several colonising Powers, stimulated interest in colonial matters.

The final awakening came with reverses at the hands of Japan in Far Eastern waters. The swift disaster that overtook French, British, Dutch and American dependencies, to say nothing of sovereign Siam, startled millions of people who had always taken the present-day colonial empires for granted into the realisation that a day might come when there would be no such empires. Not even a British Empire which so many of them had endowed in their minds with the permanence of a geological formation.

These events did not stand alone. Mussolini's *Imperium Romanum* collapsed; France's overseas empire experienced strange fortunes; the hold which Spain and Portugal maintained upon their colonies was an anxious hold. Nor were the problems thus raised mere distant overseas problems. The Germans brought them home in every sense to Europe, the mother of colonies. Lacking overseas dependencies of their own, and being minded to 'swim in luxury', they set to work to create a colonial empire in Europe and South-Western Russia. These new colonies were to be at the best spheres for the privileged finance and commerce of the Third Reich, at the worst fields to be cleared for settlement by the Aryan *herrenvolk*.

Revealed thus in a time of stress that followed a decade of acute world depression, colonial administrations and economies were assailed by a storm of criticism. So sweeping has been the condemnation that countless decent folk, who know little or nothing of the history of colonial empires, have come to believe that it is an offence against public and

private morals to attempt to govern a colonial empire at all.

This essay is not an apology for colonial empires as such. Least of all is it an apology for the British Colonial Empire. This empire has been the most persistently criticised of all, partly because it is often erroneously identified with nearly all that is shown in red on the map, but chiefly because the British, as becomes a parliamentary-minded people, wash in public such dirty linen as they may have, give few hints of the store of clean or passable linen that lies unseen within doors, and accompany their work with a running commentary in the most widely understood language in the world. The story of the making, governance and development of the British and other colonial empires is inevitably a chequered one, for it is a human story; but there are not a few pages in it which suggest that orderly Western rule has been, and will be for some time to come, the best way out for all concerned in many parts of the world. True, the coming of Western empire-builders has shaken up homes of ancient civilisations other than their own, and warped or destroyed tribal systems in many regions. But those ancient homes had to be shaken up if ever the world was to be made a tolerable place for mankind to live in, and, when all is said and done, tribal life is not all a Paradise Lost. The noble savage in his uncontaminated state knows a vast deal about want, disease, bloodshed, and an all-pervading fear that is unsuspected by Western folk.

None of the existing colonial empires can be sum-

marily dismissed as a Bad Thing. The acquisition of colonies is and always has been the result of making the most, by those who possess them, of political, economic and moral advantages of every kind in an unequal world. Peoples endowed with these things have often gathered dependants round them without any use of force; when they lose them or throw them away they justly forfeit the trust that has thus been placed in them. There would still be colonies in fact even were the name discarded to-morrow. Colonial empires will not cease until the peoples of the earth get on more equal terms with one another in every vital respect.

When Englishmen spoke of 'the Colonies' a generation ago they usually had in mind their own great colonies of settlement, the present-day Dominions. To-day, they mean the Crown colonies or their equivalents in other empires, the protectorates, protected states, mandated territories and condominiums. This is, of course, to use the word 'colony' loosely. Protected states, protectorates, and still more mandated territories and condominiums, are not juridically on the same footing as Crown colonies. Nevertheless all can fairly be classed in one category as colonies. All are ruled more or less directly by imperial authorities, and each of them contains immigrants who, however small their numbers, keep alive the old idea of a colony as an offshoot of a Mother Country. Whatever the future may have in store, the name describes present facts.

Colonial problems cannot be seen in the round, if,

as is so often done, they be ripped out of their context. This context is a world that has been reduced to one-quarter of its former size in a quarter of a century, and has seen the life crushed out of its old conceptions of sovereignty, independence and neutrality. When the nineteenth century died in the Somme wire at the close of 1916, the fastest that men could travel with reasonable safety was at 30 miles an hour along costly and permanent railways or motor roads. To-day they can cruise in a carrier plane at 200 miles an hour in any direction where landing is possible. The Colonies, which have thus been brought physically so close to their Mother Countries by the power of the air, have been brought closer to them in another sense by the tank. This engine of war, which, like the aeroplane, first became serviceable in 1917, the Year of Revolutions, is fast breaking down the barrier that once separated colonies sharply from sovereign states. To-day a handful of Great Powers stand at one extreme of the world's political hierarchy; they alone can prepare for first-class war, though even they perforce get 'somewhat mixed up' with their respective allies when war comes. At the other extreme stand the Colonies. In between are ranged the sovereign states which are not Great Powers, none of whom can hope to wage war nor even maintain its neutrality without the support of a protector. Some of the weaker states of this class are less populous, less stable, and less advanced in every way than many a colony.

The problem of the Colonies thus forms part, and a relatively small part, of the world-wide problem of

the relations of highly developed societies to the so-called backward communities.¹ Unless colonial empires be looked at in this their world setting, there is little hope of forming a just estimate of the progress they have already made, of the work that remains to be done, and of the line that should be taken in the doing of it.

COLONIAL EMPIRES IN TERMS OF SPACE

On the eve of the Axis War in 1939 the European colonising Powers were Great Britain, France, Holland, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Denmark and Norway. The extra-European colonising Powers were Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, the United States and the U.S.S.R.

Reckoned in terms of human beings, as they ought to be, the British, French and Dutch Colonial Empires were by far the largest. Each of them numbered about 70,000,000 inhabitants, the Dutch slightly more, the British somewhat less. The French Empire, including departmental Algeria which for all its assimilation to France is treated in some vital respects as a colony, covered some 4,500,000 square miles of territory. The Dutch West and East Indies, by contrast, covered only 800,000 square miles. The British Colonial Empire is not so easy to define, since it is the rearward portion of an empire which resembles a procession, a large part of which has long since crossed the flood that divides dependence from autonomy, and part is crossing now.

¹ There are less than 300,000,000 colonials in a total world population of well over 2,000,000,000.

The line can best be drawn between those members of the British Empire who have seats on the Imperial Conference, and those who have not. Thus the sovereign states of Eire and the Dominions with the territories that have been transferred or mandated to three of the latter, the Indian Empire, the self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia, and Burma, albeit a doubtful case, must be excluded from the reckoning. So also must be Newfoundland, whose recent surrender of Dominion powers and status is not likely to be of long duration. Thus defined the British Colonial Empire was, in September 1939, scattered over 3,250,000 square miles in all parts of the world. It covered one-quarter of the area of the British Empire and contained 14 per cent of its population.

Of the smaller European colonising Powers, Belgium ruled 13,000,000 subjects in 900,000 square miles of the Congo Basin. Italy possessed the Dodecanese and extensive tracts in North and East Africa. Spain had 1,000,000 colonials in one or two enclaves in North-West Africa and groups of islands off its coasts; Portugal ruled 9,000,000 in her important Atlantic island groups, considerable colonies in West and East Africa, and isolated posts in the Far East. Denmark had long regarded Iceland in Dominion fashion¹ and counted Greenland as her only true colony. Similarly Norway treated Spitzbergen as part of her home territory, and claimed as dependencies only one or two

¹ Iceland became a kingdom, distinct from the Danish Kingdom, in December 1918, an independent regency in May 1941, a republic in June 1944.

whaling islands and bleak stretches of coast in the Antarctic.

Japan possessed the largest empire of all the extra-European colonising Powers. Leaving aside, as is customary, the dependent states that centre upon Manchuria, she had in Formosa, Korea and her mandated islands a colonial empire of 30,000,000 souls. Australia ruled half of New Guinea and some of the adjacent islands, besides a stretch of Antarctic territory. New Zealand ruled Western Samoa and another stretch of the Antarctic. South Africa ruled South-West Africa. Together these dependencies had a population of 1,250,000, the great majority of them in New Guinea. The United States had no acknowledged colonies, since American citizens, recalling that the foundation members of their republic were colonies which had thrown off their allegiance to a king, have an anti-colonial tradition. But, for all that, her Outlying Territories constituted a true colonial empire of some 20,000,000 souls, rather less than the population of Nigeria.

Lastly, the U.S.S.R. The Soviets were carrying forward the peopling of the Steppe and Northern Asia that had been begun by Tsarist Russia. It was a colonising effort comparable in scale to the Teutonic *Völkerwanderung*, the colonisation of the Americas, and the present opening up of China's western provinces. Yet the U.S.S.R. rejects colonialism, for it associates colonies with the economic imperialism that Lenin regarded as one of the manifestations of monopolistic capitalism in its last paroxysms of suffocation beneath the weight

of its own unsaleable products. Nevertheless many parts of the Soviet Union were, and are, colonies in all but name and intention.¹ Inevitably so. A Soviet citizen recently explained to the author that Russian help, guidance and control must be extended to these areas *for the time being*, because their simple inhabitants are so far behind in education, knowledge of the great world, and material development. Altogether a good Russian rendering of the British idea of colonial trusteeship. The difference between the policy of the Soviets and that of the forward-looking Western Powers is one of pace rather than of direction. For this reason alone the extensive and thinly-peopled quasi-colonies of the U.S.S.R. cannot be omitted from a discussion of colonial questions.

One fact stands out from this comparison of the colonial empires in terms of space, and that is the importance of Africa, the second largest of the continents. On the eve of the Axis War the whole of Belgium's overseas possessions, the whole of Italy's except the Dodecanese, and all but a few shreds of Spain's and Portugal's, lay in Africa. The vast bulk of the French Empire was African. Fully 80 per cent of the area of the British Colonial Empire, and 60 per cent

¹ The enfranchisement of their peoples, their representation in the central legislature, and the freedom of their citizens to rise to high office in the Soviet Union, can all be paralleled from recognised colonial empires. Algeria and the Old Colonies of France have long been represented in the Paris Parliament. French citizens of whatever colour rise to high office in their centralised empire. Large numbers of colonial peoples have the vote and rise to high office in their own colonies in the decentralised Dutch, British and American colonial empires.

of its inhabitants, were African, while a further 6 per cent were descended from Africans who had been taken to the West Indies.

COLONIAL EMPIRES IN TERMS OF TIME

A full consideration of colonies in terms of time would call for a survey of more than five hundred crowded years of history. It must be sufficient to say here that the outward movement of Western Europe began almost timidly in the early fifteenth century. It gathered strength in the seventeenth century, as Europe drew ahead of the other continents in the arts of peace and war, and reached its climax some fifty years ago. The broad results of these five centuries of expansion have been the creation of great European settlements in the Americas, Southern Africa and Australasia, and the stirring up of the rest of mankind. It has been a portentous stirring up, a stirring up of All the Russias from the Polish frontier to Vladivostok, of the world of Islam that stretches from Dakar to Sourabaya, of the ancient civilisations of India, Indonesia, China and Japan, and of the tribal communities of tropical Africa and the Pacific islands. Even the Esquimaux and the Patagonians at the ends of the earth, and the Tibetans on the Roof of the World, have not altogether escaped. It has marked a change in the scope and texture of man's life more far-reaching and, in its later stages at all events, incomparably swifter than the spread of successive metals and the war-horse in the ancient world. This expansion of the West, indeed, has signified the coming of the Iron Age and

the war-horse to some outlying peoples, and of the Steel Age to very many more. For the first time in history, one civilisation, Western civilisation, imposed itself simultaneously upon all its fellows: almost completely in the economic sphere, hardly less completely in the political sphere, and markedly though much less thoroughly in the cultural sphere.

Long before this process of expansion had reached its height, the European Powers had lost their political and, to a high degree, their economic dominance over the most advanced of their colonies, the colonies most like themselves. Then, at the very moment when the expansion reached its utmost limits, they and the United States, their principal offshoot overseas, began to loose their hold on the homes of ancient civilisations other than their own. To-day, the forces which led to this relaxation of authority are visibly at work in other parts of their dependent empires.

Look at the bare bones of the story. By the mid-eighteenth century Great Britain had possessed herself of most of Royal France's overseas empire; but between 1775 and 1825 she first, and then Spain and Portugal, had seen almost all their mainland American territories become independent republics. During the next half-century most of the British colonies of settlement, the only important European colonies of their kind with the doubtful exception of French Algeria, had achieved internal self-government, while the United States, steadily absorbing her territories, had gone far to free herself from industrial and financial dependence on the Old World. Yet one more half-

century and the British Dominions, some of them enlarged by the addition of new self-governing provinces and each informed by a national spirit of its own, had acquired powers and status indistinguishable from those of sovereign states. They too were achieving something of the economic independence that had long been the boast of the kindred United States, now potentially the strongest single community in the world. Some of these Dominions, like the United States, had even built up colonial empires of their own.

The growing weight of the Western peoples of the outer world had been apparent long before the crisis of the Great War. Then, in 1917, the growing weight of India, the greatest of all dependencies, became apparent likewise. India was accorded forthwith an international status comparable with that of the Dominions at that time, and began to acquire stage by stage the powers which had elsewhere preceded the achievement of Dominion status.

The rapid advance of India was only one sign that a much greater revolution was in train than that which was altering the balance between Europe and her offshoots overseas. The West itself was coming out of Asia and the Moslem world as a ruling force. This was bound to happen as soon as the civilised millions of those ancient lands had been endowed with stable governments, and had learned enough of the peaceful and warlike arts of the West to enable them to stand on their own feet against the pressure of the West.

The promise that Asiatics would, humanly speaking, be able to do so one day had been given as far back as

1835. The British, who were then in process of unifying India politically and economically as never before in her long and troubled history, opened the flood-gates to a torrent of Western science and English literature, much of it of a highly explosive kind. Then, within the decade, the British effected an entry into China for themselves and other 'foreign devils', and let loose there forces that were most unsettling to the Celestial Empire, but in the long run fruitful. A few years later the Americans performed a like office for Japan. This time the results were startling. Within half a century Japan had westernised herself in material things, had won a place for herself as a Power by abolishing extra-territorial privileges in her growing empire and concluding an alliance with Great Britain, and, finally, had defeated corrupt and overstrained Russia. Hard on the heels of these resounding events came the withdrawal of the bulk of the British China Squadron, the Morley-Minto reforms which set India on the road that leads to parliamentary government, reforms of a liberal character in Netherlands India, and the proclamation of the Chinese Republic. Defeated Russia, for her part, embarked in fumbling fashion upon that campaign of modernisation, which, under the stimulus of the Bolshevik Revolution, was to give birth to the U.S.S.R.

Asia, the home of so great a proportion of the human race, has been 'on the march' with a vengeance since the close of the Great War. Japan, a rising industrial Power, set out to bring South-Eastern Asia and Indonesia within her exclusive Co-prosperity Sphere.

China, in spite of civil war and Japanese invasion, secured fiscal autonomy as far as the Western Powers were concerned, pushed on with industrialisation, and began to shake herself free from extra-territorial limitations. India, industrialising herself at a far more rapid rate than China, advanced on an uneven front towards self-government and saw opening up before her the prospect of independence after the Axis War. Ceylon and Burma made near approaches to self-government. The American-protected Philippines were given a high degree of autonomy and the promise of independence, if they desired it, within a given time. Indonesia has now been promised powers and status equal to those of Holland herself when the Axis War shall be ended. So it has gone. The recent expulsion of European and American Powers from so many of their Asiatic dependencies has been merely a violent hastening of the retreat of the West from Asia; for though the Japanese will doubtless be driven out, who can believe that all will be there as it was before the invasion?

The withdrawal of the West from the world of Islam has been more gradual. The signal for the political awakening of the Moslems was sounded prematurely, first in Mehemet Ali's Egypt and then in Midhat Pasha's Turkey. It was sounded again by the teutophile Young Turks shortly before the Great War; but it was the shock of that war and of the peace which followed it that called forth an effective response. Since then Kemalist Turkey has made great strides towards westernisation, autarky, and a central position

among the Moslem states. Persia has roused herself from beneath the bough. Afghanistan, a kingdom now and no mere amirate, has won freedom from the control over her external policy which the Government of India had so long exercised. Egypt and Iraq, once British protected states, have become independent monarchies and members of the League bound only by defensive treaties with Great Britain. Mandated Syria and the Lebanon have long been moving in halting fashion towards a similar relationship with France, while mandated Palestine only needs a settlement between her Arabs and Zionists to achieve autonomy. Nor have the nationalists of Libya and Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco been silent. In the background the growing influence of the Wahabi, guardians of the Holy Places, gives warning that the fires of Arabia are not dead.

War experiences cannot fail to have affected profoundly such of the Moslem lands as are still dependencies. The ideas, especially the political ideas, that are taken for granted by the British, Dominion, Indian, Colonial and American soldiers who have served in North Africa and the Levant will live on in the minds of France's subjects in those parts. These peoples will not forget that France was overrun and her colonies left to shift for themselves. They are as fully aware that they now have no cause to fear the Nazis and Fascists as were American colonists, on the morrow of the Seven Years War, that they had nothing more to fear from the Bourbons. This does not mean that France's Moslem colonies will go their own way as the Old

Thirteen did then; it does surely mean that France must give her Moslem subjects greater freedom of action than any she has hitherto been willing to contemplate.

War has also changed the political atmosphere in the Caribbean and tropical African colonies of many of the Powers. However distant it may have been from the theatres of operations colony after colony has been forced back on its own resources. Even before the Axis War there were politically minded groups in most of them inspired by ambitions similar to those of their Moslem and Asiatic counterparts. These men are now interpreting the liberal war-cries of the United Nations in their own way. They do not talk so much as do these others of an independence that is visibly losing the meaning it once had, but, with the sense of reality and humour which characterise so many folk of African stock, ask rather for fuller control of their own local affairs. Meanwhile they look for reinforcements to returning colonial soldiers and war-workers, who will expect something of the enfranchisement which the horny-handed Athenian oarsmen won after Salamis, or the women of the United Kingdom won for their sex by their services during the Great War.

The day may come when there will be no colonies as the world knows them now. Marxists indeed claim, with an assurance rivalling that of their Manchester predecessors, that a world which accepted their teachings would be a world needing no colonies. It may be so, but there is no ground yet for this assertion outside the realm of dialectical materialism. On the

contrary. The policy of the U.S.S.R., the one great state that has thus far made any approach to communism, tells against the belief. Possessed of a vast and imperfectly developed territory, the Soviets have had less temptation than others to indulge in colonial adventure; but they have been swift to act when strategic necessity, one of the most compelling of colonising motives, has dictated. They have even expressed mild surprise that Western democracies should have refrained from acting under analogous circumstances.¹ Be that as it may, it is a far cry to a communist world while the Soviets themselves are still confessedly only in the preliminary socialist stage. It is safe to assume that there will be colonies for a long time to come, and communities which are virtually dependencies of more powerful neighbours still longer.

It may be that, though the Western Powers are relaxing their political control, Powers which belong to other civilisations may seek to build up colonial empires. Japan has already tried to do so on the grand scale; the U.S.S.R. may one day essay a similar venture, though it will not speak of colonies; China has a long record of successful colonisation and may decide to add another chapter to it one day. It may even be that the day of Western colonial empire is not ending after all. If the powerful imperialist groups in the United States set out to make the next few decades 'America's century', mankind must expect a display of empire building on the 'lick creation' scale to which the great

¹ Wendell Willkie, *One World*, p. 69.

republic has accustomed it in other spheres. On the other hand, American tradition and a great weight of opinion are opposed to seeing the United States thus outdo the annexationist European Powers of the late nineteenth century. If these forces prevail, American imperialism will resemble rather that of the mid-Victorian Britain into whose shoes the United States has stepped in so many respects; that is, economic and cultural penetration combined with reluctance to assume political responsibility for the results.

THE TIME FACTOR

On the whole, present indications are that the withdrawal of Western rule, as distinct from guidance and protection, will go on. Meanwhile consideration of the time factor may take some of the sting out of a reproach that is often levelled at the colonising Powers. Why, it is asked, have these great and rich peoples not done more for their colonies during all their long years of rule? Part of the answer is that the length of this rule is apt to be grossly overestimated. The Powers acquired the mass of their dependencies only during the past sixty years. Part of the answer again is that most of the older colonies have known long periods of prosperity at one time or another, and that some of them are beginning to recover it. Many of the newer colonies were prosperous up to the eve of the Axis War, as far as any community could prosper in a disjointed world, and some have gained an unexpected prosperity from the war itself. The restiveness of the politically minded of the colonial peoples is the

best proof that their colonies have, like restive India, been advancing all along the line. Revolutions are never started by the down-and-outs, but by those who are experiencing better things than their fathers knew and see the prospect of still better things for themselves and their children. It is only right to remember, moreover, that Western governments have had to build almost from the foundations in tribal areas, and have had to clear away an intolerable deal of debris in the homes of ancient alien civilisations before they could begin to build, and then pick their way amid poverty, dirt, disease, corruption, age-old memories of despotic rule, and elaborate conservative traditions buttressed often by religious sanctions. In most parts, too, their officials have worked in the difficult, dangerous and debilitating tropics, and have seen their efforts hampered by two world wars and an unexampled economic depression. The wonder is not that so little has been done in the time, but that so much has been done by so few.

The real answer to the critics is still one of time. Just as it takes time to break in a countryside, so it takes time to root immigrant institutions or adapt local institutions to new conditions. How long has it taken to make of Great Britain south of the Highland Line the tidy, worked-over, lived-in land we know and so many of our allies have recently been discovering? How long will it take to tame completely much of what lies between the Atlantic Ocean and the Mississippi? Similarly it may be encouraging to those who demand self-government, or perhaps independence, for colo-

nial peoples here and now to reflect that democratic self-government was the work of generations in Great Britain, and of long years in the United States and the Dominions with all their British traditions behind them. Even so, British tropical colonies are experimenting with adult suffrage. Those again who are eager to see the development of colonial secondary industries may take heart of grace from the thought that the Industrial Revolution only invaded Japan and Russia within the memories of men still living; that it first got a firm hold in India and the Dominions during the Great War, and has still far to go before it becomes a decisive force in China and the most developed of the Latin American republics. Meanwhile, secondary industry is taking shape in Indonesia and Malaya, West Africa and some of the Caribbean colonies.

Finally, those whose chief interest lies in the extension of social services need not despair. After all, a broad-based system of public secondary education is a matter of the last forty years in Great Britain and is still far from complete; few of the British social security services are more than a third of a century old, and the Beveridge Report shows how greatly they need to be extended. Even as things are, the social services of Great Britain and some of the Dominions are far ahead of those of the wealthy United States and Canada, where a generous philanthropy has to struggle against strongly individualistic frontier traditions and the complications of federal institutions. And, again, these services have made great strides of recent years in more one colonial empire.

All this is not to say (Heaven forbid) that the development of self-government, secondary industry and social services in the Colonies should take as long as did their creation in the Mother Countries. Nor is it an excuse for past shortcomings. But it is a claim that colonial problems shall be seen in their proper setting and perspective.

Given reform in the more politically powerful and industrially developed parts of the world, there is every hope that the Colonies, and those sovereign states also which are really colonial areas, may attain to much of what they desire. There may be a time-lag against them since reform in head and members must begin with the head—or is it with the heart? But precedent suggests that the time-lag need not be of long duration. It was not long in the British Empire a hundred years ago. The Young Tory reforms of the eighteen-twenties preceded, and the Whig reforms of the thirties coincided with, slave emancipation and the gradual abandonment of convict transportation, Macaulay's Indian programme and the evolution of colonial responsible government. Events moved more quickly, and over an even wider field, during the early years of the twentieth century when the peoples of Europe, Russia and North America turned away from distant adventure and began to set their own houses in order. It was then that the Netherlands launched 'an admirable 'ethical policy' in Indonesia; that the Germans, after a Reichstag election fought mainly on the colonial issue, instituted effective and too little recognised reforms in their African and Pacific colonies; that the

Belgian Parliament took over the unhappy Congo Free State from Leopold II and his financial colleagues; that France began to pare the talons of the concessionaires in her Congo territories, and Lyautey began his great task of administration in Morocco; that Lugard worked out his system of indirect rule in Nigeria, and the new Portuguese Republic at least foreshadowed reform in Angola and Mozambique. Nor let it be forgotten that emergency reforms at home during the nineteen-thirties were accompanied by the beginnings of a spring-cleaning in several of the colonial empires. It is this spring-cleaning which promises to become thorough and general under the stimulus of revolutionary war.

Of course, no mere colonial spring-cleaning can hope for permanent success unless it forms part of a world-wide overhaul. But, setting aside the needs of the six-sevenths of the peoples of the earth who are not colonials, the problem of the Colonies will be formidable enough. Colonies call for all the help and guidance that can be given them, and not merely the backward colonies, but still more perhaps those that have enjoyed a hectic wartime prosperity. Colonies which have been full of troops and money from overseas may heel over on their beam-ends when the captains and contractors depart; colonies, whose staple products have been in high demand, may have to reorganise their whole economic lives because wartime substitutes can satisfy the peace-time needs of the industrialised nations.

The test of the quality of the colonising peoples, and of such peoples as are prepared to work with them,

will be whether or no this help will be given at the end of a long and exhausting war. The temptation for each people will be to concentrate on reconstruction at home, to use every effort to raise or, at the very least, maintain the domestic standard of living, to do nothing that may encourage industrial competitors overseas. If this temptation prevails, mankind will soon find itself rushing down a steep place for the third time in one generation. It need not prevail, if men will consult their experience, let alone their consciences. Expenditure of energy and money abroad has often stimulated rather than retarded a similar expenditure at home. The Christian Church has never been so live and effective at home as when it has been pushing its missions to the ends of the earth; the vigorous Britain of the nineteenth century found that the export of men and capital to distant parts, whether inside the empire or not, gave her the means to develop her own internal economy.

The expansive and wasteful days of Victorian *laissez-faire* are gone beyond recall; but the Christian doctrine that inspired *laissez-faire* still stands: a rejection of the Duchess's maxim, 'The more there is of mine, the less there is of your's', the affirmation of the truth that other folks' welfare leads in the long run to our own. It is as true of the world now, as it was of the fast-growing Jacobean London and the half-populated England of wise Sir Thomas Roe's day, that 'it is no good state of a body to have a fat head and lean members'.¹

¹ W. Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, II, 313.

CHAPTER II

THE POLICIES OF THE COLONISING POWERS

The colonising movement of the Powers of Western Europe, which has revolutionised so much of the world during the past five centuries, was set going by one revolution in Europe itself and vastly stimulated by another nearly four hundred years later. The royal and middle class revolution of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, which culminated in the Reformation, expressed itself overseas in the creation of the Spanish and Portuguese colonial empires. Moreover, by unseating the Mediaeval Church, the new monarchies, Catholic and Protestant, went far to destroy the idea that sovereign states were amenable to moral sanctions in this world as well as in the next, and, by blasting away the decaying feudal system, discredited the idea that the enjoyment of property and privilege was dependent on the performance of public duties. It was in the amoral atmosphere thus engendered that sovereign states henceforward practised against one another at home, and the more energetic of their subjects competed in the colonisable world. Then, towards the close of the eighteenth century, came the Industrial Revolution, the work of the same explosive middle class, to increase out of all knowledge the power of Western men, and those who could learn

from them, to bear down opposition, conquer space, and annihilate time.

Those, however, who see in the colonial empires of the present day the results of systematic planning by acquisitive imperialists over-simplify history. Long-term planning there has been, most markedly by France and Japan; but most of the colonising Powers for most of the time, and all of them for part of the time, worked haphazard as Rome did before them. The most that can be said of all of them is that they set themselves to acquire key-points on the world's trade and war routes. They advanced from these centres as interest dictated and opportunity served.

Spain and Portugal can boast of colonies that go back to the fifteenth century. Most of the European colonising Powers can point to colonies that date from the seventeenth century, and the British and French to still others which they took, usually in rivalry with one another, during the sixty years after Waterloo when they alone had the power and inclination to acquire overseas responsibilities. The great masses of the present-day colonial empires, however, represent the work of the two last generations.

It is outside the scope of this essay to show how the Powers acquired their colonies. It must be sufficient to say that many were planted in vacant or very sparsely peopled lands; some were secured by treaty, either at the instance of the native ruler or of the incoming Power; some were annexed at the request of their inhabitants; some were won by downright invasion; some were taken over from the original colonising

Power. Of these last, to take British examples alone, Jamaica, Trinidad and Ceylon were prizes of war; Malacca, the Dutch Gold Coast stations and Albreda, on the Gambia were the fruits of exchange; the Danish Gold Coast stations were bought; Bombay came to the English Crown in the dowry of a Portuguese princess.

Nor is it possible to examine here in detail the motives that have led men to emigrate. Since, however, these motives indicate something of the pressure that has induced governments to acquire colonies, this much must be said. The most persistent driving force has been the desire to better one's condition. So potent a force has this been that Europeans in the early days, and Asiatics and Africans later on, have been willing to earn a passage to a new land by entering into indenture. Always the quickest means of assembling a population, though not the surest of keeping it, has been to report the presence of gold or precious stones. Ambition to become a landowner has drawn many overseas, from the days when the practically stationary population of Great Britain was 'planting' Ireland, North America and the West Indies simultaneously, to those immediately following the Great War when ex-officers led 'a last foray of aristocracy' into the Kenya Highlands. Religion, and more especially religion mixed with politics, has sent settlers out in swarms: English Puritans and Royalists in turn, French Huguenots, German Moravians and Mennonites, German Liberals after the failures of 1848-49, American Mormons, and Zionists in our own day, most of them peoples with the Exodus in their souls.

seeking a Promised Land. Many folk have gone at all times to join friends; sailors have jumped their ships; soldiers have deserted or taken their discharge overseas; all sorts and conditions have gone to get away from home or the police, or out of sheer curiosity to see what lies beyond the dockhead. Thousands upon thousands have gone because they were sent: Negro slaves, political prisoners, and plain criminals. Some few relatively, moved by the missionary spirit, have gone to minister to such as these or to the native peoples. Many an official, having served his colony, has decided to end his days there.

The questions that have to be considered here, however, are why governments acquire colonies for emigrants to go to, and how far each has sought to maintain its colonies for the benefit of the metropolitan people, or the colonial peoples, or third parties.

The origins of now famous towns suggest some of the answers to the first of these two questions. New York and Batavia were Dutch trading factories. Montreal was a French mission station. Detroit was a fort guarding a French colonial frontier, and Pittsburg (Fort Duquesne) another. Winnipeg was a fur traders' stockade. Capetown began as a Dutch chartered company's vegetable garden, Durban as a haunt of ivory hunters, Johannesburg as a gold-mining camp, Sydney as a 'receptacle' for convicts and the poor of the parish. Many West African towns were once slave-trading depôts; but Freetown was a philanthropic settlement for liberated slaves which became,

by a poetic justice, the base from which a British squadron hunted down the slavers of all nations.

MORAL MOTIVES FOR COLONISATION

The motives thus indicated and many more can be grouped under three heads: the moral, the military, and the economic. Moral motives for colonisation are three in number: desire for prestige, belief in a civilising mission, and a sense of decency. These are spiritual matters, like the assurance of salvation, the awareness of nationality, or faith in communism. How far a colonising people is moved by these considerations depends upon the vigour with which they have been taught to believe them. This vigour has varied from time to time and from class to class; but there is no doubt that many of those who have directed or taken part in the colonising effort have been moved by them.

The argument from prestige goes back to the beginning, even before Machiavelli had begun to teach the political value of reputation. If Spain and Portugal had colonies, it behoved other Powers to have colonies also. So it has been throughout. It has ministered to the pride of nationalists to know that their flag flies, that their language is spoken, that their influence is predominant in distant parts of the world. Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany felt the spur, for how could a Power be really great in Europe unless it was great also in the outer world? Defeat in war, the loss of her colonies, and the assertion by the victorious Allies and Associated Powers that this deprivation was due, *inter*

alia, to her dereliction of duty as a colonising Power, redoubled Republican Germany's determination to have a colonial empire again some day. Hitler's Germany demanded the restoration of the lost colonies if only to re-establish the national prestige. Other Have-not Powers were not behindhand.

Belief in a civilising mission also goes back to the beginning. Pious onlookers, viewing the arrival of the first African slaves in Henry the Navigator's Portugal, 'reflected with great pleasure upon the salvation of those souls that before were lost'.¹ Presently Columbus was uplifted to think that the Caribs of the newly discovered West Indies would easily be made Christians, and the Portuguese found their way to the East Indies in search of Christians as well as of spices. The idea persisted, and for two hundred years thereafter crowned heads and chartered companies gave the propagation of the Gospel a high place in their list of motives for desiring colonies or commercial spheres. Then, during the nineteenth century, philanthropists and missionaries not only advocated settlement by picked and duly controlled Europeans as one means of imparting Western civilisation to tribal peoples, but often called for annexation to restrain unattached white men from showing the natives the worst side of that civilisation, and to give them the chance of showing its best side.

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century the civilising mission came to the front once more as an official motive for colonisation. The French and

¹ E. Prestage, *The Portuguese Pioneers*, p. 72.

Americans proclaimed their respective missions in word and deed, the British in deed rather than in word as their manner is, the Germans more in word than in deed for lack of opportunity. Nevertheless, Imperial Germany could point with justifiable pride to her scientific achievements and the technical education of the natives in her few colonies. Republican Germany recalled these things and hoped that she might be given a share in the civilising mission of the West. Was not the burden, she suggested, too heavy for France and Great Britain alone?

There has been a vast deal of humbug in the business down the centuries; the Cross has often been used as cover for disreputable doings and designs. But when all is said a mass of sound achievement remains to the credit of those who have believed, as Gregory the Great believed long ago, that the best thing the West could offer to other parts of the world, perhaps the only thing which could justify its domination of Darkest England or Darkest Africa, was its essentially Christian civilisation.¹

The last of the moral motives for the acquisition of colonies has been a sense of decency. Those who condemn the Scramble for tropical Africa and the Pacific islands as noxious imperialism should ask themselves what the alternative was. It was certain that these tribal areas were going to be invaded somehow.

¹ The great Marshal Lyautey used to say that the doctor was the sole justification for Western colonisation. May it not be that a still better justification has been the medical missionary, the St Luke of our day?

Nay, they were already being invaded. No government or combination of governments could draw effective sanitary cordons round a continent or the islands of the sea, even if there had still been room in the world for the museum societies that would thus have resulted. Nor could any self-respecting government pass by on the other side while some of its citizens, not always the pick of their race and nation, went in armed with all the resources of civilisation to work their will in primitive lands. Experience had shown that, in such a situation, this will would too often be a wicked will. There was nothing for it but to extend rule, either directly or indirectly through chartered companies, over all concerned. This some governments did, often enough at the request of the native peoples themselves. By so doing they at least held out to the natives of those parts the hope that they might one day learn to stand on their own feet.

MILITARY MOTIVES FOR COLONISATION

Military motives, the second main group of motives for colonisation, also fall under three heads. These are, first, the acquisition of bases or strategic frontiers; secondly, increase of the empire's man-power; thirdly, provision of materials essential to the waging of war.

The political map of the world reveals the persistent desire of colonising Powers for bases. Some vital centres, like Gibraltar and Malta, have been fortresses *sans phrase* from the first. Many more were trading posts which became military centres, since trade and war never lie far apart. The coasts of Africa are studded

with such strongholds of an earlier day: Goree, Cape Coast Castle, Elmina, Capetown, Mozambique, Mombasa. The Portuguese Indian Empire centred upon the fortress of Goa; that of the Dutch on Batavia and Malacca. The British again, after the long French wars, retained St Lucia for the sake of its harbour, and Ceylon mainly for its naval base of Trincomalee; they kept Malta and, for a time, Corfu to secure their Mediterranean route to the East, and the Cape and Mauritius to guard the long ocean route thither. Presently they founded Singapore to hold the straits that open out upon the Far East. Similarly, nineteenth-century France took Tahiti, New Caledonia, Obok, and Mayotte, that 'little Gibraltar' in the Mozambique channel, at least as much for naval as for commercial or cultural ends; since then France has sacrificed the trade of Bizerta to the exigencies of the services. Germany frankly had naval bases in view when she secured part of Samoa and bid high for Portuguese Timor, and so had the United States when she acquired Puerto Rico, Hawaii and the remainder of the Samoan group. Japan has shown to what end she desired mandated Pacific islands. The United States again, conscious of the meaning of air-power, has made haste to secure bases in the Caribbean and Western Atlantic. The end of this Roosevelt Saga is not yet.

Power has often been extended far beyond the starting-point either to secure lines of communication and strategic frontiers, or to protect existing interests and the peace of peoples already under Western rule. The advance of the French down the Niger and into

nd Morocco, and the British advance from Coast Colony into warlike Ashanti, were cases but the classic example which combined all was the Anglo-Egyptian conquest of the Other considerable territories have been for less obviously strategic reasons. The founded Virginia, and Georgia also a full later, partly at least as checks upon Spain. ians went to Turkish Libya well knowing that no Garden of Eden', but a good jumping-off for further gains. Nor were Germany's colonies lacking in similar possibilities and ons.

e strength in which colonial bases have been oned in time of peace has depended upon the ry tradition of the Power concerned, the impor- of the base, and the imminence of danger. In of war the proverbial corporal's guard may suffice old a fortress base for a while, or even a base that erely defended by shore batteries provided com- d of the sea be retained and the base be backed by endly and secure hinterland. If either or both of se safeguards be lacking, the defended base demands nsiderable forces for its security. To-day, isolated es which cannot be given adequate air support are t to be liabilities rather than assets. Colonies as distinct from bases may indeed be ilitary assets, but they are always liabilities. They ust be policed and, if they have strategic frontiers, ese must be defended. Both tasks may be difficult, specially where local conditions decree that colonial

forces shall be trained and equipped on lines so different from those of the metropolitan army that the two forces cannot readily co-operate. Again, honour demands that even militarily unprofitable colonies shall be defended, for colonial peoples are dependent peoples who have had no voice in the policy that has issued in war. Nay, more, as the Greeks well knew and the British know to-day, the sure prospect of such help must be held out in time of peace, and given in time of war, to 'colonies' that are no longer under the control of the Mother Country, maybe for the defence of strategically vital ports, certainly for old times' sake and the defence of common ideals and ways of life.

Colonial armies, other than that of Japan, were organised separately from the home armies before the Axis War. They varied greatly in size and composition. Japan and Italy maintained large garrisons in their colonies. The French also kept on foot a large combined force of Europeans and Africans in their North and West African dependencies. By contrast the United States overseas forces were very small, consisting chiefly of marines; the Dutch troops in the outlying portions of their Kingdom were not much more numerous; the Belgian and Portuguese garrisons in Africa were almost nominal; the garrisons in all the scattered British colonies amounted only to some 35,000 men. The Dutch regiments in Indonesia, however, were backed by the bulk of the light but efficient Dutch navy, while behind the British garrisons east of Suez stood the excellent Indian Army, one-fourth

British, which had seen service in many parts of Asia and Africa and, on occasion, in Europe itself.

Increase of the national man-power was not absent from the minds of colonising governments in the early mercantilist days, though then the chief expectation was that, since colonies meant trade and shipping, they would mean a plentiful supply of seamen rather than of soldiers. The man-power argument did not appeal to the British of Victorian days, for they took it almost for granted that their colonies of settlement would fall away sooner or later. But the argument returned with redoubled force with the revival of mercantilism in the late nineteenth century. Colonies appeared to statesmen of the Europe of the Armed Peace as possible additions to their countries' military strength. With means of communication improving yearly, continental warlords might hope to keep a real hold on their colonial *Ausländer*. Generally speaking, overseas settlers of Powers that had long enforced conscription at home have been held to military service overseas; but thus far their numbers have been too small to make them an important source of recruitment. There is irony in the fact that Great Britain, of all European Powers the most averse from conscription, and the only colonising Power that has given colonies independence within the Commonwealth, should have been the one Power to receive copious help time and again from kinsfolk overseas.

Colonising Powers have relied on colonies as recruiting grounds for native soldiers in varying degrees. The Americans trained a few battalions of

more or less westernised Filipinos; the Dutch brought the strength of their Indonesian army up to a couple of divisions by means of locally raised troops; the British were content to maintain small but notable regular colonial forces in the West Indies and West and East Africa, and to raise good volunteer regiments in some of their Mediterranean, Asiatic and Pacific colonies. For the rest, these three Powers, and Belgium also, pursued the Wilsonian policy of not attempting to militarise their colonial peoples. Had they done so, they might have fared better at the hands of Japan in 1942. Germany, on the other hand, enrolled considerable numbers of askaris who served her well in East Africa during the war of 1914-18, and Italy raised even larger African forces later on. France carried the policy of arming her colonials far further than any of her rivals; indeed, she is the only Power that has placed the value of colonies as recruiting grounds high in her list of motives for acquiring colonies. And this for a compelling reason. Overborne by German numbers in 1870-71, Republican France resolved to make of herself 'a nation of 100,000,000' by calling in North Africans and Senegalese to supplement her own stationary fighting population. She even saw to it that the B mandates, which forbade the recruiting of native troops for service beyond the borders, should be suitably modified in her case, though in the event she never took advantage of the concession. Meanwhile she raised large African forces for service in her colonies, and drew more than one-tenth of her metropolitan army from this source.

The last of the military motives for the acquisition of colonies is the desire to control sources of material essential for the waging of war. European Powers in the early days sought first for gold and silver, the sinews of war whose finding had caused Spain to be envied of all her rivals. Next, they sought silks and jewels, spices and other tropical products, costly and compact commodities suited to the holds of their little ships and readily convertible into cash. But even in those cramped days they were eager to have their own sources of the bulky and less expensive goods for which they must otherwise depend on hard bargaining and the favour of neighbours in time of peace, and might see cut off altogether in time of war. Once more this inducement faded during the mid-nineteenth century when comparatively free trade prevailed, and once more it gained strength during the fiercely competitive age that followed.

The value of colonies as sources of war supplies is apt to be greatly exaggerated. It is doubtful whether the combined production of all the world's colonies could have met even the peace-time needs of one of the great Have-not Powers. Colonies are in especial poor furnishers of staple foodstuffs; these come in overwhelming volume from sovereign states. On the other hand, colonies are the chief providers of certain essential raw materials. Ninety per cent of the world's rubber came in 1939 from Malaya and Indonesia; the former was approached as a supplier of tin only by Nigeria, the latter produced a great flow of mineral oil and had a virtual monopoly of quinine. The Japanese

monopoly of Formosan camphor had forced many would-be consumers to fall back on substitutes; the loss of the vegetable oils of West Africa would have been a disaster for the United Nations during the Axis War; French North Africa is rich in iron and phosphates. But the supply to the Mother Countries of all these things depends on command of the sea. If that be lost, the more vigorously the 'colonial estate' has been worked, the richer the prize to the enemy.

ECONOMIC MOTIVES FOR COLONISATION

At this point the military motives for colonisation shade off into the third main group of motives, the purely economic. These fall under two heads. First, the relief of social maladjustments at home and the creation of markets overseas by the export of surplus population, and, in less anxious times, the provision of openings, official or other, in the Colonies. Secondly, the acquisition of sure sources of raw materials, favourable markets, and secure fields for investment.

Colonisation as an outlet for redundant population made no appeal to Spain, Portugal and Holland in their great days, and this for the best of all reasons. The two Iberian Powers strained their modest human resources by their colonising efforts, and Holland only escaped a like fate by recruiting her soldiers, sailors and settlers from half Europe. Eighteenth-century France was thickly peopled as things went in those days and her social system was certainly maladjusted; but, then as ever, Frenchmen were loth to leave *la douce pays de France* for good. But the British have tried the remedy

more than once, as the Greeks had often done long before. One of the great arguments for colonisation in late Elizabethan and early Stuart times was the need to relieve social pressure at home. It was no coincidence that the Elizabethan Poor Law and the foundation of Ulster and Virginia belonged to the same decade. The British tried it again after the Napoleonic Wars, and found that they need do no more than direct, in some measure, the flood of emigrants that poured out from the United Kingdom to mingle with the flood from continental Europe.

The idea of finding colonial outlets for surplus population played an important part in the Scramble of the late nineteenth century. German colonials argued, as against Bismarck's continental school, that Germans must have colonies under their own flag in which to settle. They and the French looked for such colonies even in Black Africa. Nor were they singular in this. The vision of 'more homes' in the highlands of tropical Africa has haunted, and still haunts, the imagination of many European and some South and East African enthusiasts. Stiffening of immigration laws after the war of 1914-18 by nearly all the governments of a harassed world, and above all the virtual closing to newcomers of the once hospitable United States, drove peoples who felt themselves crowded at home to look around for colonies of settlement at all costs. Italians hoped to find in Africa some relief from the pressure of the peasantry on their own poor land. On the eve of the Axis War Poles could demand colonies if only to accommodate the three million Jews whose presence was no longer desired in their republic.

settle, and the still scantier population of the adjacent Northern Territories, Australia's mainland colony, bear witness to this fact.

Latterly the immigration policies of the Powers have been directed towards Africa. The Portuguese have never settled far from the coasts or the river banks. Belgian policy and the Congo forests have combined to limit substantial European settlement to the capital near the coast and the Katanga copper mines far up-country. France has encouraged her citizens to settle in North Africa, principally in assimilated Algeria; but she has not favoured settlement in West or Equatorial Africa, nor in Madagascar where Europeans are confined more or less to the coastal towns while the Malagasies occupy the healthy highlands. The British Government also discountenances settlement in its West African colonies, and has never encouraged it in any of its Central and East African colonies other than the Kenya Highlands. The British South Africa Company promoted the settlement of the Southern Rhodesian plateau, where its work has been carried on since 1923 by the Rhodesian Government, and along the hogsback of Northern Rhodesia which carries the copper mines and the railway to the Congo. Fascist Italy lavished help on her settlers in Libya and made great preparations for Italian settlement on the Abyssinian highlands where most of the Abyssinians dwell, but—*Dis aliter visum*. Prior to 1914 the Germans had proved themselves effective colonists of the rancher type in South-West Africa, and of the plantation type in Tanganyika and the Cameroons; moreover, between

the wars, they recovered most of their old estates in such of these territories as had passed under British mandate. Meanwhile, the Dutch have made no attempt worth speaking of to attract European settlers to Indonesia.

The upshot of it all was that, in 1939, there were about 1,000,000 Europeans, in the widest meaning of that elastic term, in the tropical and sub-tropical colonies in all parts of the world, say about one-fifth of the present annual increase of the population of India. Of these perhaps half were in tropical Africa.

The truth is that the only considerable emigration to colonial areas for a long time past has been Asiatic. Small Indian trading settlements on the East Coast of Africa are of long standing. Then, for nearly a hundred years from 1837 onwards, Indian indentured labourers went to the British, French and Dutch sugar colonies. They were followed by traders and, later, by free labourers. To-day there are some 2,500,000 Indians living abroad in East Africa, South Africa, Ceylon, Malaya, Burma, Fiji, Mauritius, and Caribbean colonies, a high proportion of them colonial born. For some years past, again, the Dutch have been organising a migration of 100,000 Javanese annually to sparsely peopled Celebes and Sumatra:

The Japanese, though multiplying fast at home, have shown comparatively little readiness to migrate to the outlying parts of their scattered empire, or even to the northern parts of their own islands. There are only 750,000 Japanese in Formosa and Korea after many years of occupation, and these are nearly all

townsmen; the only Japanese subjects who have gone on the land in any numbers in Manchuria are Koreans. On the other hand, Japanese have gone readily enough to foreign colonies and sovereign states within certain familiar latitudes, notably to Indonesia, the Philippines, Hawaii and other Pacific islands. By contrast the tough, expansive and highly adaptable Chinese have far outstripped Indians, Indonesians and Japanese as colonisers. The peasants of Northern China dug themselves into Manchuria during the quarter of a century that passed between the expulsion of the Russians and the coming of the Japanese; both then and since the Southern Chinese have flocked into Indo-China, Indonesia, Malaya and independent Siam. There were fully 4,000,000 of them in these territories in 1939. Even so they amounted to less than one per cent of China's mighty population.

The desire to have colonies as providers of official and technical employment is a specialised form of the general problem of emigration, but it has been and is a very real desire. Colonies have long been regarded as safety-valves for the energies of the younger sons and daughters, especially of the upper and middle classes, a fact which goes far to explain why these classes in every nation have been the stoutest advocates of imperial adventure. The policies of the governments concerned have varied greatly. The Latin Powers, Japan, and Germany in times past have tended to keep up large official staffs and to recruit a high proportion of them from home. Belgium, as usual, has pursued a middle course, while Holland, the United States and

Great Britain have been content with a minimum number of officials and have relied as far as possible on local recruitment.

It is hard to draw fair comparisons between these different policies, because distances, densities of population, social conditions and physical environments enforce wide variations; nevertheless it is significant that, whereas, on the eve of the Axis War, nearly 900 French officials were deemed necessary for the 3,500,000 inhabitants of French Equatorial Africa, and some 2400 Belgians for the 13,000,000 of the Congo, little more than 1300 British in all official and technical grades sufficed for the 20,000,000 of Nigeria, the home of Indirect Rule. French officials again were numerous in Indo-China; but there were only 860 British officials in complicated Malaya as against 27,000 others, for the most part Indians and Chinese. The Dutch, for their part, employed 21,000 officials of European status to guide the 70,000,000 inhabitants of Indonesia; but very many of them were Dutchmen born in the East or half-caste Indos, while the Americans, who had held 30 per cent of the official posts in the Philippines in 1913, held little more than a hundred posts thirty years later, and these for the most part in the schools. For the rest, European staffs had been considerably reduced in the Congo and Indonesia during the great depression of the nineteen-thirties and the gaps filled permanently by local men, while the outward flow of officials from France had dwindled markedly. The replacement of British officials by Colonials had proceeded steadily, till in 1939 there were fewer than 6000 officials drawn

from the United Kingdom or the Dominions among the 250,000 government employees ranging from Governor to office boy in the sixty territories of the British Colonial Empire.

It can thus no longer be said, at all events of the liberal Western Powers, that a colonial empire constitutes 'a vast system of outdoor relief for the upper classes'. Nevertheless, it is just because the inhabitants of the Mother Country and her colonies together enjoy a virtual monopoly of official posts, and a favoured entry into other employment, that peoples who do not rule colonies feel themselves worsted.

The comparative failure of modern colonies to provide outlets for emigrants, official or other, combined with the virtual impossibility of deciding whether a given colony, or even a whole colonial empire, pays in the narrow financial sense, suggest that colonies may have to be looked upon as liabilities rather than assets. This is an opinion that was entertained by most Victorian Englishmen, and is entertained to-day by some of their descendants and by very many United States citizens; but it is an opinion that is not shared by most men of our generation. These agree that, if every consideration be taken into account, colonial empire is an advantage to the Mother Country. Imperial ambitions have always sprung from this belief; colonising peoples have always hoped that their empires would pay, and most of them have tried, each in its own way, to see that they should pay.

In the old mercantilist days colonies were intended to minister to the strength and prosperity of the

empire. Generally speaking they were to furnish raw materials to the Mother Country and take her manufactures; the customs dues collected on this imperial trade were to swell the royal or republican and colonial revenues. But colonies were also regarded as profitable fields for investment. Every seventeenth- and eighteenth-century European government prized its Caribbean colonies, and the British their southern mainland colonies also, as model colonies, which not only supplied tropical goods and had no hope of competing with home industries, but stood in constant need of loans for development and gave employment to the great capital sunk in the slave trade. The British and French fought hard in the West Indies again and again, partly to deny to each other valuable supplies and naval bases, but largely also to derange each other's finances.

During the *laissez-faire* period that set in gradually after Waterloo the British threw mercantilism overboard. All the world was hungry for British goods, British money, and British shipping and other services. The British were, therefore, well pleased to trade and invest everywhere without being burdened with the cares of colonial defence and administration, except where spasmodic competition with the French drove them into reluctant annexations. These conditions of comparatively free world trade and opportunity, however, passed away and with them the unique position Great Britain had enjoyed in Victorian days. One by one the more or less nationalist governments of Europe and North America first, and then of more distant parts of the world, sought to pass out of the

'colonial' stage by varying the economy, and thus enriching the social life, of their peoples. The Industrial Revolution had gone upon its travels from the British home of its birth, and government after government sought to develop secondary industries vigorously. In the process they brought forward all the old mercantilist arguments for colonial empire, and all the old mercantilist machinery including even the chartered company. Industrialists, masters and men alike, demanded sure sources of raw materials and favoured markets for their products. They demanded them the more insistently when they found that their very protectionist armour hampered them in the race with the free trading British and Dutch. Their shipowners, and the naval authorities behind them, called for subsidies; their investors looked round for fields of investment, preferably under the national flag. Had not the British, with the French hanging back at the last minute, gone into Egypt in 1882 partly at least to ensure the service of the Egyptian debt for the benefit of the cosmopolitan body of shareholders?

During the ensuing Scramble for colonies much territory was taken by this Power or that to forestall rivals. This was true especially of the British, whose government made many of its vast acquisitions in Africa and the Pacific tardily, and as a rule under pressure of the 'men on the spot', to prevent those territories from falling into the hands of commercially exclusive rivals. Into the hands of France above all; for the Third Republic had avowed frankly that it could not remain a first-class Power unless it had an

overseas empire from which it could draw the resources necessary to that end, regardless of what anyone else might be permitted to draw from it. On the other hand, Great Britain's policy in the Far East, and that of the United States also, was to maintain the Open Door in China and the integrity of the moribund Manchu Empire in face of the attempts of Russia, Germany, France, Italy and Japan to cut it up into exclusive spheres of economic influence.

For neo-mercantilism had waxed aggressive, and this for good reason. As the number of the industrialised Powers increased and the closing of their home and colonial markets against foreigners became more and more rigid, so their activities in the 'pre-capitalist' parts of the world became more widespread. They by no means neglected trade, but they gave more thought to the placing of loans. This they, or rather their investors, did with little expectation that these loans would ever be repaid, as so many of them have been repaid in the event;¹ but they did it in the knowledge that the borrowers were eager to have the money and in the hope that interest would be forthcoming for a time at least, as from mining shares and other perishing assets. It is easy to exaggerate the volume of these loans to colonies; the vast bulk went, as ever, to sovereign states. But since experience had already shown that sovereign states had a way of scaling down

¹ The United States repatriated masses of her external debt during the Great War. India and some of the Dominions have done likewise during the Axis War. These facts suggest that colonies and sovereign 'colonial areas' which borrow need not look forward to a state of permanent indebtedness.

their debts or even of bilking their creditors completely, the impulse to acquire colonies grew stronger. There was more likelihood that interest would be paid if financial obligation was accompanied by political control.

The war of 1914-18 was not, however, so exclusively a struggle for colonies in the widest sense as Hobson had foretold it would be,¹ and Lenin, Hobson's pupil in colonial matters, insisted that it was. To argue thus is to lose sight of the determination of Germany's enemies not to be destroyed or, at the least, reduced to the level of clients of the Kaiser, and their very human resolve not to allow German *kultur* to be rammed down their throats. But, these things apart, it was the general war that had been averted almost miraculously during the nineteenth-century Scramble. Germany projected a *Mitteuropa* from Antwerp to Basra with its 'home farm' covering most of tropical Africa. Japan tried to gain a stranglehold on China as soon as her European rivals were thoroughly engaged. Italy cherished vain hopes of dominion in Africa and Asia Minor. France and Great Britain fought to hold what they had, and found more added unto them in the shape of mandated territories. Nor did all of the British Dominions go empty-handed away. The United States, surveying the scene from her lofty tariff battlements, concluded that she had wedged open many doors in what was to have been a peaceful and co-operative world.

¹ J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism* (1902). This book, together with the experiences of the South African War, ended the short era of British jingoistic imperialism.

RECENT POLICIES

The post-war world was destined to run upon lines quite other than those projected by the peacemakers of Versailles. How could it do otherwise? The peace treaties were not on the whole unjust within the limits marked out by their authors, but those limits were fatally narrow. The peacemakers indeed tried to reinforce their politics with ethics, but they left economics out of account. In the names of self-determination and national sovereignty they either created or recognised a multiplicity of small new states, which naturally began to behave like the older and larger states. Autarky swept into the ascendant from Washington to Tokyo by way of Paris, Berlin and Moscow, until, after the Wall Street crash of 1929, even the British and Dutch began to relax their hold on free trade principles. Then planning inspired by the example of Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany became the order of the day, and planning included industrialisation. Heavy industrialisation above all, for with war drawing daily nearer each state must try to equip itself for the waging or, at least, the avoidance of it. Hence governments, big and little, and those who stood behind them, pressed more and more fiercely for access to the markets and control of the raw materials on which industrialisation depended.

Colonial empires were dragged into the forefront of this world conflict in a manner that was quite unwarranted by their present or probable future importance. Colonial peoples constituted less than 15 per

cent of the world's population and their trade a mere 12 per cent of the world's trade; nevertheless this share of the world's trade was sufficiently valuable to tempt hard-pressed colonising Powers to carry out self-regarding policies, and to move the Have-not Powers to envy them their power of so doing.¹

The trade of the British colonies represented one-third of the world's colonial trade, followed in order of magnitude by that of the French, the Dutch, the American, and the Japanese colonies. It was not enough for most of the colonising governments that many forces tended to canalise trade between this independent state and that, and, *a fortiori*, between colonies and the Mother Country. Such were common or allied currencies, weights, and measures; common official and business languages; the debtor-creditor relationship, long-standing commercial connections, and, in the case of colonies, personal and national ties of all sorts. As the trade and finances of the world drifted towards deadlock these considerations were outweighed by fear of the competition of economically more successful Powers, especially of Powers that were transforming trade into a bloodless war. Once a leading Power had taken that line, the pressure on others to follow proved to be irresistible.

There were many ways of carrying out this restrictive policy. It could be done by levying preferential import or export duties, by discrimination in the

¹ The author is greatly beholden in this section to *The Colonial Problem*, the work of a Study Group of members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs:

indeed had been the policy of Imperial Germany before 1914. The policies of the rest were more or less exclusive.

Memories of the great days of Free Trade, consciousness of colonial trusteeship, and her still powerful coal and shipping interests inclined Great Britain to continue her traditional Open Door colonial policy. She had indeed little inducement to do otherwise, since she was the one great European Power that was seriously dependent on external food supplies and, together with her colonial empire, was markedly deficient in such vital products as mineral oil, potash, timber, textile materials and non-ferrous metals. Nevertheless, between 1931 and 1934, she adopted a protective policy for herself and restricted the trade of foreigners with some of her colonies.

These so-called Ottawa restrictions have been made far too much of, and by no peoples more than those who have always followed a thoroughly restrictive policy themselves. Indeed the sight of the soot-encrusted pots crying out in wrath because the British kettle had smudged itself in places would have been comic had it not been dangerous. As a matter of fact the Ottawa agreements and the anti-Japanese quotas together give colonial favours to little more than 3 per cent of Great Britain's total annual exports. Sixty per cent of her colonial peoples live in Open Door areas,¹ either in the West African colonies which are covered by many most-favoured-nation treaties, or in vast regions of tropical Africa in which preferential

¹ Modified by anti-Japanese quotas.

tariffs were forbidden long ago by the Congo Basin treaties and, later on, by the B mandates, or in A mandated territories in the Levant to which Great Britain has voluntarily extended this self-denying ordinance. Only two discriminatory export duties, those on Nigerian and Malayan tin, were in force in 1939. So little does access to raw materials depend on political control in an even partially free-trading empire that the United States, and not Great Britain, was far and away Malaya's biggest customer, and had also engrossed much of the trade of the British West Indies.

True to her *laissez-faire* principles Great Britain relied on private investors for far more than half of the capital equipment of her colonies. Foreign capital was welcome everywhere, except for the exploitation of petroleum in certain Caribbean, African and Pacific dependencies, or for the working of the mandated Nauru phosphates which was monopolised jointly by the British, Australian and New Zealand Governments. Meanwhile British shipping, on which the life of the empire depended, was left to fight a hard battle against subsidised competitors in many parts of the world, and a losing battle against the highly organised shipping of Japan in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans. True, British tramps were given occasional subsidies to encourage replacement during the nineteen-thirties, but it was only in 1939 that British shipping generally was offered state assistance at all comparable with that which had long been enjoyed by most of its rivals. For by this time the storm signals were flying, and even the most internationally minded

of Free Traders must have recalled how Adam Smith, the Father of Free Trade, had defended the Navigation Acts, those bulwarks of the Royal Navy, on the ground that defence was more important than opulence.

Since about 1870 the Netherlands had pursued a *laissez-faire* policy as frankly as Great Britain, with like results to herself, her colonies and the rest of the world. She had spent government money more freely, in Indonesia particularly, but that was the only difference. Latterly the Dutch had begun to modify this policy in Indonesia. The bulk of the capital sunk there had come from private Dutch sources, but a great deal of British and American money had also been invested. Then Japanese capital began to flow in wholesale, accompanied by irresistible commercial competition which drove down Holland's share of exports to Indonesia from one-third to a mere 12 per cent in the course of thirty years. Hence the Dutch set up anti-Japanese quotas, not to favour their own exporters so much as to protect Indonesian industries and preserve the balance of Indonesian payments in keeping with their idea that Indonesian interests must be paramount. The Batavian authorities were also empowered to require importers to use Dutch ships, though they rarely, if ever, exercised this right. In short, on the eve of the Axis War, Dutch policy was one of free trade tempered by the resolve that there should be no 'preponderance of foreign interests', Japanese or other, in the outlying portions of their kingdom. The fiscal policy of Belgium ranked next in liberality after those of Great Britain and the Netherlands, for

she was bound by international treaty and mandate to abstain from levying differential duties in the Congo and adjacent Ruanda-Urundi. Nevertheless Belgium found means to engross more than half of the total trade of both territories in spite of the fact that great sums of British and other foreign money had been invested there. Her government expended comparatively little on state ventures, but it held large blocks of shares in the leading transport, palm-oil producing, mining, and stock-breeding companies which have always been such a feature of the Europeanised Congo. It was also deeply interested in the principal shipping line that served the Congo, and subsidised it duly.

Little need be said of the policies of the minor Latin Powers. All these Powers disclaimed the very idea of an exclusive policy, and all pursued such a policy as far as they could. Portugal applied the anti-discrimination clauses of the Congo Basin treaties only to the colonies she had acquired since 1885, and exchanged high preferences with her colonies wherever she was free to do so. She also protected her shipping vigorously against that of all comers, save only Great Britain, her ancient ally and protector and the provider of much of the capital she needed for colonial development. Spain took the same general line, though she taught her colonies to look to her for money, received no preference from her island possessions, and grudgingly kept the Open Door in Spanish Morocco in terms of the international treaty of Algeciras (1906). Italy demanded high favours for herself in Libya and Eritrea, but nevertheless collected full foreign rates of

duty on all colonial goods except the quota that was given free entry at her own ports. She too protected her shipping and, for the rest, spent much public money in Africa, often with excellent results from the material point of view.

France, the great Latin colonising Power, had sought to create a closed colonial empire since the days of Louis XIV and Colbert. Latterly she had pursued a policy of *mise en valeur*, a systematic campaign to make her overseas empire as valuable as possible to herself, on the plea that only so could she discharge her duties of defending and civilising it.

North Africa, the most valuable part of the empire to France, held a special place in this régime. Morocco was bound to keep the Open Door by the treaty of Algéciras; on the other hand, Algeria, apart from its Saharan hinterland, received high preferential treatment as a member of the French customs union, and Tunisia treatment only less favourable. But neither Algeria nor Tunisia was on an equal commercial footing with France herself. Algerian and, still more, Tunisian wines were handicapped in competition with French wines; much of their wheat must fend for itself in the world market; many other Tunisian products were limited by quota on seeking entry into the metropolitan market.

The old 'assimilated' colonies in the Caribbean Sea and Indian Ocean fared much as did Algeria, for they too were members of the French customs union. The newer colonies were not so fortunate. Their tariffs were framed on the compelling advice of the Minister

for the Colonies. Colonies that gave a preference to French and Algerian goods could send certain of their raw materials free of duty to France or Algeria and pay minimum duty on the rest. Those that gave no preference had to forego the right of free entry for any of their products. Even so, colonial goods received these favours only if their goods came in ships flying the Tricolour; indeed France took power to herself in 1934 to reserve the carriage of all French colonial produce to French ships. She by no means enforced this Navigation Ordinance fully, but she did subsidise her merchant shipping so heavily that it was able to monopolise the traffic between France and Algeria, and receive an indirect subsidy from the latter by charging high freights. For the rest the French Government spent much public money on colonial communications, harbours and capitals, but failed to persuade French investors to risk much of their savings in France's colonies.

The extra-European colonising Powers were, in general, no more liberal than the Latin Powers. Japan included Formosa and Korea within her tariff wall, and dominated the rest of her empire economically. Though she was the one great Asiatic Power that was dependent in large measure on external supplies of food and other essential raw materials, she desired colonies as markets for her own manufactures and relied upon buying all she needed elsewhere. She, therefore, pushed her trade and fostered her shipping by every means in her power. That power was great and growing. Japan integrated her finance, industry,

commerce and shipping as closely as did the Goring interests in Nazi Germany, and, since she entrusted control of the whole machine to a few great families, displayed it to her rivals as a feudal system of state socialism in plutocratic guise.

The policies of the United States and the three British Dominions that held C mandates resembled one another in the main. The United States brought her Outlying Territories within the sweep of her tariff, subsidised American shipping lavishly, and claimed the right, hitherto imperfectly exercised, of including all her dependencies within the jealously reserved sphere of her coastal shipping. Australia, New Zealand and South Africa ruled their respective mandated territories as integral parts of themselves, and applied to them their own customs and transport regulations. South Africa, moreover, constituted herself South-West Africa's sole money market, and Australia extended her 'White Australia' policy to black New Guinea by refusing entry to the yellow races. The policy of the U.S.S.R. in its quasi-colonial areas was indistinguishable from that in other parts of its vast and carefully protected territory.

The outcome of all these colonial policies as the nineteen-thirties drew to their terrifying close was that investment was still free on the whole. *Pecunia non olet*; colonies, in common with other backward countries, needed all the capital equipment they could get. There were, however, signs that governments were increasingly prepared to take a direct share in colonial development and to keep undertakings

deemed vital in war-time in the hands of their own nationals; to this extent, therefore, the field open to cosmopolitan investment promised to shrink. Colonial currencies, again, were being dragged daily nearer to deadlock in the wake of their metropolitan currencies, a source of especial complaint to the great Have-not Powers, who argued that they must have colonies in which their own peculiar currencies and trading methods might have free play. For all that, Germany drove a thriving trade with the British Empire right up to the outbreak of the Axis War. Nor was Germany singular in this.

The real danger points were markets and access to raw materials. The United States and Japan both had a near-monopoly of their respective colonial trades; Japan engrossed an even greater share of the trade of her mandated territories in both directions. Italy, Belgium and France were taking anything from two-thirds to three-quarters of their colonies' exports. In return France sent her colonies two-thirds of their imports, including more than one-third of her total export of manufactured articles. Italy sent her empire some 60 per cent of its requirements, and Belgium nearly 50 per cent. Great Britain, on the other hand, sent her colonies only one-third of their imports and received a quarter of their exports in return. British colonies, however, had a considerable trade with other members of the empire. The comparable figures for the Netherlands were about one-fifth and one-seventh. Meanwhile France, Belgium and Great Britain received less in proportion from their mandated territories than

from their colonies proper. France and Great Britain also sent them less. Belgium, on the contrary, sent more to Ruanda-Urundi, which could be reached least inconveniently through the Belgian Congo.

Thus it was, as the nineteen-thirties wore on, that small and undoubtedly pacific peoples who had no colonies complained that they were at a disadvantage, and Poles could demand that their country be compensated for its inability to take part in the nineteenth-century Scramble by being given the colonies without which it could not be a strong economic unit. Then, Japan first, next Italy, and finally Germany, flung their swords into the scales. The great Have-not Powers were impelled to act thus by the familiar colonising motives: economic needs, military necessities, desire for prestige, and consciousness of civilising missions. Only the sense of responsibility towards weaker peoples, the sense of decency, would seem to have been lacking.

CHAPTER III

COLONIAL CONDITIONS

Speaking generally colonial problems are crude manifestations of the problems that face more highly articulated societies. Everything in the Colonies is less blanketed by use and wont and sheer numbers than at home; social and economic cleavages are often literally marked out in black and white; it is easier there to see the wires being pulled and to trace the ends of them to the pullers. Moreover, processes, especially economic processes, that move slowly and on an uneven front at home move faster overseas. They show at a glance what is happening.

THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN

Colonial problems have, however, complications of their own. There is, first, the often insufficiently realised problem of size. Indonesia covers an area four times that of Germany. Superimposed on the map of Europe this island group would reach from Lisbon to Baku and from Oslo to Rome, or, in North American terms, right across the Dominion of Canada at its widest. The solid block of French dependencies that stretches from the Mediterranean to the Congo is very much larger than the United States or the continent of Australia. The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan is about one-quarter the size of Europe west of the Urals.

Nigeria is four times, Mozambique and Indo-China are each fully three times, the size of the United Kingdom. On the other hand, some colonies are small enough. Gibraltar (and how much it is) covers less than two square miles.

A more serious problem than that of mere size is that of inaccessibility. New Guinea, one of the largest islands in the world, is swampy at the coast and mountainous in the interior, and so densely covered with vegetation that one hour's flight over it represents a month's toilsome and pestilential journey on foot. Air transport alone has made possible the working of its up-country alluvial goldfields. Large parts of Malaya, Indonesia, Borneo and the Philippines are still matted with jungle.

Consider Africa which resumed its pre-Suez Canal rôle of a gigantic obstacle between the West and Asia during much of the Axis War. This unbroken land mass of 11,530,000 square miles, 5000 miles from north to south and 4500 from east to west, has a coastline shorter by 3500 miles than has Europe, one-quarter of its size. It has few good natural harbours. Its rivers, other than the Nile and some stretches of the Niger-Benue and the Congo, are useless for serious navigation, for they are blocked low downstream by rapids and often also by sand-bars at the mouth. In spite of much railway building during the past fifty years and, latterly, great developments in motor roads vast tracts of Africa are still accessible by land only along narrow bush-paths. Africa is the most dependent of all the continents, except perhaps Australia,

on man-made means of communication; in none is aerial transport likely to work a greater revolution.

Africa is not only hard to get round by sea or across by land; it is not easy to get into. Its Mediterranean coast-belt, westward of the fruitful Nile Delta which is mainly the work of man through the ages, consists of fairly cultivable lands interspersed with desert. It is backed for most of the way by what the gazetteers kindly call 'poor steppe land', and in its last western reaches by high mountains. Behind these lies the Sahara desert, an effective barrier to penetration from the north.

Black Africa south of the Sahara is in little better case. Whatever flag flies over this part or that of the West Coast facing the Gulf of Guinea there is the same belt of mangrove swamp broken occasionally by beaches and backed by a narrow strip of savannah. Then, for anything from fifty to a hundred miles inland, stretch dense forest and thick undergrowth covering the hills and running far up the mountain slopes. Farther south a more hospitable coast flanks the fine estuary of the Congo, but behind lies the forest again denser and more extensive than ever. Thereafter the coast-belt deteriorates into sheer desert and so continues to within a hundred miles or so of Capetown. Behind the narrow, fertile coast-belt of the Union rise ridge after ridge of mountains, till, from Natal northwards, this coast-belt broadens out into a hot, malarious plain which runs all up the East Coast to the borders of Somaliland. Only when he has traversed these forest, desert or disease-stricken tracts

and, in many parts, climbed the mountains behind them, does the traveller come out upon the scrub or grasslands of the south-west corner of the inland plateau or, elsewhere, its rolling hills covered with high grass and low trees, too many of them equipped with thorns, among which the track seems always to be going up or down and round corners. Islands of high ground, towering up occasionally into splendid snow-capped mountain peaks, break this monotony in which a stranger may easily be lost utterly.

Inaccessibility again is one of the marks of the Caribbean colonies. The three Guianas, Dutch, British and French, all have the familiar hot, wooded, swampy coast-belt. Inland the country lifts itself up into hills and even mountains, tree clad in some parts and in others covered with grass; but to reach this pleasanter region the would-be settler must cross high boulder-strewn wastes. Out to sea lie the West Indian Islands green as emeralds, lovely from a distance but less attractive at close hand; for here are the same low-lying coast lands and, in behind, either dry country where the rain-making hills are lacking, or fertile but inaccessible slopes where the ground rises into forest-clad mountain peaks.

There are, of course, many delightful parts in these colonial empires for Europeans to dwell in. There are favoured spots in temperate North Africa and the Levant where the Mediterranean is strong enough to conquer the desert; life can be pleasant in many parts of the tropics during certain seasons or for some hours each day; many of the Pacific colonies are island

Paradises. But, taking them all round, the Colonies are trying places for white folk. A rough measure of the strain of life in a given colony is the frequency of home leave which government officers stationed there receive.

Damp heat, dry heat—this seems to be the choice in most parts of the present-day colonial empires at most times of the year. Rainfall varies greatly even within fairly restricted areas. Western Malaya is rain-sodden, eastern Malaya much drier; rainfall is deficient in some stretches of the African West Coast and excessive in others. Tornadoes sweep down at the beginning and end of the West Coast rainy season, and the short dry season brings little relief; for then the hot Harmattan blows down from the Sahara and leaves men more exhausted than ever. The Caribbean colonies again present all the climatic trials of the tropics. In spite of the sea-breezes that struggle with the heat, the climate is enervating. The dry periods are broken by torrential rains; from time to time the islands are scourged by hurricanes or shaken by earthquakes. By contrast with tropical colonies the world round, the bleak, windswept Falkland Islands have a certain attractiveness. At least the tough Scottish sheep-farmers of these southern Hebrides do not sweat as they sit.

Meanwhile the world is an unhealthy place if left to itself; the battle against disease is only now beginning to turn decisively in man's favour in the most advanced communities. The tropics are much less healthy than the temperate zones for *homo sapiens* in all his variations.

They are especially unhealthy for white folk. Transfer thither spells for them a violent change of life. It is not merely, as in the temperate colonies of settlement, a new life under other stars; it is life in utterly strange surroundings, where everything is fiercer and more excessive than at home; where the brightly coloured birds screech and squawk and chatter but rarely sing, a thing depressing to Europeans and especially to Englishmen. Increasing dietetic knowledge has indeed done much to ensure a greater measure of health and comfort in the debilitating tropics, but no knowledge can make local foodstuffs in many parts other than monotonous and unsatisfying, so that the tin-opener is a godsend to those who can afford to wield it. Drains, where these exist, and advances in tropical medicine have robbed the tropics of many of their terrors. 'If ordinary precautions are taken the risk of contracting malarial fever can be much reduced', even on the African West Coast, once the White Man's Grave.¹ But only so, and there is warning also for the luckier folk who live at the other tropical extreme on the East African highlands. Here elevation gives a coolness, especially at night, which counteracts in great degree the heat that goes with the latitude. Nevertheless the rarefied atmosphere, the actinic rays of a midday sun in which even mad dogs and English-

¹ *Colonial Office List*, 1936, pp. 302, 412, 455. 'Ordinary precautions' means, above all, quinine. Quinine came into use during the eighteen-fifties. It made possible the French expansion inland from Senegal, and the discovery of the lake and river systems of tropical Africa by Livingstone and others which led up to the Scramble for Africa.

men walk at their peril, and distance from the kindly sea beyond whose reach the sea-faring peoples who have founded these colonies have not yet learned to be happy, are 'apt to produce nervous strain, even though physical fitness is maintained'.¹ It is no wonder that, whether in the highlands or the lowlands, the sun-downer is even more of an institution in the tropics than is the quick one at the local or the pre-prandial sherry at the club in more equable climes.

Finally man in the tropics has to wage an unremitting struggle against hostile forms of life. His most persistent foes, however, are not the wild beasts that carry off men and cattle, nor the heavy-weights that trample the crops and the buck that nibble them, nor the snakes that haunt every trail, nor the leeches that fasten on him in the bush. His most implacable foes are the insects. These constitute the true white man's burden. Humanity is fighting a heavy battle against them everywhere and, in some parts of the tropics, it is a losing battle. Swept out of one area, the tsetse fly migrates to another and, by killing the cattle, closes whole countrysides to the pastoralists who alone could use them, and forces travellers to fall back on the devastating system of head-porterage. Insects ravage fields and orchards. Black ants invade the dishes in the larder; red ants bite the diners; white ants bore out the very table legs if they be given time and opportunity; at bedtime there is the 'ping' of the mosquito.

The domain of Beelzebub, Lord of Flies, extends far beyond the bounds of his native Ekron. His is the mightiest colonial empire of them all.

¹ *Colonial Office List*, 1936, p. 462.

COLONIAL PEOPLES

What now of the colonial peoples? There are two outstanding facts about the populations of most of the colonies. First, the European element is very small. Europeans constitute one in twenty of the population of the British Caribbean colonies, and one in 150 in thinly-peopled British Central and East Africa from Southern Rhodesia at one end of the line to the Kenya Highlands at the other. They amount perhaps to one in 250 in Malaya and Indonesia, and to one in 600 in the Belgian Congo. In British and French West and Equatorial Africa the disproportion is three or four times as great as in the Congo. Secondly, colonial populations are usually highly varied. Apart from its Europeans, Ceylon has half-caste Burghers, Sinhalese, and Tamils from Southern India. Fiji has its own Melanesian Fijians, many types of Polynesians, Chinese, and the Indians who form two-fifths of its total population. Indonesia has its Indos (Eurasians), 1,500,000 'non-indigenous Asiatics', which means the persistent Chinese for the most part, and a swarming variety of 'indigenous Asiatics' who range downwards from highly cultured Javanese to head-hunters. Three distinct races are crowded into Java, besides mixed Malayan groups along its coasts; elsewhere the peoples and tribes show strains in varying proportions of Polynesian, Melanesian and Black Australian blood. Fully two hundred languages are spoken in an archipelago which can show cultural differences greater than any in Europe.

Somewhat similar conditions prevail in Malaya,

where the Eurasians and native Malaysians are heavily outnumbered by immigrant Chinese and Indians. In the Philippines 90 per cent of the people are of Malay blood; but they represent twenty tribal strains, some of them much mixed with Spanish and Chinese. Aboriginal Negritos lurk in the wild interior of some of the larger islands; Chinese are numerous, and of recent years Japanese have been settling in considerable numbers.

Travelling westward from Asia the plurality of colonial society steadily loses its rigidity. This is still marked, however, in East Africa. Take Kenya as an example. Here are half-castes, Indians, Goans, Arabs, warlike blood- and milk-drinking Hamitic pastoralists, and peaceful vegetarian Bantu agricultural tribesmen. The population is still varied in West Africa. There are Negroes in the coastal and forest belts, a considerable number of them Christian, pagan Negroes farther inland, and behind these again Moslem Hausa ruled by Fulani emirs on the steppe land that fades away into the Sahara. The rivalry between Christianity and Islam constitutes a bar to unity; but, apart from this and the presence of handfuls of Europeans and Syrian traders on the coast, society is African and, to this extent, potentially homogeneous. The advance towards homogeneity is still more marked in the sugar colonies of the Caribbean and Indian Ocean as far as the long-established Europeans, mixed breeds and Negroes are concerned. All these groups belong essentially to Western civilisation. Plurality is introduced here by 'East Indians', who are numerous in Jamaica and the

Windwards, and form more than one-third of the population of Trinidad, fully half that of British Guiana,¹ and two-thirds that of Mauritius.

TROPICAL COLONIES AND PLURAL SOCIETIES

Constituted thus, and set in such physical surroundings, the Colonies tend to conform to one broad type. There is much local variety, but they are with few exceptions so-called tropical plantation colonies, or, as they are sometimes called without any sinister connotation, colonies of exploitation.

It is easy to draw too sharp a distinction between the colony of this type and the temperate farm colony, the colony of settlement. Nevertheless the differences are real, and it is these differences that account for the markedly different fortunes of the two classes. The material strength of the colony of settlement has lain in the fact that, blessed with a temperate climate, the family has been the social unit. The chance of bettering one's condition has bred hope. Population has, therefore, tended to increase fast. Immigrants have had to do their own work; the division of labour has been considerable from the first and has led to varied production and thus to exchange. The spiritual strength of the colony has lain in the fact that it has soon become 'home' to the newcomers, though a very real attachment to the Old Country as 'Home' may long persist and, as with the Greeks of old, survive even the severance of political ties. Such colonies have tended to become homogeneous societies with a national

¹ The proportion in Dutch Guiana is almost as high.

spirit and culture of their own; they have always moved fast towards parity with the Mother Country in financial and industrial equipment, and towards formal or, at the least, virtual political independence.

The clue to the comparatively slow advance of tropical colonies does not lie so much in the fact that they are tropical as in the mixed character of their populations. This radical weakness is not necessarily a matter of colour, though that may enter in. Some mixed societies are homogeneous enough because their various racial groups belong to the same civilisation and have the same fundamental ideas, regardless of pigmentation or the shape of the nose. But this happy situation is still rare. Colonial society as a rule consists of a number of more or less self-conscious groups, often marked off from one another by distinctive colours, which try to live their separate lives within a single political framework. In short, colonial societies tend to be plural.

Once more it is a matter of degree. Most political societies show signs of plurality; many which have no colour problems present the spectacle of 'nations warring in the bosom of a single state', and more are like to do so as rival national enthusiasms are stirred by popular education and political propaganda. These things are reminders that the formula, 'One nation, one state', has rarely been fully applicable outside of North-Western Europe and some of its colonies of settlement. This truth, which is penetrating even the mists of the north temperate zone, stands out in all its crude colours in the glare of the tropical sun.

Some colonial societies are diverse rather than plural, for here each group is more or less confined to its own area. The majority, however, are really plural or stratified; they are, as it were, social and economic federations, whose component parts are all mixed up and cannot be sorted out without risk of general collapse.¹ In either case society consists of groups which speak different languages, eat different foods, often follow different occupations marked out for them by law or custom, wear different clothing or sometimes none at all over their differently coloured skins, live in different types of dwellings, cherish different traditions, worship different gods, entertain different ideas of right and wrong. Such societies are not communities. They have little or no common will, and can therefore have little common political or social life.

Inevitably the colour bar tends to appear in stratified societies. The colour bar is the world problem of minorities translated into tropical terms with this difference, that in many colonies the depressed class constitutes the majority. It is to be distinguished clearly from the application of separate systems of law to groups under the same government. Moslems, for instance, usually desire to be under the Islamic law; tribesmen are protected by being left subject to tribal law, especially to tribal land law. The colour bar has nothing directly to do with religion or the structure of society. In so far as it is a colour bar pure and simple,

¹ J. S. Furnivall, *Netherlands India* (1939), especially chapter XIII.

it is a life sentence passed upon a man for having been born the son of his parents. On the other hand, it is well to note that it is not an invention of latter-day white men. Aryan invaders set up a colour bar long ago in India, and thereby stimulated that growth of caste which Mahatma Gandhi has condemned as the curse of Hindu society. It is not even a white man's monopoly. There are social bars below bars in Latin American republics as well as in Caribbean colonies. Nor is the colour bar universal in the Colonies, to go no further afield; colour prejudice varies greatly from society to society, and still more from individual to individual. Finally colour prejudice is by no means always the whole explanation of the colour bar.

Colour prejudice probably counts for least in the political sphere. White majorities in some states of the American Union do indeed withhold political rights as far as they can from Negroes mainly on the ground of colour, and leading South African Nationalists sometimes solemnly aver that voting by Europeans and Bantu on a common roll must culminate in miscegenation; but usually the political colour bar is intended to save a dominant minority from being voted down by the masses. In the economic sphere colour prejudice simply enhances the dread that a given class of worker has of a cheaper-living class which may pull down its standard of living. The phenomenon can be observed at home, but in the colonies such competitors are apt to be blacklegs in every sense. The colour bar is strongest and most far-reaching in the social sphere, for there contact may

indeed lead to racial admixture. But once more factors other than colour prejudice enter in. As a rule like feels more at ease and confident with like, and the lighter or darker colour of the skin very often denotes differences that are much more than skin-deep.¹ It is significant that dark-skinned groups, in contact with a dominant white group, tend to develop their own proper pride the higher they rise in the economic scale and the more civilly they are treated. Miscegenation flourishes best in slave societies.

Governments can say whether there is to be a political colour bar or a statutory economic bar; but they cannot do much to obviate a customary economic colour bar, which, be it noted, does not always operate in favour of the dominant groups, and can do nothing to prevent the erection of a social bar beyond themselves setting a good example. Meanwhile far-seeing Indians, like Srinivasa Sastri, have given warning that

¹ The exclusion of non-Europeans from European clubs, which is such a grievance in India and some of the Asiatic colonies, is in very large part due to more pardonable motives than colour prejudice. Critics forget what a club is, especially for men and women who live in a strange and trying land where they often work alongside alien colleagues whose suspicions and resentments are only too easily aroused. The club is the place in which they can be at ease with one another for an hour or two each day. It may be right to demand that they shall open it to relieve political strains or avoid giving pain to fellowmen, but it is only fair to realise that it is asking a hard thing of them to share their refuge thus with others, who may not eat their food nor drink their drinks, who are apt to be puzzled or even affronted by their jokes, and, however personally delightful they may be, are members of communities which observe customs that are unintelligible or even repulsive to their hosts.

the colour bar may easily lead to caste in lands younger than India. It is no idle warning. Colonial, to say nothing of Dominion and United States bars, are working out in that direction already. This was not so at first in tropical colonies. Unattached traders, prospectors, missionaries and officials, coming 'by few and few', often married or became otherwise intimate with members of the upper ranks of native society. Many officials married thus with the encouragement of their superiors. But when the white women came out, bringing with them the fierce exclusiveness of mothers of children and mistresses in their own drawing-rooms, this intimacy faded and, with it, much of the old sympathy and understanding. The white folk tended to become a caste, and the half-breeds left behind by the white men tended to become yet another caste, despised by the white folk and, often enough, by the black and brown folk also.¹

Incipient caste gives rise to one of the gravest problems that confront colonising Powers in their dealings with colonial peoples. This is the problem of 'saving face', *izzat*, self-respect, call it what you will. Asiatics and Africans, like most other peoples, are ready enough to pay deference to officials because these men represent the Government, the *Sirkar*, the *Rulumeni*, the Great Chief. They do not pay the same deference so readily to private persons simply because

¹ The author once heard a stalwart Tembu in Capetown silence an unfortunate coloured man with the crushing retort: 'The Baas, he is a nation, and I am a nation. But what are you?' This is the agony of the half-caste the world over.

they are of the officials' colour, and still less if these persons do not behave like sahibs. 'The boulder let loose upon the illimitable veld' did much harm in Southern Africa a generation ago. He (or she) has done even more harm in the tropical African bush or the jungle and river valleys of Asia.

ETHICS

Stratified tropical societies have been called 'natural dependencies'. This assertion is doubtless too sweeping; nevertheless such societies, whether colonial or not, cannot learn easily to stand on their own feet in either the cultural, the economic or, above all, the political sphere.

The dominant Europeans cannot hope to impose their home culture *en bloc* upon the rest, let alone to develop a culture of their own as in a colony of settlement. They are too few, too isolated, too dependent on the country from which they have come, and as a rule too divided among themselves to attempt anything of the sort. Cliques abound, from the Government House set right down to the remittance men and beachcombers. Everyone, with comparatively few exceptions, watches for the Home mail, and many seek to send their children Home or to some other kindly region, if not for their health's sake at least for their schooling. The dominant group is often hard put to it to maintain its own culture in such narrowing surroundings; it may even be hard put to it to maintain its moral standards. The tropical climate saps vitality; dependence upon leisurely local labour breeds con-

tentment with a slow rate of stroke. Life may be easy in many respects, but it can hardly be confident or hopeful. The air is charged, not with fear but with a certain preoccupation in face of the 'Others'. There is little here of the true colony as the Greeks knew it, the *ἀποικία*, the home from home.

Meanwhile the incoming Western culture has shaken the native culture. The problem, therefore, is how to gain time for the new and old to come to terms with one another, and thus avert social disaster. It is here that educational policy is of paramount importance; it is here that missionary influence has been most marked.

Who shall say whether the evangelising or the political and economic influence of Christian missions has been the greater from the days of Theodore of Tarsus and Boniface to those of Livingstone and Bishop Selwyn, and beyond? Missionaries have done much more than their primary work of preaching the Gospel. They have been the pioneer doctors, health officers and teachers; they have brought crafts and even arts, a whole way of life that was new, to their prospective parishioners. Missionaries brought the free press, and the vernacular press at that, to India and more than one colony. Some of them laboured to teach native governments how to stand on their own feet against other incoming and often less admirable forces of the West; they laboured thus, not without success, in Basutoland, Tonga, Hawaii and Tahiti, and even for a time in the little Griqua states that were exposed to the full flood of white South African

expansion a century ago. As a rule they have only called for annexation by a strong Power after their efforts as unofficial trustees have failed.

Missionaries have played a much greater part in tropical than in temperate colonies. There has been a more insistent call for them, for here were the heathen and the backward folk. Just as missionaries in India went first to the millions of Hinduism's Untouchables, so in the tropical colonies they have gone to the underdogs of the world's society. Often enough they had gone thither before the traders and trekkers, the troops and officials arrived.¹ But whether they have come soon or late they have brought, as they must, not peace but a sword both to ancient civilised lands and new tropical colonies. Whenever it is functioning properly, the Christian Church is not, as Constantine thought it was, a social cement but an earthquake; the more rigid and caste-bound society is, the greater the shock of its coming.

Christian missions still bear the main burden of education in most present-day colonies. Mistakes they have made, especially in the early days when they were apt to condemn unfamiliar customs wholesale as works of the Devil, and to insist that their converts should cover their vile bodies with unsuitable clothing that sometimes killed them off by the hundred. They have too often scrambled against one another for converts in most unchristian fashion; short

¹ It was because Europeans were arriving in this order that seventeenth-century Japan wiped out her many Christians and closed her gates to all comers for two hundred years.

of men and money they have often spread both out too thinly in an attempt to bring the light of the Gospel to as many nations as possible. As People of the Book, they have often given a far too 'bookish' education. But they are outgrowing these weaknesses. In common with officials and anthropologists they have realised that there is usually some good reason for even the most uncouth of tribal customs. Sectarian jealousy tends to be much less fiery in the field than in the mission hall at home. Shortage of staffs, equipment and the rest are being remedied as the State comes more and more resolutely to the help of the Church; with the dread warning of Babu India before them, officials and missionaries are laying fully as much stress on the training of the hand and heart as on that of the head. Meanwhile nothing can deprive the missionaries of the glory of a civilising work that has won the respect, and often the gratitude, even of those who reject the specifically Christian message.

Asiatics, proud of their ancient cultures, and even Africans whose cultural background is so much more meagre, tend to value Western education primarily as a path to government employment and, like others nearer home, are wrath if no such jobs await them. But some value it for its own sake, and many more desire it passionately because it is the source of the white man's power, the key to the understanding of the great world into which they are being dragged. In offering this education the authorities have to decide, first, upon its content and then upon the language in which it is to be taught. Policies naturally differ, and

no Power follows one system rigidly. Sometimes education is so straightforwardly that of the Mother Country that the little darkies of Senegal, for instance, can chant joyfully in chorus, 'The Gauls, our ancestors, had blue eyes and fair hair', and (bless their hearts) believe it. At the other extreme education may be adapted almost entirely to local conditions. The native response to each of the many systems varies. One difficulty is, however, becoming serious as education extends into the higher reaches. However unsuitable an overseas school-leaving examination may be, colonial peoples want to take it because Europeans take it; however promising the local university may be, they tend to look askance at it and try at all costs to get to a university overseas. Some indeed, especially the best of the Africans, have a higher motive. They wish to face the same tests as Europeans, lest it be said that Africa is pulling down the academic standards of the civilised world. Be this as it may, Africans and Asiatics and West Indians fear to be fobbed off with a second best, especially if they suspect that upholders of the colour bar are trying to block their path to the 'springs of true knowledge.

Similarly with the world-wide problem of the medium of instruction in its colonial aspect. Local languages are often widespread with great literatures of their own, but the majority are intensely local and lack any literature worth speaking of. In either case they are apt to be complex to a degree and unsuited to convey Western knowledge, especially in technical matters. Some Powers boldly use the European

official language at as early a stage as possible; others rely on the vernacular; others make the worst of both worlds by using a local language which is widely understood but is the spoken tongue only of a minority. Again the native response varies, and again the demand seems to be growing that as much schooling as possible shall be given in the official tongue so that the black or brown man may speak with the white man in the gate. There are not wanting those who accuse governments, which have perhaps too humbly obeyed the latest dictates of Western pedagogy by encouraging the vernaculars, of seeking to divide so that they may rule.

ECONOMICS

The desire for equality with the dominant West which inspires politically minded groups in the Colonies is directed nowadays quite as much towards economic equality as towards political equality. How, they ask, can a people be truly self-governing if they must live in a debtors' prison or go on the imperial dole? Here they are in agreement with those imperial authorities who realise that no polity can stand unaided unless it has sound cultural and economic foundations. Tropical colonies, however, face grave difficulties in their attempt to move forward from the stage of primary to that of secondary production. The more plural their societies, the greater their difficulties.

Next after law and order a community needs capital, directive ability and technical skill if it is to make the most of its resources. Nearly all of these things have had to be brought into the Colonies from outside, as

they were brought into Henry III's England, Peter's Russia, Franklin's America, Dalhousie's India, Mutsuhito's Japan, and Kruger's Transvaal. The capital could never have been raised locally by taxation in an undeveloped colony. Nor could it have been raised by loan in a tribal society where tribesmen had no money and, like good economists, thought in terms of goods and services, or in an archaic civilised society whose members thought in terms of hard cash and had been accustomed to use such as they had either for display or for short-term usury in the intervals of hiding it from their own families or the tax-collector.

Coming thus from outside capital has brought direction and skill with it and, since it pays the piper, has called the tune. From the beginning that tune has been colonial raw materials in exchange for metropolitan manufactures and services. Tropical colonies have always tended to run along plantation lines unless official policy forbade; their railways and harbour works, mineral oil production, stock-breeding and, except in rare cases where 'one-man' ventures have been possible, mining also, have been organised on the big capitalist scale. Again, the tropics are complementary to the temperate zones. Tropical colonies produce materials that either cannot be produced at all elsewhere or only at great expense and, as a rule, of inferior quality. They have, therefore, commonly been organised for the export trade, which has attractions for most of the parties concerned by giving the government a customs revenue, shippers return cargoes,

shareholders dividends, and those of the colonial people who can grow exportable produce money in their pockets. The tendency has further been to concentrate on one or two staple exports. This has not always been the doing of the immigrant group; natives have often been as quick to snatch a profit, even at the expense of food crops, as were those Nile landlords who recently concentrated on profitable war-time cotton to such purpose that corn had to be sent to Egypt.

There has been little call for secondary industries in such circumstances. Why do in the heat of the tropics what can be done under less trying conditions at home? Why raise up possible competitors in a world where production is already outstripping consumption? The one valid financial reason for attempting to do so is the cheapness of native labour. But 'cheap' labour tends to be expensive in the long run because of its inefficiency. Not that colonial peoples cannot learn modern industrial methods or handle machinery; many of them can and do, if they be given the chance. But it takes time to train them, as it took time to train the eighteenth-century British agricultural labourer or the twentieth-century Russian peasant. Unless there be some compelling reason that time will not be given.

Immigrant communities have conferred great benefits on the Colonies. This is especially true of the European immigrants who had more to give than the others. Fowell Buxton and Livingstone prophesied that it would be so, and government commissions have

recorded that it has been so. Individual traders and farmers, small firms and big corporations, have all brought in money, unaccustomed goods and ideas, new crops and new breeds of farm stock. They have taught the natives new techniques, and trained them in steady industry as Europeans understand the term; they have given new openings for earning money and, therefore, for marriage. In earlier times, and in outlying parts still, individuals and corporations in a hurry have squandered natural resources and manpower, for the more men, the less need for thought and machinery has been the story of the Industrial Revolution from the beginning. But increasing competition, good sense and government compulsion have changed much of this for the better.

In many respects big concerns have done less harm and more positive good to native society than have individuals, for they have been able to take the long view and wait for a return in the way an individual cannot. They have often gone ahead of government regulations in the care of their work people; many of them spend more on housing, medical care and welfare than on wages; some of them have experimented in education and model villages. Big enterprises have other advantages. Plantations have raised the quality of local produce and the rate of production all round; the roads and railways that have reached out to the mines up-country are to the general advantage; big undertakings bring tribesmen from far afield together in peace; they can help powerfully to provide revenue for public utilities and social services, if they be duly

taxed and the bulk of the proceeds be kept in the colony.

But, like everything else, big colonial undertakings have their perils. They may put too heavy and sudden a strain on native society. They act as whirlpools drawing in labour for hundreds of miles around; the prolonged absence of workmen from home weakens family and tribal life; the return of the young men with money in their pockets and strange ideas in their heads undermines tribal sanctions. Where these concerns employ considerable bodies of European skilled labour they serve as forcing-houses of the industrial colour bar, for in the colonies, as at home, organised skilled Labour is apt either to fight organised Capital for its own ends, or to join with Capital against less skilled Labour and the general body of consumers. And in tropical plural societies, whose most effective bond is the cash nexus against which Carlyle thundered a century ago, there is a rawness about economic politics that would hardly be tolerated in lands where the traditions of an earlier and more stable day survive. Finally, big corporations may wield irresponsible power surpassing that which similar, and perhaps allied, corporations exercise at home. Those of them that have their headquarters in a foreign state can add much to the embarrassments of colonial governments.

The regular supply of wage labourers for individual employers or companies presents few difficulties in the Asiatic and Caribbean colonies, where men have long been used to permanent or seasonal wage employment. It is far otherwise in tribal lands. The commonly held

belief that tribal natives are lazy is one of those many things that

Men, in our cold agnostic day,
Must come from Africa to say,
From England to believe.¹

The tribal division of labour is not on Western lines; too much seems to fall upon the women and children. But the men have to work hard to keep their families fed and healthy, and any old crone will tell the censorious visitor that they are usually fulfilling a useful social function even when they are just sitting around talking.² Tribesmen are like most other people. They work hard enough for themselves and their own folk; they are less ready to work for others without good cause shown.

Some of the inducements used to get tribesmen to work for immigrants have been compulsive, ranging from the slavery, which is now dead in white men's countries, by way of the indentured labour under penal sanctions, which is now dying out, to the forced labour for public purposes which is still relied on in many colonies. Forced labour at the call of the chief, or of the government as Great Chief, is a well understood African tribal custom and arouses little resentment. Forced labour for private profit is quite another matter. Similarly, the compulsory cultivation of certain crops, the *travail éducatif*, may be accepted

¹ Hilaire Belloc, *The Modern Traveller*, an epic of the seamy side of empire-building.

² Cf. Parliament and College governing bodies.

cheerfully enough, provided the crops are for the growers' sole benefit and a free market be available. Otherwise there may be trouble. Finally, official 'encouragement' to go out to work may easily drift under the head of compulsion. Chiefs are apt to interpret even a hint from the *Rulumeni* as a command, and all the more readily if they themselves stand to gain directly or indirectly from the wage labour of their followers.

Indirect methods of raising labour are more numerous and widespread than the directly compulsive. A pass which is also an identity card is valuable to its holder; a pass system which immobilises him, or even brings him to prison for a breach of its complicated regulations, is a veiled compulsion to work for others. The grant of a huge tract of forest land to a company leaves the inhabitants no choice but to gather wild produce on the company's terms. Shortage of land, whether this be due to alienations to newcomers or to pressure of numbers on poorly used soil, is a powerful incentive to go out to work. So also are the direct poll, hut, or income tax, and the indirect taxes of all kinds which send up the prices of things the native wishes to buy. New wants, especially the new wants of the wives, are an even more insistent form of compulsion; and, when all is said, many a young tribesman is just as keen as his civilised brother to go upon his travels, dodge village duties, or maybe get away from home.

One master obstacle stands in the way of the rapid advance of most colonies and that is the scantiness of their populations. Some of the West Indies and rice-

growing Asiatic colonies, and even a few areas in Africa, are densely populated; but most of the colonies are too thinly peopled to bear much more than the weight of their own primitive or archaic societies. The huge continent of Africa has a population of about 150,000,000, one-third that of Europe or China. There are plenty of reasons why this is so. Slave raids, tribal wars, wholesale ceremonial executions in some parts, infanticide and cannibalism, are now things of the past; but population is kept down by bad housing, worse sanitation, and disease. Tuberculosis, yaws and venereal are terribly widespread; malaria is the scourge of the tropics; worms go far to explain the listlessness which many colonial peoples share with the poor whites of the Union and the mean whites of the United States 'Bible belt'. Boredom induced by the passing of the old life kills as surely as bullets. Again, wasteful agriculture and haphazard stock-breeding furnish a commonly inadequate food supply, and too often such food as there is, or such as religion permits to be eaten, is of poor disease-resisting quality. Nor is it easy to supplement the local supplies in many parts. Western cereals and green vegetables do not flourish in the Caribbean area, and Nature is apt to be unkind even in those parts of Africa that are not covered by forest or desert. In some parts the torrential rainfall washes away essential constituents from the soil; in others the rainfall is scanty and erratic. Many African rivers, running deep in their beds and dwindling away during the dry season, are of little use for irrigation. Colonising governments are tackling these weak-

nesses and evils with varying degrees of thoroughness, first, by labour legislation which includes the limitation of the number of adult males in tribal areas who may be away at work at any one time; secondly, by health, agricultural, and social services of every kind, and lastly, by encouraging wherever possible the development of the peasant societies which stood up to the depression of the nineteen-thirties so much better than societies based on plantations.

POLITICS

Present-day colonies may for the most part be weak culturally and economically, but they are weakest in the political sphere, and this because of the diversity or stratification of their societies. For this reason alone demands for independence by colonial patriots on their travels are to be treated with the same caution as are offers by war-time refugees to organise governments for the countries they have been forced to leave. This demand is real in certain quarters, but comparatively few responsible colonial leaders, and still less the inarticulate masses behind them, have any urgent desire as yet to repudiate their allegiance. What most of them ask for is fuller control over the domestic affairs of their colonies.

Sometimes it is a European group that proposes to take over this control from the imperial authorities; sometimes it is a mixed-breed coloured group; usually it is a group of more or less westernised natives; occasionally it is a combination of two or more of these groups. Whichever it be, the fact that these groups are

small 'scarcely detracts from their importance. It may be true that the mass of the colonial peoples, like the masses in India, take no interest in politics; but no more do the majority of the inhabitants of Eastern and Central Europe, or a high proportion of the electors in the Western democracies except in time of crisis. These groups are the foci of colonial politics; they are the growing points thrusting up to make contact with the outer world. They must be accorded a consideration far beyond what their numbers warrant.

Growing points these groups may be, but they grow in difficult soil. Colonial politics tend to lack finality because high policy is decided elsewhere, but they commonly make up for this lack by their vehemence. Critics of an irremovable executive need not bridle their tongues, for they will not be called upon to make good their promises or their threats. Debate cannot issue in policy; the fire in the house can find no chimney, and thus the house fills with smoke which is all the more acrid that the house is small. Each man counts for so much in a restricted community, each man (and woman) knows so much of his neighbours' affairs, that politics tend to turn on personalities. Since moreover the law, or journalism, is the obvious refuge of those who cannot find official employment, political discussion rarely lacks litigiousness or invective. Sometimes high altitudes contribute tensions peculiarly their own.

Responsibility is the cure for most of these ills, but recent events in colonies belonging to more than one empire show clearly how dangerous it may be to confer

the power that goes therewith on such highly sectionalised societies.¹ Most immigrants, whether European or Asiatic, hope to make a better and easier living than they could in their own country, or to gain a competency on which to retire Home or to some more desirable part of their colony. They are, therefore, apt to resent anything that tells against the speedy attainment of these ends. Nor are Africans, who have shaken themselves free from the communal restraints of tribal life, one whit behindhand. All these groups, white, black, brown or yellow, resist the imposition of an income tax on the plea that it will fall mainly on their own small section of society and prevent its prospering—for the good of the colony. They much prefer indirect taxation, regardless of the fact that this must fall most heavily on the native masses, the poorest members of society. Some will advocate an increase of the native hut or poll tax, or suggest a war loan at so much per cent in lieu of the dreaded impost; assembled in chambers of commerce they will even call for the abrogation of international treaties and the abolition of mandates—for the good of the colony. Similar things have, of course, been heard at home, but they are demanded more ingenuously in the Colonies. The sense of humour withers in the heat engendered by the plural society.² Meanwhile, by thus

¹ The examples given on the following pages have been gathered from legislation, resolutions of legislatures and chambers of commerce, and speeches by prominent colonists in colonies ranging from the West Indies eastward to the Philippines.

² The author is not aware that any group has recently had recourse to the plea put forward against the income tax in the

seeking to evade the problem of taxation and, therefore, of controlled expenditure, these groups cut at the very roots of self-government. To the extent that they thus force their governments back upon external sources of revenue, they accentuate the dependence of their own colonies.

The situation is peculiarly difficult where a group of immigrants from the Mother Country is settled in tribal territory. Such a group naturally claims a privileged place among the colonial peoples. Its more active members feel themselves better qualified than officials from overseas to administer their colony and all that therein is, regardless of the fact that these officials may well have, and the Colonial Office behind them does have, a store of comparative colonial knowledge and administrative experience which far surpasses their own. Some proclaim themselves pioneers of empire and affect to despise the taxpayers of the Old Country as ventureless stay-at-homes, but are none the less prompt to call for metropolitan aid in bad times. Feeling is apt to run particularly high on questions of native policy. These groups are ready to resent interference by the imperial authorities in this matter, or potential interference by groups similar to their own in adjacent dependencies; they claim to know their own natives, though most of them have seen far more of the native as a house boy or farm labourer than as a free tribesman. Their aims and even achievements show that a statutory colour bar is not the only device

plural Cape Colony long ago, that it was an immoral tax because it tempted the taxpayer to falsify his returns. G. M. Theal, *History of South Africa*, v, 100-1.

by which a minority can maintain its dominance. They incline to favour the customary colour bar and a restrictive pass system, to demand taxation and other governmental aids to the recruiting of native labour, to frown upon the co-operative and trade union movements, to object to the native cultivation of certain exportable crops, to expect higher export subsidies for their own produce than those accorded to native produce, and to advocate the axing of social services first in times of financial stringency. They are ready to pay high license fees to secure for themselves the virtual monopoly of certain kinds of production. They are loyal, none loyaller, to the empire, whichever that may be; but some of them, in moments of extreme irritation, will threaten to 'march', though they rarely indicate their proposed destination.

These manifestations witness to the strain of living in a plural society under a tropical sun and an executive which is responsible to an overseas legislature. They are reminders that the supreme test that faces colonising Powers within the bounds of their respective empires is the political integration of the plural society. Mere equality before the law in such societies leads to the political supremacy of the economically successful, to a plethora of lawyers and moneylenders at one end of society and of dacoits and gangsters at the other. It is folly to go along national lines where there is as yet no nation; dictatorship is a counsel of despair. Some of those colonies that are advancing in the direction of parliamentary rule have risked a common voters' roll; others have tried various alternatives more or less on

communal lines, and have thereby sharpened communal rivalries. Some few, in an attempt to obviate this evil, have had recourse to functional franchises, a confession that, since electors cannot be trusted not to vote each other down as members of rival communities, they must be content to vote as mere producers. The hope, the difficult hope, is that one day they may be able to vote as citizens.

CHAPTER IV

CONSTITUTIONS, DEVELOPMENT, AND WELFARE

TRUSTEESHIP AND THE DUAL MANDATE

The policies of the Powers towards colonial peoples are governed by the idea of trusteeship. The legal interpretation of this idea was first applied to public affairs by John Marshall, Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. He ruled in 1831, and ruled in vain, that the Federal Government must regard itself as trustee for the lands of the Cherokees. The political interpretation of the idea, however, had already been worked out by British statesmen from 1785 onwards. It was stated most fully in 1824 by Sir Thomas Munro, administrator of Madras, in a much greater matter. Munro held that Great Britain must continue to rule John Company's Indian Empire till the Indians should have 'abandoned most of their superstitions and prejudices, and become sufficiently enlightened to frame a regular government for themselves, and to conduct and preserve it. Whenever such a time shall arrive, it will probably be best for both countries that the British control over India should be gradually withdrawn.'

¹ Ramsay Muir, *The Making of British India*, pp. 284-5. A right spirit availeth much, but the law unaided can do little. The State of Georgia moved the Cherokees away to the Federal Indian Territory, far to the west. India and Great Britain are, God willing, on the point of completing Munro's programme.

It would be idle to claim that Munro's conception of trusteeship has controlled the British in all their dealings with India or the Colonies, but it can be claimed that it has been a guiding and restraining force. Be that as it may, the framers of the Covenant of the League of Nations, Americans among them, bade the newly appointed Mandatory Powers take as models the British colonial practice and spirit at their best. Hence the Mandatory Powers accepted as 'a sacred trust' the duty of teaching the native peoples of the mandated territories to 'stand by themselves' under the strenuous conditions of the modern world; all the League colonising Powers, including Italy, Japan and the U.S.S.R., undertook to secure 'the just treatment of the native inhabitants under their control'; all the League Powers, including Germany, bound themselves to ensure 'fair and humane conditions of labour...both in their own countries, and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extended'. Nor did the United States, the great Associated Power, reject these principles.

The specific obligations enjoined by the League included the substance of the Acts of the Berlin and Brussels Conferences of 1884-85 and 1890-92. These Congo treaties prescribed trading equality and freedom of navigation in Central Africa from ocean to ocean, and forbade the importation of firearms and ardent spirits into all tropical Africa. Their stipulations for equality of economic opportunity were reinforced by the B mandates in their limited areas, and were

voluntarily extended to League and Associated Powers by the British in their A mandated territories. The colonising Powers have since signed a Slavery Convention which forbids the institution of anything 'analogous to slavery'. Most of them and the republic of Liberia have also signed a Forced Labour Convention. This ordains that forced labour must be dispensed with as soon as possible. Meanwhile it may be used only for public purposes of an exceptional and urgent nature for which voluntary labour is lacking, and then only provided the work does not put too heavy a strain on the community that furnishes the labour and is for the direct benefit of that community. For the rest the Convention strictly forbids officials to 'put restraint' on natives to work for private persons or companies. Most of the colonising Powers have been more or less guided also by the International Labour Office in their efforts to render labour legislation effective in their colonies, and have at least taken note of that body's resolution that tribal natives must not be driven to work for the private profit of others by restriction of tribal lands, pressure of taxation, the complications of the pass laws, or an unduly wide interpretation of the vagrancy laws.

The idea of trusteeship has usually been interpreted in the light of Lord Lugard's doctrine of the Dual Mandate. That doctrine, a sufficiently hard doctrine to live up to, proclaims that colonising peoples are entitled to seek their own profit, provided these benefits are made reciprocal and the native inhabitants be helped forward 'in their progress to a higher plane'.

The Powers have had to choose between three policies in applying the principle of trusteeship thus interpreted. They have either sought to retain control over their colonies until such time as these are fit to be incorporated with the Mother Country; or to develop a system of governance in the colonies similar to their own; or, finally, to encourage each colony to develop along its own lines 'till its native institutions shall become solid enough to withstand the pressure of the outer world. No Power has consistently followed any one of these three policies to the exclusion of the rest; each has taken what it would from all of them and adapted it to its own philosophy of rule.

No attempt will be made here to detail the doings of all the colonising Powers. It is sufficient to say that Japan has brought to her empire-building her own inordinate national pride and a prolonged training in the worst school of Western economic imperialism, which had begun when the seventeenth-century Dutch East India Company planted itself near Nagasaki and reached the post-graduate stage at the close of the nineteenth century when Russia, France and Germany scrambled for exclusive spheres of influence in China. Fascist Italy has done much for the material advancement of her own settlers, but has been in no hurry to impart her culture to native peoples for fear of giving them dangerous thoughts. Thus has the New Roman Empire departed from the saving tradition of the Old. Spain, with slenderer financial resources than Italy, has followed a policy similar to her's. Portugal avowedly aims at an equality between Europeans and Africans;

but, as ever, legislation means one thing at Lisbon and another in the colonial backveld. Denmark and Norway rule their few dependencies in the decent fashion that they rule themselves. Australia, New Zealand and South Africa have followed the familiar British Commonwealth lines in their respective colonies, with this exception, that South Africa has applied her colour-bar policy to thinly-peopled South-West Africa.

The policies of France, Belgium, Holland, Great Britain, the United States and the U.S.S.R. call for much fuller treatment. Not only are these the great colonising Powers, but each of them, with the exception of Belgium, has been the scene of one of those far-reaching revolutions that stirred the Western and Russian worlds during their five centuries of empire-building. Each of these revolutions gave rise to a great colonising effort.¹ The experiences and philosophies which inspired each revolution still govern the policy of the Power concerned towards its colonial peoples.

FRENCH POLICY

France, the greatest of the Latin colonising Powers, is also the most systematic of any. Whether as a monarchy, an empire or a republic she has aimed at

¹ Revolutionary France is only an apparent exception to this rule. Her colonising efforts were thwarted by the British fleet. Great Britain, on the other hand, achieved two revolutions: a constitutional revolution in the seventeenth century and an industrial revolution in the nineteenth. She built up an empire after each of these outbursts of energy.

a centralised and uniformly governed empire. Her colonial policy to-day reflects at once her devotion to the Revolutionary doctrine of the Rights of Man, with the emphasis on equality and fraternity rather than on liberty, and the resolve that the empire must make France strong so that she may continue to be *la grande nation*.

France knows no colour bar either in the colonies or at home. For a long time, therefore, her policy was one of assimilation. Colonial peoples were to absorb French culture so that they might become Frenchmen and French citizens; the colonies were to become overseas parts of France. Hence Departmental Algeria and the Old Colonies¹ in the Caribbean, Africa and South-East Asia have been given representation in the Paris Parliament, colonial troops have long been recruited for service in France, and French colonial officials are paid at the same rates as their native colleagues. The acquisition of huge new territories in Africa, the Levant and Asia led to a change of policy. These masses of new subjects could hardly be assimilated within any reasonable time. Assimilation in terms of the Rights of Man remained now as a far-off hope, and meanwhile gave way to association in terms of the law. Association aims at transforming a native *élite* into Frenchmen, and leaves the masses to learn enough French for workaday purposes and, if all goes well, to earn a better living than they have done hitherto.

¹ Martinique, Guadeloupe and Guiana; Senegal and Réunion; Cochin China and the Indian Establishments.

Neither assimilation nor association has ever contemplated anything like colonial self-government. The central authorities have always legislated freely for the colonies, vetoed colonial legislation, and kept a tight hand on colonial fiscal policy. Legislatures in the Old Colonies are wholly, and in Algeria partially, elective; but their powers are limited, while those of the partially elective councils in Madagascar and Indo-China are little more than advisory. Again, though some slight approach to the British system of indirect rule has been made in French West Africa, the chiefs, there and elsewhere, are only collectors of revenue and mouth-pieces of the government.

The predominantly Moslem parts of the French Empire stand in a class by themselves. Saharan Algeria is subject to virtually military rule. Morocco and Tunisia are under a dyarchy in which decrees are drawn up by the Resident General and promulgated by the Sultan or Bey. In North Africa Europeans are subject to French law, and Moslems to an Islamic code. In the Levant mandated Syria and the Lebanon have long had parliaments, and as long ago as 1936 were promised independence subject to partial French military occupation and the granting of further military facilities to France in case of need. These promises were implemented, as far as they could be in war-time, after the British and Free French had driven out the Vichy authorities and the infiltrating Germans in 1941. Meanwhile commissioners, *missi dominici*, sent out from headquarters keep the colonies in constant touch with Paris, and conferences between

Governors and Residents give large sections of the empire some of the benefits of federal institutions.

In the economic sphere France has latterly devoted her main energies to Africa and has spent great sums of money there on public works. The conduct of business and development in the Mediterranean dependencies proceeds along lines to which Frenchmen, Jews and Moslems have been accustomed for centuries. In tropical Africa it is not so. There France faces great difficulties. Population is scanty; most of the soil of West Africa is poor; the forest-clad provinces to the south-east are still handicapped by the strain which concessionaires put upon the inhabitants before the government cut down the area of the concessions and limited the calls upon labour. On the other hand, government itself makes fairly heavy demands upon native society in French tropical Africa and Madagascar. France imposes on her own citizens certain *prestations*, that is, compulsory labour for public purposes; she only acceded to the Forced Labour Convention, therefore, when she was assured that *prestations* would be permitted in her colonies, where they are sometimes used as a substitute for military service. Forced labour for public purposes is less common than it once was, and much less common for private purposes; warned by the heavy loss of life that accompanied the building of the equatorial railway, and the flight of native subjects into British or Spanish territory to escape the capitation tax, the authorities are now more prudent in their calls upon native man-power. Latterly they have begun to apply

104 CONSTITUTIONS, DEVELOPMENT, WELFARE
metropolitan labour laws to Africa, and have done much good work in the fields of curative and preventive medicine. They encourage Africans to grow varied and better crops, at all events for export, and occasionally enforce *travail éducatif* in bad times. For the rest they favour individual as opposed to tribal tenure of land, and propose to base West Africa on peasant production. They have also begun to foster co-operative and credit societies, starting in North Africa.

France's educational system is naturally the key to the policy of association. It is very definitely France's system, for missions play a comparatively small part in it, and then only under strict official control. French is the medium of instruction wherever possible. The masses cannot as yet expect more than elementary schooling, followed perhaps by technical training. The *élite* go on to lycées which are run on traditional French lines, except in parts of Indo-China where Oriental humanities take the place of Greek and Latin. The most successful students pass on to a metropolitan university, except again in Indo-China where they can get a good professional training at Hanoi. The system has thus given France competent colonial civil servants, soldiers and professional men; her repudiation of the social colour bar makes a strong appeal to her colonial peoples and to many non-Europeans who are not her subjects; her care for ancient native monuments, and zeal for Asiatic art and literature, have gained her deserved credit. Nevertheless the policy of association has one grave weakness. Whatever its

intention, it works out as a system of *divide et impera*. The *élite* become Frenchmen, the native masses are deprived of their natural leaders. Even so the scope of association is limited. There are many French citizens of colour in the Old Colonies, some of whom have risen to high office; latterly the Free French have extended citizenship more liberally to Moslems in Algeria; but there are not many citizens yet in tropical Africa, and these find that fewer positions of responsibility are available for them than there are for their fellow-Africans in the neighbouring British colonies. Meanwhile some of the younger French colonial administrators hold that France can learn something from the liberal governmental and economic policies of the Dutch, Belgians and British, and are anxious to collaborate with these Powers in the study of colonial problems.

BELGIAN AND DUTCH POLICIES

The Dutch have been an independent people and a first-class colonising Power for some 350 years. The Belgians have been independent for little more than a century and a colonising Power for barely sixty years. The vast bulk of Holland's colonial empire lies in a densely populated part of Asia whose civilised peoples enjoy a culture more ancient and, in some respects, more refined than her own. The whole of Belgium's empire lies in a swampy, forested African river basin where some of the scanty tribes were cannibals not long ago, few of them knew anything of agriculture till the white man came, and none but those in the

north-east corner kept cattle because of the tsetse fly. Nevertheless the aims of the two Powers are similar in many respects. Nor is this surprising. Not only have Belgian administrators learned a good deal from the Dutch, but the two countries, once the Northern and Southern Netherlands, have a long tradition in common. Both had to defend the privileges of guild, city and province against foreign and centralising overlords; both were once subject to a revolutionary French government. As good Netherlanders, therefore, both reject all idea of centralisation or uniformity in their colonial empires; both are tender of corporate rights; both hold that Europeans have their privileges, and Asiatics or Africans theirs; neither sees any reason why native privileges should not be extended till they become equal to, or maybe identical with, those of Dutchmen or Belgians. Meanwhile, as subscribers to the Rights of Man, both reject the colour bar. There is, however, one marked difference between their respective experiences. Belgium borders on France in Europe and Africa, and half her own citizens are French speaking; her colonial policy naturally shows signs of this strong French influence. Holland, on the contrary, has had long and close contact with Great Britain in war and in peace; she faces British territory across narrow seas in two continents. She has not been too proud to learn from a neighbour to whom she has taught much.

Belgium holds that her business as a colonising Power is to civilise a primitive people, but not to Europeanise them. She has an unusually difficult task.

From 1885 till 1908 the Congo was misruled by her king, Leopold II, and his financial friends. Maybe tales of the evil-doing of Leopold's agents owe something to political jealousy, but the facts were bad enough and the strain on the native peoples terrible. Having so much leeway to make up, Belgium holds out no hopes of anything approaching self-government and concentrates on laying social and economic foundations. The Governor-General of the Congo and his advisory council have wide powers within the general framework laid down by the Belgian Parliament. Rule is official throughout, tempered by the beginnings of indirect rule on British lines. In the economic sphere the worst evils of the huge forest concessions of an earlier day have been eradicated and the surviving concession areas cut down, but the Congo is still mainly a land of companies. Chief among these are the railways, the Union Minière far up-country at Katanga, and the Huileries du Congo in which the Leverhulme interests are prominent. Plantations are numerous, and large-scale stock-raising has recently been started in mandated Ruanda-Urundi.

Some twenty years ago this vigorous policy of *mise en valeur* threatened to overstrain the labour force, some of whose members were running away to Uganda to escape pressure from their chiefs to go out to work. The Congo Government, therefore, strictly limited the number of adult males who might be away from their villages at any one time, permitted head-porterage only when all else had failed, tried to check the chiefs and some of their own local officials from rendering

'most precious assistance' to companies in the matter of reluctant labour,¹ and obliged the companies to serve as health and education centres. The Katanga copper mines, bettering this instruction, set up model villages for the families of their workers. All this has since been buttressed with a growing mass of labour legislation. Meanwhile Belgium had hesitated to adhere to the Forced Labour Convention till she knew that the *travail éducatif*, of which she made great use, would be permitted. Presently, urged on by Dutch example and the Duke of Brabant, now Leopold III, she began to encourage peasant cultivation.

Government, missions and companies together have done fine work for health in the disease-sodden Congo Basin. The missions, however, have borne the main weight of the work of education. Any society can open schools, but only Belgian societies receive a state grant. The state steps in when private enterprise is not forthcoming. The policy is to raise the mass before training an *élite*; indeed, natives are not encouraged to go overseas for study. On the other hand the government has set up technical and agricultural schools, and a pre-university institution at Astrida for medicine, veterinary science and so on, so that natives may be trained to supersede Europeans in schools and industry alike in all save the highest posts.

The Dutch have carried this rudimentary Dual

¹ R. L. Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa*, II, 541. A Belgian official once told the author that the Congo could solve South Africa's native problem by taking all her natives, if they were willing to go and the Union would furnish transport.

System much further. It is their contribution to the solution of the problem of the plural society. Since 1922 they have imitated the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. in repudiating the colonial idea. The Kingdom of the Netherlands now includes the Dutch colonial empire. It is a single state, a kingdom consisting of four widely separated parts: Holland, Surinam (Guiana), the Caribbean islands around Curaçoa, and the immense archipelago of Netherlands India, now known officially as Indonesia. Each part has its own constitution, but Dutch policy has long aimed at assimilating all to that of Holland, the senior partner.

Little need be said of the Caribbean territories. Surinam shares the depression that has for so long afflicted the West Indies, but Curaçoa enjoys a high prosperity as the centre for refining Venezuelan oil and the focus of a very great shipping. Each has the usual mixed Caribbean population, and each has a partially elective legislature wielding powers that fall far short of self-government.

The test of Dutch statesmanship lies in the East. Indonesia, like the Congo, has a past that has had to be lived down. A Belgian king exploited the Congo Free State, as it then was, for a quarter of a century; the Dutch East India Company and, thereafter, the Dutch Government exploited Indonesia for 250 years. Then, from about 1870 onwards, the Dutch Parliament adopted a *laissez-faire* policy which benefited European, American and Chinese traders and investors, bore hardly on the Javanese, and ruined the morals of many Dutchmen in the East. At last the Dutch remem-

bered Sir Stamford Raffles, the forerunner of Lugard of Nigeria and Cameron of Tanganyika, who had valued Javanese culture at its true worth and made native welfare his first aim during the short British administration of Java at the close of the Napoleonic Wars. About 1900, therefore, they adopted an 'ethical policy' based on the principles of decentralisation, efficiency, welfare and expansion.¹

The Dutch extended their effective control over all Indonesia and then began to build. At first sight their Dual Policy resembles segregation; actually it is fundamentally different. It is true that in both systems the labour of the native mass forms the common foundation of the European and native communities, just as the labour of humble folk forms the foundation of any society; but whereas segregation envisages two parallel communities rising on this foundation and never meeting, the Dual Policy proposes that the two societies shall follow separate courses at first, and then throw out connecting links and come together at the top. Under segregation the weaker community can never hope to attain to a common citizenship with the stronger; the aim of the Dual Policy is precisely this common citizenship.

The European sphere in Indonesia includes all who are subject to Dutch law; that is, 100,000 Dutchmen, home or colonial born, 150,000 half-breed Indos, those few Javanese who have elected to become Europeans and all immigrants other than the 1,500,000 Chinese whose links with China are so strong that they are

¹ J. S. Furnivall, *Netherlands India*, p. 230.

treated as a separate community. The native sphere includes all, the vast majority, who are subject to Indonesian law or custom.

The Governor-General, the one-official still who must be a Dutchman, is appointed by the Crown and is responsible to the Dutch Parliament. In the event of prolonged deadlock with the legislature he may ask that the disputed measure be enacted by Royal decree; in emergency he can act alone. The Council of the Indies at Batavia, once the mainspring of administration, is now an expert advisory council of Europeans and Javanese. The powers of the General Secretariat are waning as those of the legislature increase. This legislature, the Volksraad, emerged first in 1917 as an advisory body. Ten years later it became a true legislature consisting of a Voorsitter (President) appointed by the Crown, and sixty members, half of them Javanese and the rest Europeans, Chinese and Arabs. The Governor-General nominates twenty-five of these members to represent the Outer Provinces, tribes, chambers of commerce, trade unions, and native Catholics and Protestants in a land whose peoples are overwhelmingly, though not always orthodoxly, Moslem. The majority is elected on a rather high franchise by an elaborate system of indirect election which works upwards through village, district and provincial councils. The powers of the Volksraad are considerable, and include control of taxation, immigration and the tariff; but they still fall short of the British idea of responsible government.

As in British India, the prospect of popular rule has

given rise to parties. The Javanese Nationalist Party is faced by one that stands for Islam and independence; smaller parties are radical and even communist. There are signs that the Indos are swinging over to the side of the Javanese; by way of answer, a growing number of Dutch business men in the towns, who know little of Javanese life, have formed a Dutch party and have even begun to flirt with fascism. Apart from violent outbreaks in 1926, however, Indonesian politics have not been marked by the bitterness of those of caste-ridden British India; on the other hand, some Javanese are demanding a single electoral roll, as in plural Ceylon, with nominees to represent minorities and backward regions.

The crowded island of Java, always the centre of Dutch power in the East, is divided into three Provinces, each under a Governor and partially elective council. These Provinces are subdivided into Residencies, each under a Dutch Resident, and these again into Regencies. Each Regency is ruled by an aristocratic Javanese, who has qualified by education for the succession, and a partially elective council, subject more or less to the control of the Dutch Assistant-Resident. It is an illogical system, as all forms of indirect rule must be; the effective power exercised by Regent or Resident depends largely on their respective characters; but the system works, and the power of the Javanese Regents appears to be growing *vis-à-vis* the Residents, though not always *vis-à-vis* the party politicians. There are, further, elective municipal councils and councils of management in each village.

About half the area of the Outer Provinces of Sumatra, Borneo and the Great East is ruled directly by three Residents. The remainder, and small parts of Java also, are ruled under the general direction of these Residents by some 300 Princes, many of whom have received a university education.

There are two sets of Courts. Europeans are amenable only to the Residency Courts, which are, however, often staffed by Javanese, an excellent example of how the two communities come together at the top. There are also two administrative services, staffed respectively by Europeans and Javanese, a division which some Dutch administrators believe cannot be long maintained. The more highly paid and highly esteemed specialist or technical services are staffed by men of both races, who are often called to high office in the administration. European and Javanese officials are paid at equal rates, and, as in British India and the British colonies, the tendency is to give preference to local men.

In the economic sphere the mass of the Indonesians are engaged in peasant agriculture, the majority of the Europeans in big-scale plantation, oil, and tin production. Peasant society is helped by the breaking up of huge estates acquired by Europeans and Chinese in earlier days, and by the state control and encouragement of co-operation backed by land and savings banks. Native and European agriculturists alike are helped by excellent state scientific institutions, and the latter, financed by the investors of many nations, have made Indonesian rubber, sugar, quinine and palm oil

a terror to competitors in other parts of the world. This great development has been based on wage labour, which has latterly been protected by labour legislation. Compulsory labour for public purposes (*beerendienst*) is still widespread in the comparatively backward Outer Provinces, but is almost gone from Java; recruiting of Indonesian labour for foreign colonies is still permitted, but the authorities are trying to divert this flow to their own Outer Provinces in the hope that it will replace the Chinese. Taxation is not used as a means of raising labour. The general rule is an income tax for all classes, varied sometimes by a land tax, or a wage tax payable in the case of labourers by the employer. Indirect taxation is not in favour, partly on Free Trade principles, partly because it hits the poorest hardest. Meanwhile in 1930 a beginning was made with minor secondary industries and, a few years later, with heavy industries also.

The Dutch have done admirable work for health and education in all their colonies. In Indonesia European and native doctors are numerous, the Malaria Research Bureau is world famous, and big business has played its part by taking better care of its employees. Missions have shared the burden of education with the state. There are three sets of elementary schools: Javanese schools for those in the native economic sphere, schools in which Dutch gradually supersedes the local tongue for Indonesians in the European sphere, and Dutch medium schools for most of the European groups. Vernacular normal schools train native teachers; but all races come together in the

secondary Dutch schools, whence the pick of the scholars go on to a university, in nearly every case the excellent University of Batavia.

The Dutch character never shines so brightly as in adversity. In December 1942 a great thing happened. Holland was in the hands of the Germans, the West Indian colonies were garrisoned by the troops of friendly neighbours, and Indonesia had been overrun by the Japanese. Nevertheless Queen Wilhelmina broadcast from London a promise to summon the four parts of her scattered kingdom to a conference, as soon as all should be free, there to frame a 'Commonwealth . . . a combination of independence and collaboration . . . with complete self-reliance and freedom of conduct for each part regarding its internal affairs, but with the readiness to render mutual assistance'. If this means, as it almost certainly does mean, that there is to be a federal commonwealth in three continents embracing many peoples 'undivided by racial discrimination', the Dutch will have served, not for the first time, as an inspiration to a doubting world.

BRITISH POLICY

The British, like the Dutch and the French, have an unbroken colonial record covering three and a half centuries, a record which also has its dingy pages. They have brought to their empire-building a distrust of theory, albeit certain of their countrymen were schoolmasters to eighteenth-century French and American philosophers. They have stood for the assertion of specific privileges, the civil liberties that are the birth-

right of Englishmen, liberties that have issued in the rule of law and parliamentary government. These liberties they have shared with others, taking or rejecting each man on his merits, and who shall say whether this progressive extension of English privileges has not given more genuine and widespread liberty than the pursuit of Liberty in the abstract?

Alone of colonising Powers the English of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries gave their colonies, as a matter of course, the representative institutions they themselves had had when they founded Virginia, the first of their transatlantic colonies. Again, their empire was the least uniform and restrictive of all the empires of those mercantilist days. Had it not been so, American colonists could hardly have rebelled successfully against George III and his Parliament. For fifty years after that schism, while they were fighting the French, building up an Indian empire, and ruling new colonies that were for the most part tropical, foreign, plural and slave-owning, the British fell back on the principles of law, order and security beyond which their rivals had never proceeded. Meanwhile they ended their own slave trade, freed their colonial slaves, and began to swing away from mercantilism to free trade by way of reciprocity and imperial preference. Then, before this fiscal revolution had been completed, they carried through a revolution in colonial government by extending to their colonies of settlement the cabinet system which they had painfully worked out for themselves during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In these responsible govern-

ment colonies the local executive was amenable to the local legislature in all domestic affairs, and not to the Parliament at Westminster. When, much later, this freedom of action was extended to external affairs the colony concerned became a Dominion with an international status equal, and powers similar, to those of Great Britain herself.

This process of 'colonial liberation' did not stop with the colonies of European settlement. From 1872 onwards self-governing powers were extended to colonies in which white men were often a small minority. Presently they began to be extended to British India. More than half the area that is coloured red on the map to-day is ruled in freedom by its own governments, and India, a further one-eighth of that area and the home of three-quarters of the population of the British Empire, is near to doing likewise. Meanwhile, between the two wars, the protected states of Egypt and Iraq were recognised as sovereign states bound only by treaty to allow Great Britain the use of bases and, in time of war, communications for purposes of mutual defence. This constitutional advance has not gone on unchecked. Privileges can be taken away as well as granted if they are abused or prove too heavy to be borne. It was for one or both of these reasons that many of the West Indian colonies and, later on, Cyprus and Malta lost their representative institutions, and that the Dominion of Newfoundland recently surrendered her high powers and status. On the other hand, plural and tropical Ceylon has long enjoyed a very close approximation to self-govern-

118 CONSTITUTIONS, DEVELOPMENT, WELFARE
ment; Jamaica runs Ceylon close, and Trinidad and British Guiana are hard on the heels of Jamaica....

The British Colonial Empire is not a system of 'scheduled liberation' in the usually accepted sense. The experiment of binding the future has indeed been made once, in mandated Palestine. There, in 1939, the British Government laid it down that limited Zionist immigration should continue for five more years, and even after that date subject to Arab consent, and that at the end of ten years Arabs and Zionists would be called upon to conduct their own government jointly, subject only to a few necessary safeguards. Apart from this desperate venture the British Colonial Empire has never been run to a time-table. It is, none the less, a system of scheduled liberation in the far more hopeful sense that the stages are clearly marked on the well-worn road that leads from 'the position of inferiority to that of association'.

The ideas, therefore, which inform the British Colonial Empire are that all the King's subjects are entitled to the civil liberties of Englishmen; that all shall be free to make their own ways socially and economically under the law; and that each of them is a potential citizen, not indeed of the United Kingdom unless he be domiciled there, but of the part of the empire in which he is domiciled as soon as that part shall have achieved autonomy.

These ideas have had fuller effect in old-established colonies than in protected states or tribal areas, but everywhere they have worked themselves out in a highly decentralised and varied system of governance.

Legally the Crown can veto all colonial legislation, and Parliament can legislate for any colony. Neither power is used at all frequently, nor has Parliament taxed a colony since 1778 except for the regulation of imperial trade. The British rule is for Parliament to leave everything it can to the Colonial Secretary,¹ who is responsible to itself, for him to give the colonial executives and legislatures as free a hand as possible, and for them to delegate fairly wide powers to municipal councils, tribal authorities or district officers, the colonial empire's men of all work.

The Governor, or other head of the colonial executive, relies for the detailed execution of policy on a civil service that knows no legal colour bar and has always been recruited overwhelmingly from local sources. On the other hand the key posts, other than the judicial, have usually been held by men recruited in the United Kingdom or the Dominions and paid at higher rates than their colonial colleagues. The appointment of local men to high administrative posts has latterly become much more frequent. The Governor himself must obey the instructions of the Secretary of State and, where the official bloc forms the majority of his Executive Council, can do so without difficulty. Elsewhere the cabinet system is visibly taking shape. In some colonies unofficial nominees and elective members of the legislature together balance the officials, the Governor wielding a casting vote; in Ceylon and

¹ The Sudan is under the Foreign Secretary, and the three South African High Commission Territories or Protectorates are under the Dominion Secretary.

120 CONSTITUTIONS, DEVELOPMENT, WELFARE
Jamaica members of the legislature are in the majority.

Legislatures, which exist in most colonies, range from mere advisory councils to fully elective assemblies. An increasing number of them contain an elective element. There is no political colour bar, but the height of the franchise often gives Europeans and westernised natives an advantage. On the other hand Ceylon and Jamaica have adult suffrage. Usually there is a single voters' roll, but where society is too plural to permit of this, there are communal rolls, minorities and other special interests being represented by nominees. Tribes are usually represented by chiefs, or by natives possessing the chief's confidence, or by European nominees. Meanwhile the imperial policy is to enfranchise in some way all the King's subjects who are literate, in whatever language. The powers of these legislatures vary according to their composition. Where the official bloc or the Governor's casting vote can prevail, the official policy can always be carried; elsewhere the Governor can certify a measure as absolutely necessary and carry it subject to confirmation from Whitehall. But, as in India, these overriding powers are little used, for the sound parliamentary practice is growing of bringing in measures that have been more or less agreed upon beforehand by the executive and leaders of the legislature.

This full system of colonial rule does not apply to many parts of the colonial empire. In protected states government is in the name, and, in varying degrees, by the authority of the native rulers; in Moslem states

Islamic law runs parallel to British law; in many other parts tribal law and custom are maintained. The specifically British form of indirect rule has been set up in large areas of tropical Africa and parts of Asia also. This is a system which seeks to combine British officials and Native authorities, whether these be chiefs or councils, in a single administration, to build up native institutions, and to train natives to manage their own local affairs in the expectation that they will one day manage affairs that are very much more than local.

Shortly before the Great War the British carried through a good deal of closer political union, in Malaya, Northern Rhodesia and Nigeria. Since that war they have only been able to effect closer official collaboration, French fashion, in certain parts. Dispersion and strong local interests have thus far prevented closer union in the Caribbean area and West Africa; native opposition and imperial fears that power will pass to small European minorities have checked it in East and Central Africa; native opposition and imperial disapproval of South Africa's segregation policy have prevented the transfer of the governance of the three local High Commission Territories to the Union.

In the economic sphere the British Colonial Empire is still in the main a *laissez-faire* empire in which protectionists and planners have to prove their case. There is no statutory economic colour bar, but in some colonies white farmers or skilled workmen have been strong enough to secure one either by custom, regulation or administrative practice. Colonial economies

are still almost entirely at the stage of primary production. Secondary industries were indeed springing up here and there even before the Axis War, and have been stimulated by war-time needs, especially in West Africa; but the industrialisation of the British colonies still lies ahead. Meanwhile mining and mineral oil production are almost entirely on capitalist lines; agriculture is either on a tribal, peasant or plantation basis.

British policy, generally speaking, aims at maintaining tribal tenures of land, especially in areas subject to indirect rule. Where conditions are favourable and native individual tenure shows signs of spreading, as in Uganda, the Southern Sudan and West Africa, it encourages peasant cultivation and buttresses it with co-operative and other customary aids to the small man. Large European plantations are the rule in Barbados, the ex-German Cameroons, the white enclaves of Central and East Africa, Malaya, and Fiji, but even here there are plenty of tribal or peasant holdings. All these systems of cultivation are receiving an increasing volume of official advice based on the work of the Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture in Trinidad.

Wage labour is forthcoming readily enough where society is organised on a capitalist basis; in tribal lands it is produced by most of the pressures and attractions which operate elsewhere. The poll or hut tax is universal in tropical Africa except on the West Coast; poverty is a great incentive in Kenya, isolated Nyasaland, and the South African High Commission Terri-

tories. Labour recruiting is regulated, often by bilateral agreements between neighbouring governments; in some parts, notably in the Pacific islands, indentured labour survives. Officials are forbidden to press chiefs for labour, but it must be confessed that sometimes a wink here is as good as a nod. Compulsory labour for public purposes is used sparingly; compulsory labour for private purposes had long been discarded when desperate pressure of war led to its revival in one or two areas in East and West Africa. *Travail éducatif* has been tried only in a few Pacific colonies, and this a generation ago. Meanwhile a growing body of labour legislation has been built up from about 1930 onwards.

The provision of social services was long inadequate. This was due partly to the traditional British reliance on voluntary effort, partly to the Treasury's insistence that each colony must pay its own way and, if it called for imperial aid, cut expenditure to the bone, partly also to lack of revenue. A high proportion of this has always been raised by indirect taxation. Mines and great commercial companies have indeed been taxed directly, but too high a proportion of the proceeds has gone overseas to the state in which the company is registered. Direct taxation was, however, becoming more common before the Axis War, and now the combined pressure of war and the Colonial Office has imposed a modest income tax on nearly every colony.

Much has been done for colonial health and education, though far more remains to be done. Missionaries have been pioneers in both fields more completely than

in any other empire, but, in both, governments have long been taking an increasing share of the burden. Health services draw upon the researches of the London and Liverpool Schools of Tropical Medicine; the Suva Medical School in Fiji is a centre of hope and healing for far more than the British Pacific colonies. Everywhere the doctors, European and native, are being reinforced by dispensers and first aid personnel. In the sphere of education the British, like the Dutch, link up state and missions in one system, and give grants in aid to help the mission schools to raise their standards of teaching. As a rule the state only sets up elementary schools where no mission school is available. Usually the local language is used in the earlier stages, with English later on. Missions and government alike have aimed from the first at giving education a moral, that is, in effect, a religious basis; now they are seeking to train the hand as well as the head, adapting their work to the conditions the child knows. They do not want to train imitation Englishmen, but good members of the local community and, thereafter perhaps, of the world; with the eager help of Africans they are trying to raise the masses as well as train native leaders. Schools range from the humblest bush school to institutions, in Hong Kong, Malaya, Ceylon, Uganda, Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and Barbados, either at or near the university level. Advanced work will, however, have to be done outside the Colonies for some time to come, since a first-class university cannot be created on the instant. Meanwhile the welcome flow of colonial students to

United Kingdom universities has been greatly stimulated by the demands of war and British policy.

The British adopted a policy of development and welfare at their darkest hour in 1940 after a dozen years spent in inquiry and experiment. Financed by the British taxpayer and guided by imperial officials, the scheme aims at developing the social services, encouraging a varied local food production and secondary industries even at the expense of the export trade, and generally of putting the interests of colonial peoples before those of overseas shareholders. The money is no dole, but a means of helping the colonies to stand on their own feet, a capital investment in the work, wealth and happiness of a not inconsiderable section of mankind. Already results are beginning to show themselves in many parts, notably in the West Indies which have also benefited from the work of the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission.

The greatest weakness of the British colonial system is the social colour bar. Whether it is because the British find the class distinctions to which they are accustomed at home emphasised by colour overseas, or that, being eminently clubbable, they do not feel at ease with strangers in the club, the fact remains that this bar is very real in many parts of their colonial empire.

Nevertheless the British Colonial Empire, for all its shortcomings, has won the respect of the liberal and experienced Dutch, and, as their war record shows, the support of the mass of the colonial peoples. The reason is not far to seek. It is the still uncompleted

126 CONSTITUTIONS, DEVELOPMENT, WELFARE
portion of what General Smuts has called 'the widest system of organised human freedom', and Wendell Willkie 'the most exciting experiment in international democracy the world has ever known'.¹ It forms part, and knows that it forms part, of a process of 'decolonisation' which surpasses in scope and variety that effected by the United States, and is surpassed in speed alone by that in course of completion by the U.S.S.R.

UNITED STATES POLICY

The United States derives its political tradition from two worlds: the British and the French. American colonists fought the British to defend their birthrights as Englishmen. They justified their actions in the light of French philosophy, laying more stress on liberty and fraternity than on equality, as became a pioneering people that was still saddled with the 'domestic institution' of slavery. This devotion to ex-British privilege and French theory reveals itself in their Constitution; it inspires their economic policy with its demand for *laissez-faire* for American citizens within the tariff wall and *laissez-passer* for American men, goods, and ideas without; it has dictated their colonial policy. All men may have been created equal and have an inalienable right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, but not all men are acceptable as citizens of these United States. As a rule, therefore, Americans have either incorporated their colonies in the Republic or relinquished them altogether.

¹ *The Daily Mail*, 28 December 1942; *The Times*, 18 November 1943.

Americans have had a notable experience of de-colonisation on their own continent. They made wise provision at the start for the governance and ultimate incorporation of newly-settled territories. Fully two-thirds of their forty-eight States have been Territories, that is, United States colonies. These Territories have been governed first under a republican form of Crown colony rule, and then in the transition stage under a representative system. This system falls short of British responsible government. A Territory indeed sends one non-voting representative to Congress, but it has to submit to taxation for federal purposes without consent. Attempts have been made from time to time to define the stage of development at which a Territory should be eligible for incorporation as a State, but these have in no way limited the absolute freedom of Congress to grant or withhold admission. Territories have sometimes had to wait on party convenience or the settlement of foreign complications. Mormon Utah and Spanish-Indian New Mexico had to wait many years because Congress feared that the social customs of the one and the racial composition of the other would render them unassimilable.

By its own choice the United States has had only a recent and limited experience of ruling distant dependencies. It naturally applies its illogical but highly practical continental system to the Outlying Territories, its present-day colonies. All their inhabitants are American citizens, except the Filipinos, who are protected persons. Each colony has a constitution, more or less complete, on the American model. The

State Department supervises the Territories of Alaska and Hawaii, the Philippines Protectorate, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. The War Department controls the Panama Canal Zone, Guam and Samoa.¹ The Navy Department is responsible for the smaller islands in the Pacific. Problems of indirect rule hardly arise, except in Samoa, where regard is paid to the chiefs and native law.

Thinly peopled and heterogeneous Alaska, and more populous but plural Hawaii, await admission as full States. Predominantly Spanish Puerto Rico and the smaller islands can hardly hope for this privilege, but need not fear to be abandoned since they are strategically valuable. The bases which the United States has leased recently in British Caribbean and Atlantic colonies are no more American possessions than is the naval base at Simonstown in South Africa a British possession, or Napoleon's estate on St Helena a French, for all that the White Ensign flies over the one and the Tricolour over the other. The Philippines, on the other hand, are well on the way to 'scheduled liberation'. The Protectorate is the one notable instance, other than Palestine, in which this method of decolonisation is being tried. Conditions there are as favourable as those in Palestine are unfavourable. The Filipino population is far more coherent than the acutely plural societies of the Levant or Indonesia or Malaya; the bulk of it is more nearly assimilated to Western civilisation than that of Ceylon or Indonesia

¹ 'War and Colonies' were combined at Whitehall from 1801 till 1854.

or Indo-China. Neither Hinduism nor Islam ever dominated the Filipinos; hence, the vast majority of them became Catholics during the long centuries of Spanish rule, and, thanks to enthusiastic American schooling during the early years of the American occupation, use English as their lingua franca. Moreover their ruling class has been ready and able to take over.

The Philippines have long had an elective President and legislature. On the other hand, the United States High Commissioner at Manila has exercised considerable powers, and the United States President has controlled in the last resort foreign affairs, finance and the tariff. In 1935 the Protectorate was promised independence in 1946. This promise was given, partly because Filipino spokesmen desired it, partly because Congress deemed so distant a community unassimilable, and partly because certain American business interests were anxious to see an end to the competition of the Philippines' tropical produce with their own in the highly privileged home market.¹ Fear of Japan presently led Filipinos to hint their preference for Dominion powers and status behind the shield of the United States Navy rather than a bleak and unqualified independence. More immediately to the point, fear of

¹ History tends to repeat itself, in English at all events. One of the reasons why the British kept French Canada (*quelques arpents de neige*) and Spanish Florida instead of Guadeloupe and Puerto Rico at the close of the Seven Years' War was that the West Indian interest had no mind to see ex-French and ex-Spanish sugar competing with that of Barbados and Jamaica in the highly privileged home market.

exposure to the full blast of highly developed Indonesian competition moved them to obtain an assurance that they would not be thrust completely into economic isolation till 1961. Then, while they were seeking to give a stiffening to the promised independence by launching secondary industries, they were overrun by the Japanese. The United States authorities presently extended the term of office of the Filipino President till the invaders should have been driven out, and renewed the promise of independence subject now to the grant of bases and other facilities.

For the rest most Americans have taken to their overseas empire the colour prejudice which they hold in even stronger measure than the British, thanks to continued contact with the Negro tenth of their own republic. They have had little call, however, to give way to it in their principal dependencies since the ruling class in the Philippines is not so very different from their own, and half-breed descendants of white folk and that splendid Polynesian race, which has learned to live happily beside Europeans in Tonga and New Zealand, have in large measure set the social standards in Hawaii. American missionaries, teachers and doctors have lived up to their customary high standards in their limited colonial field. In the economic sphere American *laissez-faire* has naturally prevailed. In the Panama Zone the vital canal has been cut and disease conquered. Hawaii has prospered on its sub-tropical produce, the tourist traffic and the naval base at Pearl Harbour. Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have shared to the full in the prolonged

Caribbean depression from which they may now hope to be rescued by the Anglo-American Commission. Alaska has been more or less neglected since the gold rush died away. It may expect better things now that its strategic importance has been revealed and a national highway links it to the main body of the United States. As for the Philippines, nearly two-thirds of their area is cultivable, but little more than one-sixth has been cultivated. The rest is jungle.

U.S.S.R. POLICY

The U.S.S.R. is the colonising Power that has acted most decisively on the conviction that politics cannot be divorced from economics. The October Revolution was a protest against the spiritual and material confusion that had been wrought by a head-on collision between the Industrial Revolution and the liberal revolutions of the West in a land whose social structure was outrageous and traditions fierce. The Soviets claim the Right to Live in return for labour. Like the French they stress equality and fraternity far more than the liberty that may so easily degenerate into license to live at ease by the labour of others. They set little store by the specific liberties which have meant so much to Belgians, Dutch, British and Americans, but which their own fathers had never known.

The experience, traditions and governmental machinery of the U.S.S.R. are so different from those of the Western Powers that it is hard to compare the Soviets' quasi-colonial policy with their's with fairness to all parties. The Soviet Union consists of a federation

132 CONSTITUTIONS, DEVELOPMENT, WELFARE
of Union Republics. Every adult in the federation is an enfranchised citizen. Some of the Union Republics are subdivided into Autonomous Republics, Autonomous Regions, and National Areas which all have their due measure of representation in both houses of the central legislature beside the Union Republics. The less advanced of these subdivisions are the quasi-colonies of the U.S.S.R. Outer Mongolia is an independent republic bound by treaty to the federation.

Like most other communities the Soviets give effective political power to those who will take the trouble to gain it, but they give it in a manner more frank and formal than do many of them. Each citizen is eligible to the Communist Party provided he or she passes the tests and submits to party discipline. Effective power lies with the small minority of the Soviets' 193,000,000 inhabitants who are thus organised, and with Joseph Stalin, the Party's Secretary General. The appointment of party members to key positions and the overwhelming influence of the immense Russian Republic hold the federation together and ensure its effective control from the centre.

There is as yet little of the political liberty that Westerners know in any part of the U.S.S.R. Citizens are encouraged indeed to take an active part in their own daily affairs; they may criticise the working of the Soviet system, and the shortcomings of its officials from the Secretary General downwards, with fraternal bluntness; but they still find it inadvisable to criticise the system itself. It is not easy for a foreigner to judge how far rights conferred in theory are actual. For

instance, the Union Republics, which correspond to Dominions in the British system, have the right to secede. This right is not specifically conferred on Dominions; but whereas all the world knows that a Dominion can secede without let or hindrance, and Eire has virtually done so, it does not yet know what would happen to a local patriot who advocated such a step for his Union Republic. In the quasi-colonial sphere again, local citizens hold high office, but from force of circumstances and policy Russian control is as real there as is metropolitan control in the acknowledged colonies of other Powers.

Forward-looking Soviet citizens, like their Chinese fellows under the one-party rule of the Kuomintang, hope that fuller political freedoms may be their's one day. Meanwhile they agree that first things must come first, and first things are food in the belly, boots on the feet, and approved ideas in a man's head, or, as an Englishman would say, development and welfare before responsible government. The Soviets are carrying into the remotest corners of their backveld the agricultural, mining and industrial revolutions which they began in their western republics a quarter of a century ago. This they are doing, not merely to enhance the might of their vast continental federation, but to raise the standard of life everywhere nearer to that of the most favoured regions. At the same time they are devolving upon their quasi-colonies responsibility for local finance and the local planning of the production of consumption goods. This devolution had already been set on foot before the German invasion of 1941;

it has been carried on fast to meet the needs of a war that has everywhere enforced a dispersion of industry and responsibility.

Doctors and teachers go to all parts of the U.S.S.R. side by side with the technicians and agricultural experts, especially the teachers trained at the Leningrad Institute for service in the backward areas of the south-east and the tribal lands of Northern Asia. The idea is to provide mass education, and reverse the old Tsarist policy of Russification. The Soviets, like the Chinese, have worked wonders in overcoming illiteracy, but even they have not been able to carry through the second part of their policy at one sweep. Except in the Ukraine, most of the teachers are still perforce Russians; Russian is the second, if not the first, language in the schools everywhere; most of the school books, for lack of others, are Russian and in the Russian script; communist doctrines alone are permissible in the schools. On the other hand, a determined effort is being made to revive vernaculars and local cultures, in so far as these do not conflict with the law of the Soviet Union, and to develop them so that one day they may be fitted into world cultures which shall be 'national in form and international in content'.

The distinction which the U.S.S.R. thus draws between the cultural, spiritual, idea of the nation and the political idea of the state is not new; it has often been drawn in practice, as Welshmen, French Canadians, Afrikanders, and many colonial peoples well know. But the stress which the U.S.S.R. lays upon it does constitute a contribution to the art of politics, at

all events as this art has commonly been practised in continental Europe and the United States. It is a distinction which the Powers will have to draw clearly, both in the Colonies and within their own borders, if they are to avoid repeating one of the greatest mistakes of the peacemakers of Versailles.

CHAPTER V

THE FUTURE OF THE COLONIES

The future of the Colonies depends on the character of the post-war settlement. If, in its political aspects, this settlement merely promises a return to the pre-war anarchy of self-regarding sovereign states, the colonising Powers must be reluctant to do anything that will radically reduce their strength at home or weaken their authority overseas. If, again, this settlement be not accompanied by a sustained effort to bring the Colonies, the slums that boast their sovereign independence, and the distressed areas that are the shame of great states nearer to the level of more favoured regions, there can be no lasting hope of peace. If, on the other hand, a beginning be made of these necessary tasks and the settlement establishes an effective world order, the Colonies' hopes of rapid political advancement may well be realised, for then the Powers will have less need to play for safety.

However important the economic and social aspects of the colonial problem may be, the future of the Colonies is ultimately a question of politics. This fact must be emphasised because imperial reformers tend nowadays to salaam perfunctorily before the throne of self-government and then hurry off to the day's work of furthering colonial development and welfare. This tendency to shelve the political side of the problem is

part of the general reaction against all that the nineteenth century stood for. It will not do. Doubtless, the Western democracies of that great age, and the British above all, expected too much of politics divorced from economics; but they are not all fools who contend for forms of government to-day. Economic planners, and moralists also, defeat their own ends if they pass over too lightly such matters as the part to be played by power in international affairs, the relations of legislatures to executives, or the connection between votes and the morale of electors and the morals of elected persons, between votes and the preservation of civil rights, votes and deliverance from the monstrous regiment of experts, even between votes and bread. In the last resort it is the politically effective members of a community who decide what form the national housekeeping shall take, what kind of public morals shall be honoured, and what the attitude of their state shall be towards other states.

COLONIAL LIBERATION

Two extreme solutions of the colonial problem can, perhaps, be ruled out at once: the use of colonies as pawns in the great game of power politics, and the 'instant liberation' of all dependencies. The use of colonies as counters to secure 'a good European settlement' was excusable in Castlereagh's time. Anything of the kind would be unpardonable to-day when so many of the Colonies are no mere naval bases, commercial entrepôts or slave-owning islands, but extensive, populous and civilised territories, and nearly

all have become self-conscious with wishes and wills of their own. Yet there are people, some of them internationalists, others quite the reverse, who indulge in the fascinating game of rearranging the map. The process resembles nothing so much as the dealing of an ecumenical pack of cards, and it is remarkable how, with absolutely no deception, the economic trumps fall to the country of the dealer's birth or adoption. The demand for instant liberation, on the other hand, is raised by groups who hope to assume power in certain colonies, and elsewhere by doctrinaires who think in terms of a standardised colonial subject struggling to be free. In the real world colonial peoples range from Stone Age pigmies to executive councillors and professors, not all of whom are thirsting for a dangerous and illusory independence.

Both of these extreme solutions ignore the fact that colonies are groups of human beings set in a naughty world. The same comment applies to the more commonly heard demand for 'scheduled liberation'. This procedure might have the merit of encouraging a colony, and the Mother Country for her credit's sake, to prepare for the day of formal or virtual independence, but that is all that can be said for attempting to run an empire by the clock. The idea of a time-table is not new. The South Africa Act of 1909, the Government of India Act of 1919, and the recent Jamaican constitution provided for an overhaul at the end of a term of years. But this was merely to express the hope and expectation that changes would then be possible. To promise that changes will be made, come rain or

shine, is to gamble against fate and circumstance. If the promise cannot be fulfilled on the appointed day to the satisfaction of all parties, including third parties, one of two things must happen: either the promised advance will be withheld amid mutual recriminations, or it will be carried out at the risk of injustice to some and, possibly, disaster to all. The progress of the two experiments that are now being made does not augur well for the general application of scheduled liberation to the Colonies. Quite apart from the Japanese invasion, two radical changes have already been made in the Philippines programme of 1935, while prolonged war has so exacerbated the mutual antipathies and rival ambitions of Arabs and Zionists that any attempt to adhere to the Palestine time-table of 1939 will probably lead to a collision.

Finally, 'scheduled liberation' goes dead against the traditions and practice of the British and Americans, the only two peoples who have pursued a policy of decolonisation over a long term of years. In both their empires each case has been considered on its merits; many factors have been taken into account beside the time factor. Decision has been reached by the human method of discussion helped forward sometimes by pressure, and not always pressure from the colonial side. In dealing with so difficult and complex a matter as the future of the Colonies the proper course would seem to be to follow the advice of John Dickinson, who bade the Founding Fathers of the United States let experience be their only guide, since reason might mislead them. The American federation is the monu-

ment to the wisdom of the 'Pennsylvania Farmer's' counsel.

Freedom from imperial control can be given in four ways: either by the recognition of independence, or by incorporation with the metropolitan state, or by the recognition of Dominion powers and status, or, less comprehensively, by the grant of responsible government as the British understand it. Dominion powers and status differ from formal independence only in this, that the moral obligation of the Mother Country and the Dominions to stand by one another is more real and lively than it can be as between formally independent allies. Responsible government, on the other hand, gives the colony control of its domestic affairs, subject perhaps to safeguards which are in practice merely an imperial invitation to think twice before acting, but withholds from it the conduct of foreign affairs.

Far-reaching 'liberation' along one or other of these lines has been achieved recently, or is in process of achievement, in the U.S.S.R., Iraq, Egypt, India, Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines, Syria, the Lebanon, and several British colonies. Given a stable and peaceful world, the French North African protectorates, Puerto Rico, Indo-China and Korea could probably shoulder similar responsibilities. If, however, ability to perform public duties is thus to be taken as the test of fitness, as in feudal times, other dependencies cannot hope to enjoy these privileges yet awhile. The fate of Newfoundland proves that autonomy demands a certain magnitude, and many colonies are smaller,

more limited in human and material resources, and more isolated than this ex-Dominion. They cannot meet the primary demands that they shall maintain internal order, provide for their own landward defence in time of peace, and pay their own way. The caution with which Jamaica and Trinidad have availed themselves of development and welfare money under imperial control shows that these two advanced communities are well aware that a colony cannot be self-governing if the Mother Country has to finance it. Closer union might help some groups of colonies out of this dilemma; but the problem of the plural society would still have to be overcome in very many dependencies, while the proved inability of tribal societies to stand up to the onrush of Western, Moslem or Indian civilisation suggests that withdrawal from them of the imperial protection would induce chaos. Mankind has a right to demand that a 'liberated' people shall not prove a menace to its own minorities or a nuisance to its neighbours. The multiplication of weak states in the tropics, at a time when the tendency in more fully developed regions is towards consolidation, must serve at once as a temptation to the rapacious and an embarrassment to the guardians of the world's peace.

EXTERNAL PROBLEMS

The external dangers that await the 'liberated' colony arise from predatory governments and acquisitive members of stronger societies. However perfect the peace settlement, small states, and states not so very small, may find that their surest defence lies in affording

strong and friendly Powers the use of bases and other facilities. Precedents for this partial solution of the problem of independence combined with security were set up by the Anglo-Irish Treaty and the Anglo-South African Agreement of 1921. These have been followed by Great Britain again in Iraq and Egypt, by the U.S.S.R. in Outer Mongolia, by France in Syria, and by the U.S.A., first in Cuba and now in the Philippines. The outcome of the two experimental arrangements illustrate the mutual, and indeed general, advantages that may issue from this device. South Africa stood by the Simonstown Agreement and thus made possible the conduct of the East and North African campaigns round by the Cape. Eire insisted on the abrogation of the clauses of the treaty that safeguarded the North Atlantic route and thereby imperilled the liberties of mankind.

Weak and unprotected communities are, however, likely to be endangered in the immediate future rather by acquisitive members of stronger societies than by predatory governments. Just as piracy has shown its ugly skull and crossbones wherever resolute sea-power has been lacking, so, on land, well-equipped and unscrupulous individuals or groups have committed abominations wherever governments and public opinion have been too feeble to resist them. It was because of the doings of men like these that even reluctant governments took over huge tracts of tribal territory half a century ago. Given similar circumstances, they would have to do so again.

Considerable and reasonably stable societies can

usually hold a handful of such invaders in check; but even the Great Powers, other than the U.S.S.R. where the problem cannot arise, are finding it hard to control great semi-monopolistic companies and cartels. Such associations have served a useful purpose, but the benefits they confer on society are now being outweighed by the dangers arising from their irresponsible power. This is especially true of the Colonies, where the forces that can combat them are weak. The American-owned United Fruit Company, whose tentacles reach far up the Pacific Slope and far down into South America, cannot be controlled by any Caribbean government. A British-owned corporation like the United Africa Company, which ramifies from London to the Congo, enjoys effective powers in West Africa that sort ill with nascent democracy in those parts.

The danger arising from great corporations is that, however personally admirable their directors may be, they cannot in the long run belie their purpose. That purpose is, as the attorney of a famous chartered company once explained, 'the acquisition of gain'. Without gain they cannot survive, and in pursuit of it they are tempted to behave like mediaeval barons who sought to control the King and dominate the common people at home, and did things that shocked Popes once they had gone eastward of the Adriatic. This is no idle simile. Lacking a controlling hand, companies are apt to do 'strange things when they go crusading beyond the Line or east of Suez, even though they blazon 'Service' on their shields and deck their spears with the pennon of 'Uplift'. The one black chapter in

the long history of British dealings with India covers the dozen years after the victory of Plassey, when the East India Company exercised power in Bengal without responsibility to anyone. Much later the doings of the concessionaires in the Congo Free State and the French Congo were scandalous. Conversely, as parliamentary control became more real, so did John Company mend its ways, till at the last, when it was ceasing to be a trading concern at all, it ruled British India to the admiration even of its enemies. Similarly, the greater the measure of parliamentary control, and the more lively the public opinion behind Parliament, the better the records of more recent chartered companies.

Meanwhile, after the war of 1914-18, big business, with one foot at Westminster and the other in the City, cheerfully proposed to pay off war debts and give the British working man better wages and a six-hour day by exploiting tropical Africa. That campaign was defeated, but there are signs to-day on both sides of the North Atlantic that something like it may be attempted again. Some of those who incline towards such things are keen advocates of colonial 'liberation' here and now. The widely different fortunes of the French and British West African colonies and the neighbouring Republic of Liberia show what such liberation may be worth to weak tropical societies. Each of these territories has a small and more or less westernised Negro community on the coast and unsophisticated tribesmen in the hinterland. The Negro government of Liberia, inexperienced, needy,

and not without ambition, fell well and truly into the debt of the Firestone Tyre Company. It was obliged to grant a concession which, if exercised to the full, will give the company the best land in the republic and a call upon the great bulk of its man-power. By contrast the Governors of Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast greeted coldly proposals from the Leverhulme palm-oil interests to develop their respective colonies on a plantation basis, while the Governor of Nigeria rejected them so flatly that the company's spokesman retired to the more congenial atmosphere of the Belgian Congo, alleging with more warmth than accuracy that it was this kind of thing that had lost Great Britain her American colonies.¹

One last external force has to be reckoned with. Until recently governments have relied on individual European settlers as a prime means of developing the agricultural resources of many of their colonies. In days when they themselves were not prepared to give a lead, such settlers were the readiest means of giving archaic civilisations and tribal communities the thrust they must have if ever they were to catch up with more efficient and developed communities. But now that this thrust has been given and governments are prepared to plan and act, there is less need to rely on such haphazard and expensive civilising methods. This is especially true of tribal colonies. There, European farming is gentleman farming, farming by the successors of those 'spirited proprietors' of Arthur

¹ W. K. Hancock, *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*, II, Part 2, pp. 190-1; R. L. Buell, *Native Problem*, I, 768-9, 869.

Young's day who did great things for scientific agriculture and drove the British peasantry off the land in the process. The price paid for this saving thrust by some tribal colonies is already high, for much of the best land has been earmarked by the settlers, and the cost of keeping white farmers on the land, educating their children locally, and giving them the social services they expect, falls heavily on the colonial revenues. If, as some groups of white settlers now propose, tribal colonies are to be called upon to carry the weight of large civilised communities, the price will be unconscionable, and all the more unconscionable in that it is still unproven whether white societies can perpetuate themselves without deterioration in these high tropical altitudes.

How unconscionable this price may be can be read in the history of Ireland from the late twelfth century onwards. The story is that of the clash between two types of society: the one essentially tribal, especially *in the vital matter of landholding*, the other *feudal at first and then individualist*. Lacking the power to rule effectively, the English Crown left its segregationist colony of the Irish Pale to maintain itself against 'the wild Irish', while Anglo-Norman-Welsh lords behaved after the manner of their kind on either side of the border. Then, in the course of a century and a half of alternate rebellion, confiscation and plantation, the colony spread over all Ireland. Thereafter an oligarchy of Protestant landlords, some of them absentees, monopolised local political power and drew rent or services from a mass of Catholic tenants-at-will and

short-term labourers, who grubbed for a living on inadequate lands, and multiplied. The way out was found in the end, at great expense to the British taxpayer, by the Land Purchase Act of 1903, which created the free Irish peasantry. But no Act could eradicate the ancient grudge that festers wherever Irishmen meet from Glasgow to Sydney by way of Chicago.

Mercifully there is no need for colonies to choose between degenerating into eighteenth-century tropical Irelands or remaining in a state of mummified tribalism. The British Government, and men like Sir Horace Plunkett, at long last taught the peoples of the British Isles that suitable legislation and self-help can at least establish a free farming community. Lord Milner again taught South Africa, and Lord Curzon taught India, that official guidance and example can teach good farming to intelligent peoples. Experiments in colonies (and colonial peoples have their fair share of intelligence) have since shown that these methods can teach good farming better, and quite as quickly, as work even upon a model company's plantation or the most admirable settler's farm. Given time, many tribal societies can be transformed into communities of peasants and small farmers.

Peasant cultivation is no more easy to establish on dry lands or forest lands than are other kinds of cultivation. It answers best where a relatively numerous population is blessed with reasonably good soil and climate. Since, however, these are the very conditions that attract plantation owners, peasant societies must be protected till they have taken root.

Once they have done so, however, they can be a positive source of strength to such plantations as exist or other big undertakings that may be set on foot. Younger sons and daughters seek wages wherewith to meet the family's demand for a higher standard of living, and work all the better on their employer's estate for having helped to work their father's holding. If, as may well be, these young folk have learned simple secondary industries at home, they will fall the more readily into place in major industries, and if they ask higher wages than is customary in most parts now, so much the better for the prospects of their colony as a market for home and overseas goods, provided local production keeps pace with the rise in wages.

On the other hand, the peasant family left to its own devices has always worked on the narrowest of margins and drifted into hopeless debt. It may look now for salvation from this secular misery to co-operation reinforced by land, local credit, and savings banks. Co-operators can buy expensive plant, standardise products, and organise marketing; they can build up capital, send the local moneylender to his own place, and even stand up to companies; above all they can train their own directors and accustom their rank and file to self-government, starting, where self-government should start, at the bottom. Co-operation, whether by producers or consumers, promises much to all colonies; it promises most perhaps to Black Africa and the Pacific islands whose tribal life is still based in the main on co-operative principles. Colonial administrators and peoples can take heart from the

thought that the Rochdale Pioneers of 1844 were forerunners of the enfranchised British artisans of 1867 and the Labour Party of 1893.

INTERNAL PROBLEMS

The chief internal dangers that threaten most of the colonies that hope for 'liberation' arise from the heterogeneity of their own societies. Where society is diverse, each group living in its own area, a temporary solution may be found by partition. The partition of artificial administrative units may be a good thing, especially where it forms part of the rectification of badly drawn frontiers; but partition will often have the drawback of multiplying frontiers and administrations. Since, moreover, Western civilisation has worked inwards from the sea, coastal areas are commonly the most advanced, and will have the best claim to become self-governing colonies, Dominions, or even states. By so doing they will lose control of their more backward hinterlands, and these hinterlands, in the absence of awkward 'Polish corridors', will lie at the mercy of the governments that control the ports.

Even the dubious remedy of partition cannot be applied to plural or stratified societies. Here, whether the governmental tradition be bureaucratic or parliamentary, self-government may easily mean, and too often has meant, government of the rest by one or two favoured groups. Such groups, being human and in power, tend to put their own interests first even more nakedly than do classes in a homogeneous society, and, being more personally interested than a distant elec-

torate or body of shareholders in the labour of the masses, are tempted to exploit that labour more vigorously than they. They are better able to do so from having learned much of the arts of government and organisation from the imperial Power. Mere withdrawal of imperial authority can never restore the *status quo ante*.

The records of many plural tropical colonies that have become independent are not encouraging. Neither are those of some which aspire to become so. The Creoles, who drove the Spaniards out of mainland Latin America, bore hardly on the masses; the Iraqis did not display patience towards their Assyrian minority; British settlers in Central and East Africa are inclined towards oligarchy. There is no need to believe all that is said against the Government of Liberia, for that government is black and possessed of coveted assets; but the story of its relations with its tribesmen is not inspiring. The first Burmese prime minister was narrowly prevented from declaring himself dictator after a defeat in the legislature, and has since collaborated with the invading Japanese. The Filipino President, for his part, disclaimed all idea of dictatorship, but declared in favour of one-party rule and, relying on landlords who controlled the masses more completely than ever, raised markedly the age of entry into the public schools.

But again the story of Ireland reveals most clearly the lengths to which an unrestrained oligarchy can go in a plural society. The Dublin Parliament in the Irish Pale, England's first colony, ran true to 'tropical'

colonial form throughout. While the old Ireland stood, it showed itself hostile to the tribes, nervous of the lords, and prickly towards the English Crown. When, in the eighteenth century, it had degenerated into a mere Anglican Garrison Parliament, it behaved like the bolder of the West Indian legislatures of its day. Having been given freedom to manage its Catholics and Dissenters in return for 'a quiet session', it oppressed the mass of the population and defied the imperial authorities as far as it dared for fear of these 'Others'. Many of the Garrison legislators were most estimable men in private life; but since they and their handful of electors were in an utterly false position, their Parliament became notorious in an age of parliamentary corruption. In the end it had to be bought out at a flat rate of so much a seat, sometimes with a title thrown in for good measure.

Corruptio optimi pessima. As usual the lesson was read most easily in the tropics, where black skins, servile status, and distance brought out the facts in higher relief than nearer home. Throughout the nineteenth century philanthropists helped powerfully to deprive the oligarchic West Indian legislatures of their powers. To-day they are even more opposed than imperial officials to the grant of premature constitutional liberties to tropical colonies, lest power should fall into the hands of oligarchies of whatever colour or origin.

If colonial autonomy is to be real and just it must be based on representative institutions of some kind. If these institutions are to be elective the franchise must

be liberal, since elected persons necessarily pay more heed to those who elect them than to those who do not. The problem is how to achieve this in a plural society. Those colonising peoples who have aimed at conferring effective powers on their Colonials have thus far given them instalments of the institutions they themselves possess. Naturally so. These things are their's; they understand them and are proud of them; the dependent peoples ask for them, and would resent anything else as a Machiavellian attempt to foist an inferior article upon them. Time and fuller information alone can show how the Soviet system really works in the quasi-colonies of the U.S.S.R., but it is already clear that Western representative institutions are not easily adaptable to plural societies whose sectionalism encourages the deplorable identification of democracy with the counting of heads. This is true of the United States system with its rigid division of powers; it is doubly true of the flexible British system, to which the Dutch more or less conforms. So many of the rules of the parliamentary game, as of any game worth playing, are matters of the spirit and not of the letter; they cannot be set down in black and white, and indexed. On the other hand, other forms of representation exist, or can be devised, by which the essentials of democratic rule may be secured. Meanwhile, whatever the prospects of the British parliamentary system elsewhere, it should answer well in the Caribbean colonies with their long experience of its earlier stages and their relatively homogeneous societies, and also in British tropical Africa, where the British understand it and

the Africans are good tempered, practical, fond of debate, and used to the committee work on which their tribal system and Parliament alike depend.

No central representative legislature can stand unless it is based on local government. It is here that the British system of indirect rule, and the analogous Dutch system, may serve as invaluable training grounds. Indirect rule has its weaknesses. It cannot work where the demand for wage labour is excessive, for this wears down the tribes. Again, chiefs supported by European authority, and relieved thus of many of the checks that operate under purely tribal conditions, may gain too much power; westernised natives find it hard to work with possibly uneducated chiefs from whose authority they or their fathers have broken away; even where the native authority is a tribal council, there is no certainty that indirect rule will ever mean more than local rule. On the other hand the system has two outstanding merits: it gives time for civilised and tribal societies to come to terms with one another, and it is highly flexible. The line of advance would seem to lie through the education of chiefs and masses alike, the gradual transfer to the central authority of powers that cover the interests common to many tribes, the steady admission of natives to the central administration, and the dovetailing and vigorous development of such native and European representative institutions as are compatible with one another.

INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS

Whatever forms of government may grow up within the Colonies, the unchecked rule of colonies by their respective metropolitan Powers can scarcely continue. The jealous insistence of other Powers on their interests as third parties forbids. This insistence is not unreasonable. Third parties have at least as much right to be considered by a government which is administering a colonial empire as have second parties when a government is framing its tariff or immigration laws. Acceptance by a colonising Power of this claim will be a frank admission that a steward is all the better for having an external check on his actions, a guide all the more reliable for having had the benefit of other folks' advice.

International rule, that is, joint rule by a group of governments, was once much talked of. It is now widely condemned, and not least by colonial spokesmen. 'International' may be a blessed word on either side of the North Atlantic, but it is not blessed in Black Africa which remembers Leopold II's International Association of the Congo. Colonial peoples, African and other, realise that international rule must be regulated by a document with the rigidity of a treaty, whereas their hope lies in the flexibility of existing colonial administrations. They know their present district officers and their little ways; they do not want to find themselves under complete strangers speaking unknown tongues and bred in unfamiliar political philosophies. They note, moreover, that many of the ad-

vocates of international rule have hitherto seemed to be more concerned with equality of opportunity for the Powers than with the welfare of colonial peoples, and wonder how many official posts will be left for themselves after so many foreign claimants have been satisfied. Finally, they are learning how to get what they want from their respective imperial Powers, and have no mind to undertake the thankless task of trying to cope with a group of governments. Better the devil they know than seven unknown devils in committee.

The most comprehensive argument against international rule, however, is the fact that the Powers have never tried it on themselves, except within the narrow limits of Tangier and Shanghai and, under rigidly defined conditions, in the little districts of Danzig, Memel and the Saar. True, they have tried it on a bigger scale in two dependencies; but the Anglo-Egyptian condominium of the Sudan works because the stronger partner controls it, while the Anglo-French condominium in the New Hebrides does not work at all, except when a British Commissioner, who realises that morality is not a synonym for British interests, happens to coincide with a French Commissioner who can believe that France may be mistaken. The League of Nations, for all its excellent influence, was in no sense a government, nor was its staff at Geneva always a band of brothers. There is really nothing for the Powers to go by. Until there is, they have no obligation to accept a *pis aller* and call it an administration; they have no right to experiment with dependent peoples.

The situation would be different if a group of Powers were to federate or unite, for then there would be a single administration inspired by one philosophy of rule, drawing upon a wider field of skill and experience than any single administration can now do, and supported by the undivided loyalty of its members whatever their national origins. It is partly to secure these advantages that Lionel Curtis and others advocate the federation of the United Kingdom, the Dominions, and the Powers, some of them colonising Powers, of North-Western Europe. Meanwhile the remaining and more immediately hopeful alternative is national rule of colonies under international supervision.

International supervision as distinct from rule is the idea behind the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League. It is implicit in the Atlantic Charter and is taken for granted by the British Government. Its feasibility has been proved by the co-operation between governments which the International Labour Office has long been fostering and the pressure of war has carried far. Many governments, including colonial governments, were represented at the Eastern Group Supply Conference at Delhi; many more have since been learning to work together on the Middle East Supply Conference, the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, and U.N.R.R.A.

Advocates of a world order seem to be generally agreed that there should be a central council, representing governments, at least to advise and therefore to focus world opinion on planning, investment, tariffs, the rectification of awkward frontiers, development

and welfare. Many also envisage a permanent commission, responsible to this council, for the supervision of the Colonies. This commission is to be more expert in colonial administration than the Mandates Commission of the League was in its later days, and is to have very wide powers to receive appeals from colonial peoples, examine colonial conditions on the spot, and give colonial affairs the widest possible publicity.

Various proposals have been made for rendering the work of this central organisation effective. British Labour, briefed by the Fabians, suggests that a conference representing the peoples of the world, including colonial peoples, shall serve at regular intervals as a kind of lower house to the council, and thus ensure, *inter alia*, that world planning shall not mean the entrenching of established interests to the detriment of newcomers, many of whom will be Colonials. Others recommend rather the devolution of as much of the work as possible upon regional councils. Lord Hailey is the chief exponent of this idea, and has won for it the support of many Americans, Chinese and others who are specially interested in the Pacific. Lord Hailey would demarcate zones, each of which is to be under the supervision of a council consisting of representatives of the governments interested in that zone, and of colonial peoples also whenever their affairs are under discussion. The colonising Powers would, however, continue to rule their colonies, unless they consented to share this duty with the regional councils. The British Government has subscribed to the

Hailey scheme in principle, but rightly emphasise need for collaboration by colonial peoples. General Smuts, on the other hand, lays stress on the part played by the Dominions and third party Powers; proposes that, within the British Empire, Great Britain and the Dominions shall continue to rule their respective dependencies, but that, wherever possible, groups of colonies shall be federated into 'national units'. Then, in keeping with the idea which he expounded in relation to tropical Africa in 1929, suggests that 'any interested neighbouring British Commonwealth' shall collaborate with Great Britain and the adjacent national unit or units in the supervision and co-ordination of development policy. Further, the General would group the colonies of the Powers under regional councils representing the colonising Powers concerned and other Powers which are 'regionally interested for security or economic reasons'. These councils are to have 'ultimate control of policy under these two heads and perhaps under others also. Apparently no place is to be found for the colonial national units at this high level.

Regional councils offer obvious benefits, but they also conceal dangers. They may well saddle colonising Powers and colonial peoples with the disadvantages of international rule, unless the distinction between supervisory duties and controlling powers be drawn very sharply. Again, unless the right of third parties to seats on the councils be strictly limited, there is grave risk that colonising Powers, and such colonial peoples as may be consulted, will be overborne by

Powers whose interests are simply military, commercial, or financial, lacking the human ties that subsist between colonisers and the colonised. Above all, there is the danger that colonising Powers which are seeking to pursue liberal policies may be held back by others whose policies are less liberal.

Nowhere is this danger likely to be more real than in the line of British dependencies that stretches northward from the borders of the Union to the borders of Abyssinia and the Sudan. Developments are taking place there, as in other parts of tropical Africa, which promise to give Africans a happier and fuller life than they have yet known. These developments may be warped, to say the least, if the influence of the Union of South Africa, together with that of self-governing Southern Rhodesia, prevails. The Union is bound to play a great part in Africa as the strongest purely African Power, the one large and well-established white community in the entire continent. South Africans have made notable contributions to the world in science, literature, law, architecture and statesmanship; they have done fine work for Africa in engineering, health, education, evangelisation, trade and war. But their rural economy, like that of Southern Rhodesia and the still smaller European communities in the other tropical colonies farther north, is based on the plantation system against which peasants, small farmers and tribesmen cannot stand unaided; their whole society, like that of Southern Rhodesia, is based on the colour bar which has already begun to appear beyond the Zambesi in Northern Rhodesia and Kenya

under the stimulus of war. Meanwhile the Union has long been encouraging the Pan-African idea; white settlers in the North have turned to Pretoria for support whenever imperial policy has seemed to favour the natives; Southern Rhodesia has recently called for a Pan-African Conference.

It is well to get this thing into perspective. The colour bar policy is advocated by at most 2,400,000 white folk in Africa, of whom fully 2,250,000 are South Africans. It is condemned by a small minority of these white folk, and by the governments of Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Portugal. These governments speak for some 120,000,000 white folk in Europe. Four of them speak also for a comparable number of black Africans. Surely the Noes have it, even though the Ayes be reinforced by a considerable body of United States and, less probably, White Australian opinion. In any event, the need for unity on this vital issue constitutes one of the strongest arguments for that closer collaboration between Great Britain and the Powers of North-Western Europe which General Smuts has recommended on other grounds.

Be this as it may, collaboration by colonial peoples in the projected councils will establish their claim to be the partners and not merely wards of their respective Mother Countries. The honoured word 'trusteeship' has fallen into disfavour. Colonial spokesmen dislike its implications of indefinite wardship; other critics thrust upon this political analogy the full rigours of legal definition, and insist

that, whatever third parties may receive, the self-appointed trustee must take no profit from the ward's estate; imperial reformers object that 'trusteeship' is not a programme but a mere principle, which is susceptible of such varied interpretations that even South Africans and Rhodesians can claim that it inspires their restrictive policies.

The strongest argument for substituting the idea of 'partnership' for that of 'trusteeship' is that the change will enhance the self-respect of colonial peoples. But no change of name can alter facts. The Balfour Declaration warned even the Dominions that 'the principles of equality and similarity, appropriate to status do not universally extend to function. Here we require something more than immutable dogmas.' In most cases, and for a long time to come, partnership between the Mother Country and a colony will be a very unequal partnership; decision must rest with the partner with whom real responsibility lies. Further, it will be a disaster if the spirit of trusteeship be abandoned with the word. It is so easy for governments to justify dubious steps on the ground that they make the empire strong in face of its enemies; there are so many parties at home, and in the Colonies, who see ways of furthering their own interests under cover of serving the common weal, and so many more who, by a process of rationalisation, honestly see no distinction between the two, that colonising governments and electorates need a constant reminder of their moral obligations to dependent peoples. There is, by reason of their very dominance, a special call upon them to make sure that

their investment policies do not bear hardly on alien civilised communities, that their land and labour policies do not threaten tribal societies with premature disruption, and that their tariff policies are at least intended to benefit their colonies as well as themselves. A lively sense of trusteeship makes it easier for a colonising people to regard Colonials as ends in themselves and not as means to their own ends.

There is need for imagination in the handling of colonial problems to-day, but there is need above all for courage and honesty. Burke's warning of long ago still stands: 'If we make ourselves too little for the sphere of our duty... be well assured that everything about us will dwindle by degrees, until at length our concerns are shrunk to the dimensions of our minds.... A great empire and little minds go ill together.'

INDEX

- Abyssinia, 41
 Afghanistan, 15
 Africa, 7-10, 16, 30, 40, 42,
 47, 53, 63-5, 80-2, 87, 89,
 97, 124, 148, 152, 158-60
 —, Central, 41, 69, 122,
 150-9
 —, East, 26, 36, 41-2, 64,
 67, 69, 122, 150, 159
 —, Equatorial, 41, 44, 69,
 103
 —, North, 15, 36, 38, 41, 57,
 65, 102, 140
 —, South, 6, 8, 10, 42, 59,
 74, 100, 138, 142, 147, 159-
 60
 —, South-West, 8, 41, 59,
 100
 —, West, 20, 36, 38, 41,
 64-70, 102-4, 121-2, 143-4
 Agriculture, 40, 83-9, 104,
 108, 113, 122, 133, 145
 Alaska, 128, 131
 Albreda, 26
 Algeciras, Act of, 56-7
 Algeria, 6, 9, 11, 15, 41, 57-8,
 101-2, 105
 Angola, 22
 Arabs, 15, 111, 118, 139
 Ashanti, 33
 Assimilation, 101
 Association, 101-5
 Atlantic Charter, 156
 Australia, 6, 8, 10, 41, 54, 59,
 100, 160
 Balfour Declaration, 161
 Bantu, 74
 Barbados, 122, 124, 129
 Bases, 15, 17, 25, 31-4, 102,
 117, 128, 130, 132, 142
 Batavia, 27, 32, 111, 115
 Belgium, *vii*, 6, 7, 9, 22, 34, 36,
 41-4, 52, 55-6, 60-1, 105-8,
 160
 Bizerta, 32
 Bombay, 26
 Borneo, 63, 113
 Burma, 7, 14, 42, 140, 150
 Buxton, Sir T. F., 84
 Cameroons, 41, 122
 Canada, 20, 129
 Cape Coast Castle, 32
 Capetown, 27, 32, 64
 Capital, 45-61, 82-6
 Caribbean Commission, An-
 glo-American, 125, 131,
 156
 Celebes, 42, 113
 Certification, 120
 Ceylon, 14, 26, 32, 42, 69, 117,
 119-20, 124, 128
 China, 8, 10, 13, 14, 17, 20,
 43-4, 48-9, 69, 70, 99,
 110-11, 113, 133-4
 Climate, 65-6
 Colour bar, 73-7, 86, 100-1,
 104, 106, 119-21, 125,
 159-60
 Communications, 63-5
 Company, British South
 Africa, 41
 —, Dutch East India, 99, 109
 —, English East India, 144
 —, Firestone Tyre, 145

- Company, Huileries du Congo, 107
 —, Union Minière, 107
 —, United Africa, 143
 —, United Fruit, 143
 Concessions, 88, 103, 107, 113, 143-5
 Condominiums, 4, 155
 Conference, Eastern Group Supply, 156
 —, Middle East Supply, 156
 Congo, 22, 41, 44, 54-6, 61, 64, 69, 97, 105-8, 143-5, 154
 Conscription, 35-6
 Co-operative societies, 94, 104, 113, 122, 148-9
 Corfu, 32
 Cuba, 142
 Culture, 77-82, 134-5
 Curaçoa, 109
 Curtis, Lionel, 156
 Curzon, Lord, 147
 Cyprus, 117
 Dakar, 10
 Danzig, 155
 Denmark, 6, 7, 26, 100
 Detroit, 27
 Development and Welfare Policy, 125, 141
 Dickinson, John, 139
 Diet, 67, 89
 Dodecanese, 7, 9
 Dominions, 4, 6, 7, 12, 20, 44-5, 49, 59, 76, 117, 129, 133, 140, 158, 161
 Dual Mandate, 98-100
 — Policy, Dutch, 110-15
 Durban, 27
 Education, 79-82, 104, 108, 114, 123-4, 129-30, 134
 Egypt, 14, 15, 47, 84, 117, 140, 142
 Eire, *see* Ireland
 Elmina, 32
 Eritrea, 56
 Fabian Society, 157
 Falkland Islands, 66
 Federation, 115, 121, 131-2, 139, 141, 156, 160
 Fiji, 42, 69, 122, 124
 Florida, 129
 Formosa, 8, 38, 42, 58
 France, *viii*, 2, 6, 9, 11, 15, 22, 25, 29, 32-8, 41-9, 57-61, 99-105, 142, 160
 Franchise, 20, 74, 94-5, 112, 120, 151-3
 Freetown, 27
 Gambia, 26
 Gandhi, Mahatma, 74
 Georgia, 33, 96
 Germany, 2, 21, 28-33, 36, 39-43, 48-50, 53, 60-1, 97-9
 Gibraltar, 31, 63
 Goa, 32
 Gold Coast, 26, 33, 124
 Greece, 52
 Great Britain, *viii*, 2, 3, 6, 9-15, 18-26, 30-2, 36-49, 52-4, 60, 98, 100, 115-26, 139, 142, 157, 160
 Greenland, 7
 Griquas, 78
 Guadeloupe, 101, 129
 Guam, 128
 Guiana, British, 65, 71, 118
 —, Dutch, 65, 71, 109
 —, French, 65, 101
 Hailey, Lord, 157

- Malaya, 20, 37, 42-4, 54, 63,
 66, 69, 70, 121-2, 124, 128
 Malta, 31-2, 117
 Manchuria, 8, 43
 Mandates, 4, 36, 49, 54, 56,
 97-8, 156-7
 Manila, 129
 Marshall, John, 96
 Martinique, 101
 Mauritius, 32, 42, 71
 Mayotte, 32
 Memel, 155
 Mercantilism, 35, 37, 45-61,
 116
 Milner, Lord, 147
 Mines, 83-6, 107, 122-3, 133
 Missionaries, 29, 30, 78-80,
 104, 108, 114, 123-4, 130
 Mombasa, 32
 Montreal, 27
 Morocco, 15, 22, 33, 56-7,
 102
 Mozambique, 22, 32, 63
 Munro, Sir Thomas, 96

 Natal, 64
 Nauru, 54
 Negroes, 70, 74, 130, 144
 Netherlands, *vii*, 6, 9, 14, 21, 26,
 34-8, 42-4, 47, 52, 55, 60,
 106-15, 160
 New Caledonia, 32
 Newfoundland, 7, 117, 140
 New Guinea, 8, 40, 59, 63
 — Hebrides, 155
 — Mexico, 127
 — York, 27
 — Zealand, 6, 8, 54, 59, 100,
 130
 Nigeria, 8, 22, 32, 37, 44, 54,
 63, 121, 124, 145
 Norway, 6, 7, 100
 Nyasaland, 22

 Obok, 32
 Officials, 43-5, 101, 107, 113,
 119
 Open Door, 48, 53, 56-7
 Ottawa Conference, 53
 Outer Mongolia, 132, 142

 Pacific Islands, 10, 30, 32, 43,
 47, 65, 128, 148
 Palestine, 15, 118, 128
 Panama Canal, 128, 130
 Partnership, 161-2
 Passes, 88, 94
 Pearl Harbour, 130
 Peasant, society, 90, 104, 108,
 113, 122, 146-9, 159
 Persia, 15
 Philippines, 14, 36, 44, 63, 70,
 127-31, 139-42, 150
 Pittsburg, 27
 Plantations, 83-8, 107, 113,
 122, 145-8, 159
 Plunkett, Sir Horace, 147
 Plural society, 71-95, 109,
 138, 141, 149-53
 Poland, 39, 61
 Population, 6-9, 50-1, 69-71,
 88-9, 110, 160
 Portugal, 2, 6-11, 22-6, 29,
 32, 34, 38, 41, 56, 99, 160
 Preferences, 51-61, 116
 Press, 78
 Products, colonial, 22, 37-8,
 41-2, 52-4, 67-70, 83-6,
 107-9, 113, 122-3, 129, 135,
 145
 Puerto Rico, 128-30, 140

 Queensland, 40
 Quotas, 52-3

 Raffles, Sir Stamford, 110
 Regencies, 112

- Regional Councils, 157-60
 Representative institutions,
 12, 91, 102, 111-12, 116-21,
 127, 132, 150-3
 Restriction schemes, 52
 Réunion, 101
 Rhodesia, Northern, 41, 121,
 159
 —, Southern, 7, 41, 69, 159-
 60
 Ruanda-Urundi, 56, 61, 107
 Russia, *see* U.S.S.R.

 Saar, 150
 St Helena, 128
 St Lucia, 32
 Samoa, 8, 32, 128
 Sastri, Srinivasa, 75
 Secondary industries, 20, 84-6,
 114, 122
 Segregation, 110
 Self-government, 11-13, 16,
 19-21, 90-5, 102, 111-12,
 116-18, 127, 140, 149-53
 Senegal, 67, 81, 101
 Shanghai, 155
 Shipping, 54-61, 97, 109
 Siam, 2, 43
 Sierra Leone, 27, 124
 Simonstown, 128
 — Agreement, 142
 Singapore, 32
 Slavery, 21, 27, 29, 87, 98, 116
 Smuts, General J. C., 126,
 158-60
 Social services, 20, 90, 104,
 108, 114, 123-5, 130, 133-4
 Somaliland, 64
 Sourabaya, 10
 Spain, 2, 6-11, 24-5, 37-8, 56,
 70, 99
 Spitzbergen, 7
 Stalin, Joseph, 132

 Sudan, 62, 119, 122, 155
 Sumatra, 42, 113
 Suva, 124
 Sydney, 27
 Synthetic materials, 22, 52
 Syria, 15, 70, 102, 140, 142

 Tahiti, 32, 78
 Tanganyika, 40-1
 Tangier, 155
 Taxation, 88, 92, 102, 114,
 119, 122-3
 Territories, S.A. High Com-
 mission, 119-22
 —, United States, *viii*, 8, 59,
 60, 126-31, 139
 Timor, 32
 Tonga, 78, 130
 Trade, colonial, 37-8, 47,
 50-61, 83-4, 99, 109, 113,
 116, 125, 129-30
 — Unions, 86, 94
 Travail éducatif, 87, 104, 108,
 123
 Treaties, Congo Basin, 54, 56,
 59
 —, mutual defence, 15, 102,
 117, 128-32, 142
 Tribal system, *viii*, 3, 10, 19,
 30-1, 40, 73, 78, 83, 86-9,
 93, 98, 102-7, 122, 144-8,
 151-3
 Trincomalee, 32
 Trinidad, 26, 71, 118, 122,
 141
 Trusteeship, 9, 53, 96-100,
 160-2
 Tunisia, 15, 33, 57, 102
 Turkey, 14

 Uganda, 122, 124
 Ukraine, 134
 U.N.R.R.A., 156

- United States, *iii*, 2, 6-14,
 17-20, 26, 30-5, 39, 43-4,
 48-9, 54, 59, 60, 74, 76,
 97, 116, 126-31, 139, 142,
 160
 U.S.S.R., *iii*, 6-10, 13, 17, 20,
 48, 50, 59, 97, 99, 131-5,
 140, 142, 152
 Utah, 127

 Vernaculars, 78, 81-2, 104,
 114, 124, 134
 Virginia, 116

 Virgin Islands, 128, 130
 Vladivostok, 10

 Wahabi, 15
 West Indies, 6, 10, 16, 20, 26,
 29, 32, 36, 40, 46, 57, 65-6,
 69, 70, 74, 88, 109, 115,
 117, 121, 125, 128, 131, 143,
 148, 151-2
 Wilhelmina, Queen, 115
 Willkie, Wendell L., 17, 126
 Windward Islands, 71
 Winnipeg, 27

everybody left the theatre owing to a rumour that gladiators were to be on view elsewhere. After the death of Terence the only forms of the drama which were popular at Rome were the Mimes and Atellane plays, the latter farces which were liked because the audience could read into them satirical allusions to high-placed persons. Caligula burned an author alive in the arena who had made a joke in one of these farces which could be construed as a hit at himself, Jupiter's own brother. The query of Augustus on his death-bed when he asked his friends if he had played the "mime" of life (not the "comedy") to their satisfaction shows how sketches from everyday life, seasoned with coarse immorality and wisdom in tabloid form, retained their popularity. The tragedies of Seneca (born about the beginning of the Christian era) were closet dramas and, furthermore, plays with a moral purpose. It is impossible to believe that a Roman audience could have tolerated his declamation and psychological hair-splittings, which take the place of action and emotion. But the popular taste would not have been offended—rather it would have been intensely gratified—by such un-Greek horrors as the sight of Theseus in the "Phædra" piecing together the fragments of his son's mangled body, or the terrific outbursts of ranting which occur at a crisis. Now and again Seneca hits upon a good piece of

business as when, in his "Troades," Ulysses comes to fetch Hector's son, Astyanax, for execution, and Andromache, who has hidden the child in his father's tomb, can truthfully assert that he is with the dead, gone from the light of day. Ulysses, rejoicing that the possible avenger of Troy is no more, hurries off in delight, then stops and remembers that he has only a parent's word for the fact. Observing the Queen closely, he suspects it is fear, not grief, that afflicts her; and with his traditional cunning, says that she is happy in that her son has escaped the terrible death designed for him, to be flung from the last tower of Troy left standing. Andromache cannot repress a start, a word of horror. So by degrees he picks up the scent, as it were, and eventually sets his men to pull down Hector's tomb, where-upon the poor mother, afraid that her child will be crushed in the ruin of the massive monument, reveals his hiding-place. All this was hugely admired by Seneca's many modern imitators. Indeed his tragedies have had a tremendous influence, not only with our Elizabethan dramatists, but also with Corneille, Racine and even Alfieri. There seems to be no possible doubt, if literary style be a sufficient criticism, that these tragedies were the work of the philosopher and statesman who was entrusted by Agrippina with the education of Nero, shared the administration of the Empire with Burrus, the Captain of

the Guard, and so laid the foundation of his colossal fortune and in the end received from his terrible pupil the order to commit suicide, which he obeyed with courage and dignity. His so-called "Dialogues," which are written in the vocabulary of ordinary cultured conversation, are so full of epigrams that Montaigne complained they made it difficult to read much of them at a sitting. But these epigrams are evolved naturally, are not forced.—"If Seneca sparkles," said Diderot, "it is as the diamond sparkles or the star, because it is his nature." Even when Ciceronianism became the overruling fashion, writers of all nations drew liberally upon the great store-house of Senecan wit and wisdom, and his influence as a sort of universal-provider of moral reflections and aphorisms reached its climax in England during the first half of the eighteenth century. Pope's "Essay on Man" is Senecan through and through, both in manner and matter.

III

Cicero, however, is by far the greatest and most influential of Roman prose-writers. The Roman historians, with whom I have dealt in a previous chapter, cannot compare with him, jointly or severally, as a formative factor in the literature of the world. Indeed he was in prose what Virgil was in poetry—a bridge leaping in a

single unbroken span from the ancient to the modern world. Not only the customary prose of the Roman Empire, but also that of St. Jerome and St. Augustine, of the mediæval Church, and of the earlier and later Renaissance was Ciceronian. Even to-day the Sixth-form boy or the writer of a Latin epitaph tries to use Cicero's vocabulary in the way Cicero used it. Cicero was not a great original thinker, but he devised a supple and sumptuous prose, a really wonderfully complete instrument of expression, which also propagates an atmosphere of *humanitas*, as a flower its perfume, and so fosters and ennobles the sense of Græco-Roman culture. Time was when Cicero's reputation tyrannised over the minds of the Renaissance—when he was regarded as the equal of the great Greek philosophers in ethics and metaphysics and the peer in oratory of Demosthenes. In later centuries his copiousness came to be distrusted; he was sneered at as a "mere journalist," as one who substituted phrase-making for thinking and feeling. To-day we admit, while insisting that Cicero was neither a philosopher nor a statesman of the first rank, that Ciceronianism has always been one of the vital forces of world-culture.

As a forensic orator he has never been surpassed. His speeches as chief counsel for the prosecution of Verres for maladministration in the government of Sicily were never excelled,

even by himself, in richness of style, ease and lucidity, and the power of making effective use of vast masses of evidence. This prosecution was political, an attack on the Sullan constitution, and Cicero's conspicuous success made him the chief orator in the Pompeian party. His defence of Aulus Cluentius Habitus on a charge of poisoning, which is a dazzling flash-light on the social life of Rome and the provincial towns, and the "Pro Archia" uttered in defence of a Greek man of letters, who was a member of his literary circle and a personal friend, are noble examples of Ciceronian eloquence, permanent treasures of Latin literature. In all such orations Cicero is addressing not only the forum, but the whole civilised world, for he has the gift of lifting a case and a cause above the plane of judicial problems and exhibiting it as a lesson for humanity in the strength and weakness of human nature. His later speeches, including his fourteen "Philippics" against Antonius, are not quite so splendid in their sonorous actuality, for his personality was becoming more and more engrossed in those philosophic masterpieces, of which the "De Oratore" and the delightful "De Senectute" and "De Amicitia" (quarries for all the essayists and makers of imaginary dialogues that have ever lived) are among the most finished examples.

It is in such minor works as the "Somnium Scipionis" that we hear most clearly the organ

music of the Ciceronian style in its noblest form, the solemn cadences of which have passed into the Vulgate and the liturgy of the Church of Rome. His poems, which may have revealed him as the Kipling of his age, building stately fugues on such resounding phrases as *Fortuna Populi Romani* (Dr. J. W. Mackail poetically compares them to a bourdon stop in the oration "Pro Lege Manilia"), have unfortunately been lost. His letters, happily, are extant, and in the collection preserved and edited by his secretary, Tiro, the "Epistolæ ad Familiares," a large number of those addressed to him by various compatriots are to be read. As a letter-writer Cicero has a vivid, easy, even slipshod style in which the gossip of his times is colloquially presented—indeed, as we read we seem to be listening to the after-dinner talk of the social personages of the Rome he knew and loved so well.

Latin literature is none too rich in these revelations of social life. In later ages than Cicero's, however, Petronius Arbiter—in all probability the same person who was Nero's *arbiter elegantiarum* or master of the ceremonies—gave us a humorous character-sketch of the newly-rich Trimalchio, and Apuleius opened for a moment the gates of the gloomy *ergastula* or labour-houses in which the toilers of the Imperial world-State dragged out their joyless existence. These two writers were the pioneers of the picaresque

novel, to whom Cervantes and other modern masters owe a great deal.

IV

Ennius was the first of the great Roman poets, and the most Roman of them all. He was a busy writer, perhaps the first professional man of letters in the Western world, and until his death at the age of seventy he was hard at work producing treatises on all sorts of literary subjects. But his fame rests on his tragedies (often quoted by Cicero, who greatly admired his work), and the epic "*Annales*" in which he related the history of the Roman power from the fabulous arrival of Æneas in Latium down to his own days. He adapted the hexameter to his purpose, which was to glorify the proud virtue and the very narrow, but very strong, character of the makers of the Republic. There are such a rugged force and truthfulness in the few hundred lines of the "*Annales*" which have come down to us, and such a broad and unfaltering sagacity, that we are not surprised that he was for a whole century (until the appearance of Virgil's epic, in fact) regarded as almost the Homer of the Roman race. Such weighty and memorable lines as—

"*Quem nemo ferro potuit superare nec auro*"

and the fine simile of that judicious critic, Quintilian, who likens his epic to a holy grove of aged oaks, filling the observer's soul with solemn awe rather than with the delight inspired by sheer beauty, cause us to look upon the loss of his works as one of the great literary catastrophes.

A still greater poet, ranked by some of the Augustan critics above Virgil, nearly met a similar fate. All the manuscripts of the amazing "De Rerum Natura" of Lucretius (born 94 B.C.) are copies of a single original, and if that had perished, we should have known nothing of one of the greatest poets and philosophers of antiquity, so few are the allusions to the man and his work in Latin literature. Both as literary achievement and as scientific prophecy the work of Lucretius is unique; he might be compared with Milton, not only for his powerful technique and lofty moral, but also for his aloofness from the literary movements of his day, the chief of which originated in the Alexandrian clearing-house of ideas. Homer and Euripides are the only poets Lucretius mentions; truth, not beauty, was the object of his high quest, but though he never faltered in his long journeyings to seek the ultimate secrets of the universe he finds all manner of beautiful and poignant things by the wayside. The Lucretian hexameter is a simpler and mightier thing than Virgil's; it has the mass and momentum of things and actions and is a

development of the Ennian line, having more variety yet no less power. His Latin, moreover, is the pure and perfect idiom, owing nothing to alien sources, such as is found nowhere else save in the *pura et illustris brevis* of Cæsar at his best.

Epicureanism was a religion, not merely a philosophy, with Lucretius, and his great purpose was to cure mankind of that fear of death, and of what might follow it, which makes human life so anxious and despicable. To the true Epicurean death was not to be feared at all, for longing does not survive it and nothing whatsoever happens after it. It is a perfect and everlasting Nirvana, an eternal sleep with never a dream. But it is his vivid anticipations of the scientific discoveries of to-day—the constitution of the atom, the nature of light, the beginnings of human society as seen by the imagination—which most amaze the modern world and have given him a place in the hierarchy of creative thinkers who can transcend the horizons of their age and their ego.

We wonder at Lucretius, but we love Virgil, who can wring our hearts, as he wrung the hearts of Rome, with the sense of tears—the “tears of things” in the most magical of all his lines—

“Sunt lacrimæ rerum et mentem mortalia tangunt”—

behind all the sustained splendours of his golden verse. There are times when we think of him, as we think of Sophocles or of our own Tennyson,

as greater in his artistry than in his love of the truth whereof beauty, at least the lesser beauty, is but a fleeting shadow. Now and again we are conscious of a fastidiousness which gilds that which is golden. We know him to have been the most fastidious of master-poets. On his death-bed he besought that the "*Æneid*" might be destroyed, on the score that it required three years of further work to perfect it. The Emperor's command (which alone should wash away all his faults in the world's undying gratitude) prevented this wish from being carried out. It is dreadful to think what mankind would have lost if this day-spring of all romanticism had remained unknown to the sequent ages. Virgil is the Roman Homer—for the old foolish idea that the "*Iliad*" and the "*Odyssey*" are "natural" epics, whereas the "*Æneid*" is "artificial," has long been confuted by the new knowledge of history which shows the Homeric age as a late term in a long series of steps towards a civilisation complete in itself. Homer is as consciously artistic as Virgil; more so, perhaps, in his characterisation and in his management of episodes. But there is nothing so modern in the Homeric poems as the wonderful portrait of Dido, which may have been suggested by the Medea of Apollonius—if he stole, Virgil knew what to do with the stealings, which is a mark of the triumphant artist in every age. It is the sad earnestness, the

secret compassion of Virgil which made him the chief poet of the Middle Ages, being in the eyes of Christians a soul that was by nature Christian, and caused him to be Dante's guide through a more dreadful underworld than that of the greatest book of his "*Æneid*."

Horace is the man of the world in poetry; in his work we are conscious of the *curiosa felicitas* ("careful happiness"—the blest inevitableness that comes of taking infinite pains), yet cannot understand why he is the most popular of Latin poets. He is half-way between Herrick and Pope, both of whom lacked inspiration: without the flower-like freshness of the former or the Senecan sententiousness of the latter. Gautier is perhaps the nearest parallel to him in modern literature; like Horace, he gave us carven gems and his conviction that "the work emerges more beautiful" if the medium be hard to handle, the least slip being fatal, would have been shared by the Roman master-craftsman. The art of Horace is nearer akin, surely, to sculpture than to music. And the quality of urbanity, which almost makes a gentleman of this world a man for the next, is manifest in him in its ripe perfection. Neither God nor the Good Devil, one feels, could ever be angry with Horace, and he for his part would never lose his temper, much less his temperament. Where Virgil, his contemporary, is august, Horace remains impeccably, irresistibly Augustan.

Yet 'if the "lyric cry"—the word that is a pang—be vital to lyrical poetry, then Horace was not of the order of singers in which we read the names of Sappho, of Burns, of Shelley, of Heine, and of how few others! Catullus, however, is surely of that blest-unblest company. In all literature there is nothing to surpass in fire and tears, in the passion that is as much loathing as loving, the lyrics which Catullus addressed to his Lady of Lesbos, the absolute mistress of his heart, yes, and his brain. She was one of those *grandes amoureuses*, no doubt, about whose graves since they can make poets and men of action out of mere clogs of flesh, they are in their way benefactors to the human race. Clodia, for such was the real name of the Lesbia of these intolerable love-poems, these insatiable songs of hate, was a Claudian by birth and the wife of Cecilius Metellus, so that she was by birth and marriage linked to the proudest of aristocratic families. Cicero in a petulant moment (perhaps she had patronised that vain and loquacious "plebeian" a little) sneers at her great blazing eyes, and the chroniclers do not forget to tell us that she was seven years older than Catullus, as if that mattered at all. The woman amorist is never older or younger than her vocation. The lyrics of Catullus are a fugue of piercing music on the famous lines:—

"Odi et amo : quare id faciam fortasse requiris;
Nescio, sed fieri sentio et excrucior."

(I hate and love : you ask how that can be ;
I know not, but 'tis agony to me.)

The first rapture turning all fleshly things into a white leaping flame, passes away ; but the desire of the flesh abides and the enthrallment. Wrongs only cause the fire to blaze up afresh ; there are raptures and reconciliations ; yet his hatred for this Circe-like enchantress waxes continually. Perhaps, if there had been no Clodia for him, he would have been as great a lyric poet in a happier mode, for his "Ode to Diana," short as it is, is a masterpiece, and his Epithalamium for Mallius and Vinia is full of future chimes and has a richness of imagery which challenges the Song of Solomon or the Ode of Sappho I have commented on in a previous chapter. Yet it had been a loss to the world for all time if we had missed his story of a grand passion which begins with love's defiance of age and wisdom, out-kisses the number of sands and stars, and ends in such rancour and repining that the last farewell is a gross insult by proxy—and little the lady cared about it, having taken in her toils another brilliant and erratic young aristocrat.

There is a fading, a falling off, as we cross over into the age of "Silver Latin," of the autocrat of taste, of language with "point," of the salons and of the declamations. Pope presided over a similar age in the history of English literature.

Yet in the master-versifiers of this age—Martial, Juvenal, Lucan—we have writers who have never ceased to be cunningly imitated by the moderns. It is society, not humanity, with which they are mainly concerned. Martial with his 1,200 epigrams “seasoned with true Roman wit,” as he himself boasts (and indeed he owes little to the Greeks, whose conception of the epigram was very different) holds his distorting mirror up to all the possible and impossible types of social bipeds that infest a great city. These very types are always with us, and there is not one of Martial’s successful epigrams, having a sting that stung, which has not been imitated again and again in modern times. Juvenal, the professional satirist, has many faults; worst of all, he did not, he dared not, attack the living. But his fierce indignation (*sæva indignatio*), which is only surpassed by Swift’s, carries them all off in a flood of passionate eloquence. He has left us a cinematograph of the every-day life of Imperial Rome, and some of his oft-quoted lines are effectual even in English, when the force of his almost Lucretian hexameter is lost. Lucan, who took part in the Piso conspiracy against Nero and committed suicide at the age of twenty-six, wrote a modern epic, the “Pharsalia,” which has, I think, been most unfairly belittled. It may be that the personages of the drama—Cæsar, Pompey, and Cato, who is the hero—are lay-figures, and that the fierce republicanism of the

author is a sham, since it goes with abject flattery of the reigning Emperor. But it is a wonderful achievement for a mere boy, and some of its great lines, such as—

“ Nil actum credens dum quid superesset agendum ”
written of Julius Cæsar, and

“ Victrix causa deis placuit, sed victa Catoni ”—
are trumpet-clangs, which ring out across the ages, and the whole vast poem sustains its lofty note and stir of action in a marvellous fashion. What would Lucan have done had he lived long enough for so great a gift to ripen?

* * * * *

These are but a few of the Latin authors who have a message for us even to-day. As time goes on, and the tides of life in the great Empire slacken, the primal inspiration of Latin literature fails—but the Latin remains! There was not a day before the dreadful day when the city was taken and sacked by Alaric's army of Goths and Huns at which there existed no Latin poet or prose-writer who is not still worthy of close study. And now and again, as in the “ *Per-vigilium Veneris* ” with its haunting refrain—

“ *Cras amet qui nunquam amavit quique amavit cras amet* ”—

we have dulcet-clear anticipatory echoes of the songs that were to be sung in Provençal vineyards or in English meadows a thousand years later.

A Brief Bibliography

THOSE who wish to fill out the outline given in this little book should, in the first place, procure "The Claim of Antiquity" (Oxford Univ. Press, 1s. net), which contains a complete list of the best translations of Greek and Latin authors and books on the classics suitable for the general reader. The chief series of inexpensive translations are (1) Oxford Library of Translations (Oxford Univ. Press), (2) Everyman Library (J. M. Dent), and (3) World's Classics (Oxford Univ. Press). The Loeb Classical Library (Heinemann), which prints the Latin or Greek text with the translation opposite it, can be recommended to those who have the courage to try to read the originals. The reading of good translations, verse as well as prose, should be made the basis of all further study. The student should at the same time read "The Legacy of the Ancient World" (Macdonald and Evans), by W. G. de Burgh, M.A., Professor of Philosophy in University College, Reading, which is the only continuous and complete history in our language of the Jewish, Greek and Roman cultures, their complex relationships and their influence on mediæval and modern civilisation. The "Bibliographical Index" to this invaluable work will be most helpful to the more advanced student.

The following works can also be warmly recommended :—

- (1) "The Legacy of Greece." A collection of Essays on the chief aspects of Greek culture by a number of leading authorities. Edited by R. W. Livingstone. Oxford Univ. Press.
- (2) "The Pageant of Greece." A selection of translated excerpts from the great Greek writers suitably introduced and interpreted. Edited by R. W. Livingstone. Oxford Univ. Press.
- (3) "Ancient Greek Literature." By Gilbert Murray. Heinemann.

- (4) "Greece." By C. A. Fyffe. Macmillan. Though out of date for prehistoric Greece, as a result of the Cretan discoveries and for other reasons, this little primer is a masterly survey of Greek history and still the best introduction to the study thereof.
- (5) "Ancient Times." By J. H. Breasted. Ginn and Co.
- (6) "Science and Mathematics in Classical Antiquity." By J. L. Heilberg. Oxford Univ. Press.
- (7) "The Legacy of Rome." Essays on the various aspects of Roman civilisation by a number of high authorities. Edited by Cyril Bailey. With an Introduction by the Right Hon. H. H. Asquith. Oxford Univ. Press. As reliable, if not as readable, as "The Legacy of Greece."
- (8) "Latin Literature." By J. W. Mackail. Murray.
- (9) "The Silver Age of Latin Literature." By Professor W. C. Summers. Methuen.
- (10) "The Roman Empire." By H. Stuart Jones. (Story of the Nations.)

For the history of Greece and Rome, the ancient historians should be read (with a note-book) in good translations *pari passu* with modern writers, of whom a wide choice will be found in almost any free library. Gibbon's "Decline and Fall" is indispensable; it should be read in the edition with notes by Professor J. B. Bury, whose "History of Greece" is the best modern text-book on its subject. Mommsen's "History of Rome" is the most sympathetic history of its kind. The works of Zeller and Burnet on Greek philosophy, of Haig on the Attic Theatre, of Warde Fowler and Dill on Social Life at Rome, and of Maine on Ancient Law should be studied, and Bryce's "Holy Roman Empire" is indispensable for an understanding of the persistence of the Roman tradition through the Middle Ages.